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## Debt Ceiling

#### Congress will raise the debt ceiling now -

Taylor 9/12/13 (Andrew, Associated Press, GOP Leaders Confounded on Stopgap Spending Bill")

The speaker met Wednesday with Treasury Secretary [Jacob Lew](http://www.ctpost.com/?controllerName=search&action=search&channel=news%2Fpolitics&search=1&inlineLink=1&query=%22Jacob+Lew%22) — an adversary from the 2011 budget and debt negotiations — and presented him with a list of examples in which debt ceiling legislation has been paired with budget cuts. Such examples including budget pacts in 2011, 1997 and 1990.¶ "For decades the White House, the [Congress](http://www.ctpost.com/?controllerName=search&action=search&channel=news%2Fpolitics&search=1&inlineLink=1&query=%22Congress%22) have used the debt limit to find bipartisan solutions on the deficit and the debt. Now these types of changes were signed into law by Presidents Reagan, Bush, Clinton — and President Obama himself two years ago," Boehner said. The administration says is won't negotiate on the debt limit after Republicans used it in 2011 to demand spending cuts.¶ On numerous other occasions, including seven instances during the administration of [George W. Bush](http://www.ctpost.com/?controllerName=search&action=search&channel=news%2Fpolitics&search=1&inlineLink=1&query=%22George+W.+Bush%22), Republicans have delivered support for debt ceiling increases without any spending cuts attached. That's what the administration and Democrats are demanding now, and they're confident that Republicans have less leverage than they think.¶ "If push comes to shove on debt ceiling, I'm virtually certain they blink," Sen. [Chuck Schumer](http://www.ctpost.com/?controllerName=search&action=search&channel=news%2Fpolitics&search=1&inlineLink=1&query=%22Chuck+Schumer%22), D-N.Y., said. "They know they shouldn't be playing havoc with the markets."

#### Perception of external restraint destroys political capital and makes him looked weak

Paterno 6/23/2013 (Scott, Writer for Rock the Capital, “Selfish Obama” http://www.rockthecapital.com/06/23/selfish-obama/)

Now we have a Democratic president who wants to make war and does not want to abide by the War Powers Resolution. But rather than truly test the constitutionality of the measure, he is choosing to simply claim that THIS use of US military power is not applicable.¶ This is an extraordinarily selfish act, and one liberals especially should fear. POTUS is setting a precedent that subsequent presidents will be able to use – presidents that the left might not find so “enlightened.” Left as is, President Obama has set a standard where the president can essentially attack anywhere he wants without congressional approval for as long as he wants so long as he does not commit ground forces.¶ That is an extraordinarily selfish act. Why selfish? Because the president is avoiding congress because he fears a rebuke – from his own party, no less. The politically safe way to both claim to be decisive and to not face political defeat at the hands of Democrats – a defeat that would signal White House weakness – is to avoid congress all together. Precedent be damned, there is an election to win after all.

#### Political capital is necessary – the budget is the litmus test for Obama

Wolf 9/12/13 (Z. Byron, "Analysis: Is Obama A Winner or Loser on Syria")

The president just seems to be very uncomfortable with being commander in chief of this nation," Corker said, although he added that he hopes the new diplomatic track pans out.¶ "He just can't follow through," said Corker, who was clearly frustrated that the president hadn't made a stronger argument to the nation that when an American president draws a red line, no country should be able to cross it without repercussions.¶ Obama will need senators like Corker to work with him now that Syria has been paused on Capitol Hill. Given Americans' continued focus on the economy, this president may be judged more for how he handles the looming two-headed fiscal dragon of government funding and debt ceiling authority.¶ Those issues will fester over the next two weeks until government funding runs out October 1 and the debt limit is reached [as soon as October 18](http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/10/news/economy/debt-ceiling-bills-coming-due/index.html).¶ On those matters, he's not going to get any help from Putin. He must figure out how to work with Congress.

#### Failure to raise the debt ceiling has economic ripple effects – investor uncertainty

Masters 13 (Jonathan, Deputy Editor at the Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder, jan 2 2013"US Debt Ceiling. Costs and Consequences")

Most economists, including those in the White House and from former administrations, agree that the impact of an outright government default would be severe. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has said a U.S. default could be a ["recovery-ending event"](http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/03/01/bernanke-warns-on-debt-limit-chaos/) that would likely spark another financial crisis. Short of default, officials warn that legislative delays in raising the debt ceiling could also inflict significant harm on the economy.¶ Many analysts say congressional gridlock over the debt limit will likely sow significant uncertainty in the bond markets and place upward pressure on interest rates. Rate increases would not only hike future borrowing costs of the federal government, but would also raise capital costs for struggling U.S. businesses and cash-strapped homebuyers. In addition, rising rates could divert future taxpayer money away from much-needed federal investments in such areas as infrastructure, education, and health care.¶ The protracted and politically acrimonious debt limit showdown in the summer 2011 prompted Standard and Poor's to take the unprecedented step of downgrading the U.S. credit rating from its triple-A status, and analysts fear such brinksmanship in early 2013 could bring about similar moves from other rating agencies.¶ A 2012 study by the non-partisan Government Accountability Office estimated that [delays in raising the debt ceiling](http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-701) in 2011 cost taxpayers approximately $1.3 billion for FY 2011. BPC estimated the ten-year costs of the prolonged fight at roughly $19 billion.¶ The stock market also was thrown into frenzy in the lead-up to and aftermath of the 2011 debt limit debate, with the [Dow Jones Industrial Average](http://www.bizjournals.com/nashville/news/2011/08/08/slideshow-dows-10-worst-days-ever.html) plunging roughly 2,000 points from the final days of July through the first days of August. Indeed, the Dow recorded one of its worst single-day drops in history on August 8, the day after the S&P downgrade, tumbling 635 points.¶ Speaking to the [Economic Club of New York](http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/20/idUSW1E8KA00A20121120) in November 2012, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke warned that congressional inaction with regard to the fiscal cliff, the raising of the debt ceiling, and the longer-term budget situation was creating uncertainty that "appears already to be affecting private spending and investment decisions and may be contributing to an increased sense of caution in financial markets, with adverse effects on the economy."

#### Furthermore, Economic collapse kills millions and sparks great power wars

Duncan ’12 (Richard Duncan, Former IMF consultant, Financial sector specialist for the World Bank, Chief Economist Blackhorse Asset Management, The New Depression: The Breakdown of the Paper Money Economy, Page 12, Ebooks, 2012)

The political battle over America’s future would be bitter, and quite possibly bloody. It cannot be guaranteed that the U.S. Constitution would survive. Foreign affairs would also confront the United States with enormous challenges. During the Great Depression, the United States did not have a global empire. Now it does. The United States maintains hundreds of military bases across dozens of countries around the world. Added to this is a fleet of 11 aircraft carriers and 18 nuclear-armed submarines. The countryspends more than $650 billion a year on its military. If the U.S. economy collapsesinto a New Great Depression,the United States could not afford to maintain its worldwide military presence or to continue in its role as global peacekeeper.Or, at least, it could not finance its military in the same way it does at present. Therefore, either the United States would have to find an alternative funding method for its global military presence or else it would have to radically scale it back. Historically, empires were financed with plunder and territorial expropriation. The estates of the vanquished ruling classes were given to the conquering generals, while the rest of the population was forced to pay imperial taxes. The U.S. model of empire has been unique. It has financed its global military presence by issuing government debt, thereby taxing future generations of Americans to pay for this generation’s global supremacy. That would no longer be possible if the economy collapsed. Cost–benefit analysis would quickly reveal that much of America’s global presence was simply no longer affordable. Many—or even most—of the outposts that did not pay for themselves would have to be abandoned. Priority would be given to those places that were of vital economic interests to the United States. The Middle East oil fields would be at the top of that list. The United States would have to maintain control over them whatever the price**.** In this global depression scenario, the price of oil could collapse to $3 per barrel**.** Oil consumption would fall by half and there would be no speculators left to manipulate prices higher. Oil at that level would impoverish the oil-producing nations, with extremely destabilizing political consequences**.** Maintaining control over the Middle East oil fields would become much more difficult for the United States. It would require a much larger military presence than it does now. On the one hand, it might become necessary for the United States to reinstate the draft (which would possibly meet with violent resistance from draftees, as it did during the Vietnam War). On the other hand, America’s all-volunteer army might find it had more than enough volunteers with the national unemployment rate in excess of 20 percent. The army might have to be employed to keep order at home, given that mass unemployment would inevitably lead to a sharp spike in crime. Only after the Middle East oil was secured would the country know how much more of its global military presence it could afford to maintain. If international trade had broken down, would there be any reason for the United States to keep a military presence in Asia when there was no obvious way to finance that presence?In a global depression, the United States’ allies in Asia would most likely be unwilling or unable to finance America’s military bases there or to pay for the upkeep of the U.S. Pacific fleet**.** Norwould the United States have the strength to force them to pay for U.S. protection**.** Retreat from Asia might become unavoidable. And Europe?What would a cost–benefit analysis conclude about the wisdom of the United States maintaining military bases there? What valued added does Europe provide to the United States? Necessity may mean Europe will have to defend itself**.** Should a New Great Depression put an end to the Pax Americana, the world would become a much more dangerous place**.** When the Great Depression began, Japan was the rising industrial power in Asia. It invaded Manchuria in 1931 and conquered much of the rest of Asia in the early 1940s. Would China, Asia’s new rising power, behave the same way in the event of a new global economic collapse? Possibly. China is the only nuclear power in Asia east of India (other than North Korea, which is largely a Chinese satellite state). However**,** in this disaster scenario, it is not certain that China would survive in its current configuration.Its economy would be in ruins. Most of its factories and banks would be closed. Unemployment could exceed 30 percent**.** There would most likely be starvation both in the cities and in the countryside. The Communist Party could lose its grip on power, in which case the country could break apart**,** as it has numerous times in the past. It was less than 100 years ago that China’s provinces, ruled by warlords, were at war with one another.United or divided, China’s nuclear arsenal would make it Asia’s undisputed superpower if the United States were to withdrawfrom the region. From Korea and Japan in the North to New Zealand in the South to Burma in the West,all of Asia would be at China’s mercy**.** And hunger among China’s population of 1.3 billion people could necessitate territorial expansion into Southeast Asia. In fact, the central government might not be able to prevent mass migration southward, even if it wanted to. In Europe, severe economic hardship would revive the centuries-old struggle between the left and the right**.** During the 1930s, the Fascists movement arose and imposed a police state on most of Western Europe. In the East, the Soviet Union had become a communist police state even earlier. The far right and the far left of the political spectrum converge in totalitarianism**.** It is difficult to judge whether Europe’s democratic institutions would hold up better this time that they did last time. England had an empire during the Great Depression. Now it only has banks. In a severe worldwide depression, the country—or, at least London—could become ungovernable. Frustration over poverty and a lack of jobs would erupt into anti-immigration riots not only in the United Kingdom but also across most of Europe. The extent to which Russia would menace its European neighbors is unclear. On the one hand,Russia would be impoverished by the collapse in oil prices and might be too preoccupied with internal unrest to threaten anyone. On the other hand, it could provoke a war with the goal of maintaining internal order through emergency wartime powers**.** Germany is very nearly demilitarized today when compared with the late 1930s. Lacking a nuclear deterrent of its own, it could be subject to Russian intimidation. While Germany could appeal for protection from England and France, who do have nuclear capabilities, it is uncertain that would buy Germany enough time to remilitarize before it became a victim of Eastern aggression. As for the rest of the world, its prospects in this disaster scenario can be summed up in only a couple of sentences. Global economic output could fall by as much as half, from $60 trillion to $30 trillion.Not all of the world’s seven billion people would survive in a $30 trillion global economy. Starvation would be widespread. Food riots would provoke political upheaval and myriad big and small conflicts around the world. It would be a humanitarian catastrophe so extreme as to be unimaginablefor the current generation, who, at least in the industrialized world, has known only prosperity**.** Nor would there be reason to hope that theNew GreatDepression would end quickly**.** The Great Depression was only ended by an even more calamitous global war that killed approximately 60 million people.

## T-Prohibit

#### **The affirmative does not prohibit the ability of the President to make a military decision in one of the following areas mentioned in the topic – it merely requires a process or disclosure for the President to go through before exercising his commander and chief power**

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation.

Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as;

A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.

In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment.

Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

#### C. Prefer our interpretation

#### Ground – the negative should be able to say Drone Strikes good– This is the core negative topic ground – they get to link turn our disad and claim advs by saying we still allow authority in one of the areas- makes the topic bidirectional

#### Limits – they justify any aff that does transparency or requires a process before implementing a particular war power – this allows them to apply any process to any particular subsection…

## Transparency CP

**The President of the United States should issue an executive order transferring lead executive authority for targeted killing outside zones of active hostilities from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Joint Special Operations Command. The President of the United States should disclose the results of targeted killings to Congress.**

**Transferring authority boosts transparency and intel without restricting strikes – solves the aff**

**Zenko 13**¸ Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow with the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Clip the Agency's Wings: Why Obama needs to take the drones away from the CIA,” April 16th, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/16/clip\_the\_agencys\_wings\_cia\_drones?utm\_source=feedly

Last month, Daniel Klaidman reported that three senior officials had told him that President Obama would gradually transfer targeted killings to the Pentagon during his second term. Other journalists report that this is not a certainty or that "it would most likely leave drone operations in Pakistan under the CIA," making any transition meaningless since over 80 percent of all U.S. targeted killings have occurred in Pakistan. But if Obama is serious about reforming targeted killing policies, as he has stated, then he needs to sign an executive order transferring lead executive authority for non-battlefield targeted killings from the CIA to the Defense Department. Doing this has three significant benefits for U.S. foreign policy. First, it would increase the transparency of targeted killings, including what methods are used to prevent civilian harm. Strikes by the CIA are classified as Title 50 "covert action," which under law are "activities of the United States Government...where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include traditional...military activities." CIA operations purportedly allow for deniability about the U.S. role, though this rationale no longer applies to the highly-publicized drone campaign in Pakistan, which Obama personally acknowledged in January 2012. Beyond adjectives in public speeches ("methodical," "deliberate," "not willy-nilly"), the government does not, and cannot, describe the procedures and rules for CIA targeted killings. JSOC operations in Somalia and Yemen, on the other hand, fall under the Title 10 "armed forces" section of U.S. law, which the White House reports as "direct action" to Congress. The United States has also acknowledged clandestine military operations to the United Nations "against al-Qaida terrorist targets in Somalia in response to on-going threats to the United States." Moreover, JSOC operations are guided by military doctrine, available to the public in Joint Publication 3-60 (JP 3-60): Joint Targeting. (While the complete 2007 edition can be found online, only the executive summary of the most-recent version, released on January 31, is available. If the Joint Staff's J-7 Directorate for Joint Force Development posted this updated edition in its entirety -- or fulfilled my FOIA request [case number 13-F-0514] -- that would be appreciated.) JP 3-60 matters because it details each step in the targeting cycle, including the fundamentals, processes, responsibilities, legal considerations, and methods to reduce civilian casualties. This degree of transparency is impossible for CIA covert actions. Second, it would focus the finite resources and bandwidth of the CIA on its primary responsibilities of intelligence collection, analysis, and early warning. Last year, the President's Intelligence Advisory Board -- a semi-independent executive branch body, the findings of which rarely leak -- reportedly told Obama that "U.S. spy agencies were paying inadequate attention to China, the Middle East and other national security flash points because they had become too focused on military operations and drone strikes." This is not a new charge, since every few years an independent group or congressional report determines that "the CIA has been ignoring its core mission activities." But, as Mark Mazzetti shows in his indispensable CIA history, the agency has evolved from an organization once deeply divided at senior levels about using armed drones, to one that is a fully functioning paramilitary army. As former senior CIA official Ross Newland warns, the agency's armed drones program "ends up hurting the CIA. This just is not an intelligence mission." There is no longer any justification for the CIA to have its own redundant fleet of 30 to 35 armed drones. During White House debates of CIA requests in 2009, Gen. James Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, repeatedly asked: "Can you tell me why we are building a second Air Force?" Obama eventually granted every single request made by then-Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta, adding: "The CIA gets what it wants." With this year's proposed National Intelligence Program budget scheduled to fall by 8 percent, an open checkbook for Langley is not sustainable or strategically wise.

## War Powers DA

#### Statutory restriction of Presidential War Powers makes warfighting impossible and internal link turns terror

**Yoo 12 – prof of law @ UC Berkeley**

**(John, War Powers Belong to the President, ABA Journal February 2012 Issue,** http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/war\_powers\_belong\_to\_the\_president) <we do not endorse the ableist language used in this card, but have left it in to preserve the author’s intent. we apologize for the author’s inappropriate use of the word “paralyze”>

The framers realized the obvious. Foreign affairs are unpredictable and involve the highest of stakes, making them unsuitable to regulation by pre-existing legislation. Instead, they can demand swift, decisive action—sometimes under pressured or even emergency circumstances—that is best carried out by a branch of government that does not suffer from multiple vetoes or is delayed by disagreements. Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. Our framers replaced the Articles of Confederation, which had failed in the management of foreign relations because they had no single executive, with the Constitution’s single president for precisely this reason. Even when it has access to the same intelligence as the executive branch, Congress’ loose, decentralized structure would paralyze American policy while foreign threats grow. Congress has no political incentive to mount and see through its own wartime policy. Members of Congress, who are interested in keeping their seats at the next election, do not want to take stands on controversial issues where the future is uncertain. They will avoid like the plague any vote that will anger large segments of the electorate. They prefer that the president take the political risks and be held accountable for failure. Congress’ track record when it has opposed presidential leadership has not been a happy one. Perhaps the most telling example was the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. Congress’ isolationist urge kept the United States out of Europe at a time when democracies fell and fascism grew in their place. Even as Europe and Asia plunged into war, Congress passed the Neutrality Acts designed to keep the United States out of the conflict. President Franklin Roosevelt violated those laws to help the Allies and draw the nation into war against the Axis. While pro-Congress critics worry about a president’s foreign adventurism, the real threat to our national security may come from inaction and isolationism. Many point to the Vietnam War as an example of the faults of the “imperial presidency.” Vietnam, however, could not have continued without the consistent support of Congress in raising a large military and paying for hostilities. And Vietnam ushered in a period of congressional dominance that witnessed American setbacks in the Cold War and the passage of the ineffectual War Powers Resolution. Congress passed the resolution in 1973 over President Richard Nixon’s veto, and no president, Republican or Democrat, George W. Bush or Obama, has ever accepted the constitutionality of its 60-day limit on the use of troops abroad. No federal court has ever upheld the resolution. Even Congress has never enforced it. Despite the record of practice and the Constitution’s institutional design, critics nevertheless argue for a radical remaking of the American way of war. They typically base their claim on Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to “declare war.” But these observers read the 18th century constitutional text through a modern lens by interpreting “declare war” to mean “start war.” When the Constitution was written, however, a declaration of war served diplomatic notice about a change in legal relations between nations. It had little to do with launching hostilities. In the century before the Constitution, for example, Great Britain—where the framers got the idea of the declare-war power—fought numerous major conflicts but declared war only once beforehand. Our Constitution sets out specific procedures for passing laws, appointing officers and making treaties. There are none for waging war because the framers expected the president and Congress to struggle over war through the national political process. In fact, other parts of the Constitution, properly read, support this reading. Article I, Section 10, for example, declares that the states shall not “engage” in war “without the consent of Congress” unless “actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.” This provision creates exactly the limits desired by anti-war critics, complete with an exception for self-defense. If the framers had wanted to require congressional permission before the president could wage war, they simply could have repeated this provision and applied it to the executive. Presidents, of course, do not have complete freedom to take the nation to war. Congress has ample powers to control presidential policy, if it wants to. Only Congress can raise the military, which gives it the power to block, delay or modify war plans. Before 1945, for example, the United States had such a small peacetime military that presidents who started a war would have to go hat in hand to Congress to build an army to fight it. Since World War II, it has been Congress that has authorized and funded our large standing military, one primarily designed to conduct offensive, not defensive, operations (as we learned all too tragically on 9/11) and to swiftly project power worldwide. If Congress wanted to discourage presidential initiative in war, it could build a smaller, less offensive-minded military. Congress’ check on the presidency lies not just in the long-term raising of the military. It can also block any immediate armed conflict through the power of the purse. If Congress feels it has been misled in authorizing war, or it disagrees with the president’s decisions, all it need do is cut off funds, either all at once or gradually. It can reduce the size of the military, shrink or eliminate units, or freeze supplies. Using the power of the purse does not even require affirmative congressional action. Congress can just sit on its hands and refuse to pass a law funding the latest presidential adventure, and the war will end quickly. Even the Kosovo war, which lasted little more than two months and involved no ground troops, required special funding legislation. The framers expected Congress’ power of the purse to serve as the primary check on presidential war. During the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention, Patrick Henry attacked the Constitution for failing to limit executive militarism. James Madison responded: “The sword is in the hands of the British king; the purse is in the hands of the Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist.” Congress ended America’s involvement in Vietnam by cutting off all funds for the war. Our Constitution has succeeded because it favors swift presidential action in war, later checked by Congress’ funding power. If a president continues to wage war without congressional authorization, as in Libya, Kosovo or Korea, it is only because Congress has chosen not to exercise its easy check. We should not confuse a desire to escape political responsibility for a defect in the Constitution. A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security. In order to forestall another 9/11 attack, or to take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations, the executive branch needs flexibility. It is not hard to think of situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act. Time for congressional deliberation, which leads only to passivity and isolation and not smarter decisions, will come at the price of speed and secrecy. The Constitution creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security. Presidents can take the initiative and Congress can use its funding power to check them. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the framers left war to politics. As we confront the new challenges of terrorism, rogue nations and WMD proliferation, now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes in the way we make war.

#### That would uniquely decimate Obama and the military’s ability to calm alliances and deter enemies ---- makes terrorism and global nuclear war more likely

WAXMAN 2013 - law professor at Columbia Law School, co-chairs the Roger Hertog Program on Law and National Security (Matthew Waxman, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War,” August 27, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2316777)

As a prescriptive matter, Part II also shows that examination of threatened force and the credibility requirements for its effectiveness calls into question many orthodoxies of the policy advantages and risks attendant to various allocations of legal war powers, including the existing one and proposed reforms.23 Most functional arguments about war powers focus on fighting wars or hostile engagements, but that is not all – or even predominantly – what the United States does with its military power. Much of the time it seeks to avert such clashes while achieving its foreign policy objectives: to bargain, coerce, deter.24 The President’s flexibility to use force in turn affects decision-making about threatening it, with major implications for securing peace or dragging the United States into conflicts. Moreover, constitutional war power allocations affect potential conflicts not only because they may constrain U.S. actions but because they may send signals and shape other states’ (including adversaries’) expectations of U.S. actions.25 That is, most analysis of war-powers law is inward-looking, focused on audiences internal to the U.S. government and polity, but thinking about threatened force prompts us to look outward, at how war-powers law affects external perceptions among adversaries and allies. Here, extant political science and strategic studies offer few clear conclusions, but they point the way toward more sophisticated and realistic policy assessment of legal doctrine and proposed reform. More generally, as explained in Part III, analysis of threatened force and war powers exposes an under-appreciated relationship between constitutional doctrine and grand strategy. Instead of proposing a functionally optimal allocation of legal powers, as legal scholars are often tempted to do, this Article in the end denies the tenability of any such claim. Having identified new spaces of war and peace powers that legal scholars need to take account of in understanding how those powers are really exercised, this Article also highlights the extent to which any normative account of the proper distribution of authority over this area depends on many matters that cannot be predicted in advance or expected to remain constant.26 Instead of proposing a policy-optimal solution, this Article concludes that the allocation of constitutional war powers is – and should be –geopolitically and strategically contingent; the actual and effective balance between presidential and congressional powers over war and peace in practice necessarily depends on fundamental assumptions and shifting policy choices about how best to secure U.S. interests against potential threats.27 I. Constitutional War Powers and Threats of Force Decisions to go to war or to send military forces into hostilities are immensely consequential, so it is no surprise that debates about constitutional war powers occupy so much space. But one of the most common and important ways that the United States uses its military power is by threatening war or force – and the constitutional dimensions of that activity receive almost no scrutiny or even theoretical investigation. A. War Powers Doctrine and Debates The Constitution grants Congress the powers to create military forces and to “declare war,”28 which the Supreme Court early on made clear includes the power to authorize limited uses of force short of full-blown war.29 The Constitution then vests the President with executive power and designates him commander in chief of the armed forces,30 and it has been well-accepted since the Founding that these powers include unilateral authority to repel invasions if the United States is attacked.31 Although there is nearly universal acceptance of these basic starting points, there is little legal agreement about how the Constitution allocates responsibility for the vast bulk of cases in which the United States has actually resorted to force. The United States has declared war or been invaded only a handful of times in its history, but it has used force – sometimes large-scale force – hundreds of other times.32 Views split over questions like when, if ever, the President may use force to deal with aggression against third parties and how much unilateral discretion the President has to use limited force short of full-blown war. For many lawyers and legal scholars, at least one important methodological tool for resolving such questions is to look at historical practice, and especially the extent to which the political branches acquiesced in common practices.33 Interpretation of that historical practice for constitutional purposes again divides legal scholars, but most would agree at least descriptively on some basic parts of that history. In particular, most scholars assess that from the Founding era through World War II, Presidents and Congresses alike recognized through their behavior and statements that except in certain narrow types of contingencies, congressional authorization was required for large-scale military operations against other states and international actors, even as many Presidents pushed and sometimes crossed those boundaries.34 Whatever constitutional constraints on presidential use of force existed prior to World War II, however, most scholars also note that the President asserted much more extensive unilateral powers to use force during and after the Cold War, and many trace the turning point to the 1950 Korean War.35 Congress did not declare war in that instance, nor did it expressly authorize U.S. participation.36 From that point forward, presidents have asserted broad unilateral authority to use force to address threats to U.S. interests, including threats to U.S. allies, and that neither Congress nor courts pushed back much against this expanding power.37 Concerns about expansive presidential war-making authority spiked during the Vietnam War. In the wind-down of that conflict, Congress passed – over President Nixon’s veto – the War Powers Resolution,38 which stated its purpose as to ensure the constitutional Founders’ original vision that the “collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.”39 Since then, presidentialists have argued that the President still retains expansive authority to use force abroad to protect American interests,40 and congressionalists argue that this authority is tightly circumscribed.41 These constitutional debates have continued through the first decade of the 21st century. Constitutional scholars split, for example, over President Obama’s power to participate in coalition operations against Libya without congressional authorization in 2011, especially after the War Powers Resolution’s 60-day clock expired.42 Some argue that President Obama’s use of military force without specific congressional authorization in that case reflects the broad constitutional discretion presidents now have to protect American interests, at least short of full-blown “war”, while others argue that it is the latest in a long record of presidential violations of the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution.43 B. Threats of Force and Constitutional Powers These days it is usually taken for granted that – whether or not he can make war unilaterally – the President is constitutionally empowered to threaten the use of force, implicitly or explicitly, through diplomatic means or shows of force. It is never seriously contested whether the President may declare that United States is contemplating military options in response to a crisis, or whether the President may move substantial U.S. military forces to a crisis region or engage in military exercises there. To take the Libya example just mentioned, is there any constitutional limitation on the President’s authority to move U.S. military forces to the Mediterranean region and prepare them very visibly to strike?44 Or his authority to issue an ultimatum to Libyan leaders that they cease their brutal conduct or else face military action? Would it matter whether such threats were explicit versus implicit, whether they were open and public versus secret, or whether they were just a bluff? If not a constitutional obstacle, could it be argued that the War Powers Resolution’s reporting requirements and limits on operations were triggered by a President’s mere ultimatum or threatening military demonstration, insofar as those moves might constitute a “situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances”? These questions simply are not asked (at least not anymore).45 If anything, most lawyers would probably conclude that the President’s constitutional powers to threaten war are not just expansive but largely beyond Congress’s authority to regulate directly. From a constitutional standpoint, to the extent it is considered at all, the President’s power to threaten force is probably regarded to be at least as broad as his power to use it. One way to look at it is that the power to threaten force is a lesser included element of presidential war powers; the power to threaten to use force is simply a secondary question, the answer to which is bounded by the primary issue of the scope of presidential power to actually use it. If one interprets the President’s defensive war powers very broadly, to include dealing with aggression not only directed against U.S. territories but also against third parties,46 then it might seem easy to conclude that the President can also therefore take steps that stop short of actual armed intervention to deter or prevent such aggression. If, however, one interprets the President’s powers narrowly, for example, to include only limited unilateral authority to repel attacks against U.S. territory,47 then one might expect objections to arguably excessive presidential power to include his unilateral threats of armed intervention. Another way of looking at it is that in many cases, threats of war or force might fall within even quite narrow interpretations of the President’s inherent foreign relations powers to conduct diplomacy or his express commander in chief power to control U.S. military forces – or some combination of the two – depending on how a particular threat is communicated. A President’s verbal warning, ultimatum, or declared intention to use military force, for instance, could be seen as merely exercising his role as the “sole organ” of U.S. foreign diplomacy, conveying externally information about U.S. capabilities and intentions.48 A president’s movement of U.S. troops or warships to a crisis region or elevation of their alert level could be seen as merely exercising his dayto- day tactical control over forces under his command.49 Generally it is not seriously contested whether the exercise of these powers alone could so affect the likelihood of hostilities or war as to intrude on Congress’s powers over war and peace.50 We know from historical examples that such unilateral military moves, even those that are ostensibly pure defensive ones, can provoke wars – take, for example, President Polk’s movement of U.S. forces to the contested border with Mexico in 1846, and the resulting skirmishes that led Congress to declare war.51 Coming at the issue from Congress’s Article I powers rather than the President’s Article II powers, the very phrasing of the power “To declare War” puts most naturally all the emphasis on the present tense of U.S. military action, rather than its potentiality. Even as congressionalists advance interpretations of the clause to include not merely declarative authority but primary decision-making authority as to whether or not to wage war or use force abroad, their modern-day interpretations do not include a power to threaten war (except perhaps through the specific act of declaring it). None seriously argues – at least not any more – that the Declare War Clause precludes presidential threats of war. This was not always the case. During the early period of the Republic, there was a powerful view that beyond outright initiation of armed hostilities or declaration of war, more broadly the President also could not unilaterally take actions (putting aside actual military attacks) that would likely or directly risk war,52 provoke a war with another state,53 or change the condition of affairs or relations with another state along the continuum from peace to war.54 To do so, it was often argued, would usurp Congress’s prerogative to control the nation’s state of peace or war.55 During the Quasi-War with France at the end of the 18th century, for example, some members of Congress questioned whether the President, absent congressional authorization, could take actions that visibly signaled an intention to retaliate against French maritime harassment,56 and even some members of President Adams’ cabinet shared doubts.57 Some questions over the President’s power to threaten force arose (eventually) in relation to the Monroe Doctrine, announced in an 1823 presidential address to Congress and which in effect declared to European powers that the United States would oppose any efforts to colonize or reassert control in the Western Hemisphere.58 “Virtually no one questioned [Monroe’s proclamation] at the time. Yet it posed a constitutional difficulty of the first importance.”59 Of course, Monroe did not actually initiate any military hostilities, but his implied threat – without congressional action – risked provoking rather than deterring European aggression and by putting U.S. prestige and credibility on the line it limited Congress’s practical freedom of action if European powers chose to intervene.60 The United States would have had at the time to rely on British naval power to make good on that tacit threat, though a more assertive role for the President in wielding the potential for war or intervention during this period went hand in hand with a more sustained projection of U.S. power beyond its borders, especially in dealing with dangers emanating from Spanish-held Florida territory.61 Monroe’s successor, John Quincy Adams, faced complaints from opposition members of Congress that Monroe’s proclamation had exceeded his constitutional authority and had usurped Congress’s by committing the United States – even in a non-binding way – to resisting European meddling in the hemisphere.62 The question whether the President could unilaterally send militarily-threatening signals was in some respects a mirror image of the issues raised soon after the Constitution was ratified during the 1793 Neutrality Controversy: could President Washington unilaterally declare the United States to be neutral as to the war among European powers. Washington’s politically controversial proclamation declaring the nation “friendly and impartial” in the conflict between France and Great Britain (along with other European states) famously prompted a back-and-forth contest of public letters by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, writing pseudonymously as “Pacificus” and “Helvidius”, about whether the President had such unilateral power or whether it belonged to Congress.63 Legal historian David Currie points out the irony that the neutrality proclamation was met with stronger and more immediate constitutional scrutiny and criticism than was Monroe’s threat. After all, Washington’s action accorded with the principle that only Congress, representing popular will, should be able to take the country from the baseline state of peace to war, whereas Monroe’s action seemed (at least superficially) to commit it to a war that Congress had not approved.64 Curiously (though for reasons offered below, perhaps not surprisingly) this issue – whether there are constitutional limits on the President’s power to threaten war – has almost vanished completely from legal discussion, and that evaporation occurred even before the dramatic post-war expansion in asserted presidential power to make war. Just prior to World War II, political scientist and presidential powers theorist Edward Corwin remarked that “[o]f course, it may be argued, and has in fact been argued many times, that the President is under constitutional obligation not to incur the risk of war in the prosecution of a diplomatic policy without first consulting Congress and getting its consent.”65 “Nevertheless,” he continued,66 “the supposed principle is clearly a maxim of policy rather than a generalization from consistent practice.” In his 1945 study World Policing and the Constitution, James Grafton Rogers noted: [E]xamples of demonstrations on land and sea made for a variety of purposes and under Presidents of varied temper and in different political climates will suffice to make the point. The Commander-in-Chief under the Constitution can display our military resources and threaten their use whenever he thinks best. The weakness in the diplomatic weapon is the possibility of dissidence at home which may cast doubt on our serious intent. The danger of the weapon is war.67 At least since then, however, the importance to U.S. foreign policy of threatened force has increased dramatically, while legal questions about it have receded further from discussion. In recent decades a few prominent legal scholars have addressed the President’s power to threaten force, though in only brief terms.

Taylor Reveley noted in his volume on war powers the importance of allocating constitutional responsibility not only for the actual use of force but also “[v]erbal or written threats or assurances about the circumstances in which the United States will take military action …, whether delivered by declarations of American policy, through formal agreements with foreign entities, by the demeanor or words of American officials, or by some other sign of national intent.”68 Beyond recognizing the critical importance of threats and other non-military actions in affecting war and peace, however, Reveley made little effort to address the issue in any detail. Among the few legal scholars attempting to define the limiting doctrinal contours of presidentially threatened force, Louis Henkin wrote in his monumental Foreign Affairs and the Constitution that: Unfortunately, the line between war and lesser uses of force is often elusive, sometimes illusory, and the use of force for foreign policy purposes can almost imperceptibly become a national commitment to war. Even when he does not use military force, the President can incite other nations or otherwise plunge or stumble this country into war, or force the hand of Congress to declare or to acquiesce and cooperate in war. As a matter of constitutional doctrine, however, one can declare with confidence that a President begins to exceed his authority if he willfully or recklessly moves the nation towards war…69 The implication seems to be that the President may not unilaterally threaten force in ways that are dramatically escalatory and could likely lead to war, or perhaps that the President may not unilaterally threaten the use of force that he does not have the authority to initiate unilaterally.70 Jefferson Powell, who generally takes a more expansive view than Henkin of the President’s war powers, argues by contrast that “[t]he ability to warn of, or threaten, the use of military force is an ordinary and essential element in the toolbox of that branch of government empowered to formulate and implement foreign policy.”71 For Powell, the President is constantly taking actions as part of everyday international relations that carry a risk of military escalation, and these are well-accepted as part of the President’s broader authority to manage, if not set, foreign policy. Such brief mentions are in recent times among the rare exceptions to otherwise barren constitutional discussion of presidential powers to threaten force. That the President’s authority to threaten force is so well-accepted these days as to seem self-evident is not just an academic phenomenon. It is also reflected in the legal debates among and inside all three branches of government. In 1989, Michael Reisman observed: Military maneuvers designed to convey commitment to allies or contingent threats to adversaries … are matters of presidential competence. Congress does not appear to view as within its bailiwick many low-profile contemporaneous expressions of gunboat diplomacy, i.e., the physical interposition of some U.S. war-making capacity as communication to an adversary of United States’ intentions and capacities to oppose it.72 This was and remains a correct description but understates the pattern of practice, insofar as even major and high-profile expressions of coercive diplomacy are regarded among all three branches of government as within presidential competence. In Dellums v. Bush – perhaps the most assertive judicial scrutiny of presidential power to use large-scale force abroad since the end of the Cold War – the district court dismissed on ripeness grounds congressmembers’ suit challenging President George H. W. Bush’s intended military operations against Iraq in 1991 and seeking to prevent him from initiating an offensive attack against Iraq without first securing explicit congressional authorization for such action.73 That at the time of the suit the President had openly threatened war – through ultimatums and deployment of several hundred thousand U.S. troops – but had not yet “committed to a definitive course of action” to carry out the threat meant there was no justiciable legal issue, held the court.74 The President’s threat of war did not seem to give the district court legal pause at all; quite the contrary, the mere threat of war was treated by the court as a non-issue entirely.75 There are several reasons why constitutional questions about threatened force have dropped out of legal discussions. First, the more politically salient debate about the President’s unilateral power to use force has probably swallowed up this seemingly secondary issue. As explained below, it is a mistake to view threats as secondary in importance to uses of force, but they do not command the same political attention and their impacts are harder to measure.76 Second, the expansion of American power after World War II, combined with the growth of peacetime military forces and a set of defense alliance commitments (developments that are elaborated below) make at least some threat of force much more common – in the case of defensive alliances and some deterrent policies, virtually constant – and difficult to distinguish from other forms of everyday diplomacy and security policy.77 Besides, for political and diplomatic reasons, presidents rarely threaten war or intervention without at least a little deliberate ambiguity. As historian Marc Trachtenberg puts it: “It often makes sense … to muddy the waters a bit and avoid direct threats.”78 Any legal lines one might try to draw (recall early attempts to restrict the President’s unilateral authority to alter the state of affairs along the peacetime-wartime continuum) have become blurrier and blurrier. In sum, if the constitutional power to threaten war ever posed a serious legal controversy, it does so no more. As the following section explains, however, threats of war and armed force have during most of our history become a greater and greater part of American grand strategy, defined here as long-term policies for using the country’s military and non-military power to achieve national goals. The prominent role of threatened force in U.S. strategy has become the focus of political scientists and other students of security strategy, crises, and responses – but constitutional study has not adjusted accordingly.79 C. Threats of Force and U.S. Grand Strategy While the Korean and Vietnam Wars were generating intense study among lawyers and legal scholars about constitutional authority to wage military actions abroad, during that same period many political scientists and strategists – economists, historians, statesmen, and others who studied international conflict – turned their focus to the role of threatened force as an instrument of foreign policy. The United States was building and sustaining a massive war-fighting apparatus, but its security policy was not oriented primarily around waging or winning wars but around deterring them and using the threat of war – including demonstrative military actions – to advance U.S. security interests. It was the potential of U.S. military might, not its direct application or engagement with the enemy, that would do much of the heavy lifting. U.S. military power would be used to deter the Soviet Union and other hostile states from taking aggressive action. It would be unsheathed to prompt them to back down over disputes. It would reassure allies that they could depend on U.S. help in defending themselves. All this required that U.S. willingness to go to war be credible in the eyes of adversaries and allies alike. Much of the early Cold War study of threatened force concerned nuclear strategy, and especially deterrence or escalation of nuclear war. Works by Albert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, and others not only studied but shaped the strategy of nuclear threats, as well as how to use limited applications of force or threats of force to pursue strategic interests in remote parts of the globe without sparking massive conflagrations.80 As the strategic analyst Bernard Brodie wrote in 1946, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.”81 Toward that end, U.S. government security and defense planners during this time focused heavily on preserving and improving the credibility of U.S. military threats – while the Soviet Union was doing likewise.82 The Truman administration developed a militarized version of containment strategy against the Soviet empire, emphasizing that stronger military capabilities were necessary to prevent the Soviets from seizing the initiative and to resist its aggressive probes: “it is clear,” according to NSC-68, the government document which encapsulated that strategy, “that a substantial and rapid building up of strength in the free world is necessary to support a firm policy intended to check and to roll back the Kremlin's drive for world domination.”83 The Eisenhower administration’s “New Look” policy and doctrine of “massive retaliation” emphasized making Western collective security both more effective and less costly by placing greater reliance on deterrent threats – including threatened escalation to general or nuclear war. As his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles explained, “[t]here is no local defense which alone will contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power.”84 As described in Evan Thomas’s recent book, Ike’s Bluff, Eisenhower managed to convince Soviet leaders that he was ready to use nuclear weapons to check their advance in Europe and elsewhere. In part due to concerns that threats of massive retaliation might be insufficiently credible in Soviet eyes (especially with respect to U.S. interests perceived as peripheral), the Kennedy administration in 1961 shifted toward a strategy of “flexible response,” which relied on the development of a wider spectrum of military options that could quickly and efficiently deliver varying degrees of force in response to foreign aggression.85 Throughout these periods, the President often resorted to discrete, limited uses of force to demonstrate U.S. willingness to escalate. For example, in 1961 the Kennedy administration (mostly successfully in the short-run) deployed intervention-ready military force immediately off the coast of the Dominican Republic to compel its government's ouster,86 and that same year it used military exercises and shows of force in ending the Berlin crisis;87 in 1964, the Johnson administration unsuccessfully used air strikes on North Vietnamese targets following the Tonkin Gulf incidents, failing to deter what it viewed as further North Vietnamese aggression.88 The point here is not the shifting details of U.S. strategy after World War II – during this era of dramatic expansion in asserted presidential war powers – but the central role of credible threats of war in it, as well as the interrelationship of plans for using force and credible threats to do so. Also during this period, the United States abandoned its long-standing aversion to “entangling alliances,”89 and committed to a network of mutual defense treaties with dependent allies. Besides the global collective security arrangement enshrined in the UN Charter, the United States committed soon after World War II to mutual defense pacts with, for example, groups of states in Western Europe (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization)90 and Asia (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization,91 as well as a bilateral defense agreement with the Republic of Korea,92 Japan,93 and the Republic of China,94 among others). These alliance commitments were part of a U.S. effort to “extend” deterrence of Communist bloc aggression far beyond its own borders.95 “Extended deterrence” was also critical to reassuring these U.S. allies that their security needs would be met, in some instances to head off their own dangerous rearmament.96 Among the leading academic works on strategy of the 1960s and 70s were those of Thomas Schelling, who developed the theoretical structure of coercion theory, arguing that rational states routinely use the threat of military force – the manipulation of an adversary’s perceptions of future risks and costs with military threats – as a significant component of their diplomacy.97 Schelling distinguished between deterrence (the use of threats to dissuade an adversary from taking undesired action) and compellence (the use of threats to persuade an adversary to behave a certain way), and he distinguished both forms of coercion from brute force: “[B]rute force succeeds when it is used, whereas the power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve. It is the threat of damage to come that can make someone yield of comply. It is latent violence that can influence someone’s choice.”98 Alexander George, David Hall, and William Simons then led the way in taking a more empirical approach, reviewing case studies to draw insights about the success and failure of U.S. coercive threats, analyzing contextual variables and their effects on parties’ reactions to threats during crises. Among their goals was to generate lessons informed by history for successful strategies that combine diplomatic efforts with threats or demonstrations of force, recognizing that the United States was relying heavily on threatened force in addressing security crises. Coercive diplomacy – if successful – offered ways to do so with minimal actual application of military force.99 One of the most influential studies that followed was Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, a Brookings Institution study led by Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan and published in 1977.100 They studied “political uses of force”, defined as actions by U.S. military forces “as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continued contest of violence.”101 Blechman and Kaplan’s work, including their large data set and collected case studies, was important for showing the many ways that threatened force could support U.S. security policy. Besides deterrence and compellence, threats of force were used to assure allies (thereby, for example, avoiding their own drive toward militarization of policies or crises) and to induce third parties to behave certain ways (such as contributing to diplomatic resolution of crises). The record of success in relying on threatened force has been quite mixed, they showed. Blechman and Kaplan’s work, and that of others who built upon it through the end of the Cold War and the period that has followed,102 helped understand the factors that correlated with successful threats or demonstrations of force without resort or escalation to war, especially the importance of credible signals.103 After the Cold War, the United States continued to rely on coercive force – threatened force to deter or compel behavior by other actors – as a central pillar of its grand strategy. During the 1990s, the United States wielded coercive power with varied results against rogue actors in many cases that, without the overlay of superpower enmities, were considered secondary or peripheral, not vital, interests: Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and elsewhere. For analysts of U.S. national security policy, a major puzzle was reconciling the fact that the United States possessed overwhelming military superiority in raw terms over any rivals with its difficult time during this era in compelling changes in their behavior.104 As Daniel Byman and I wrote about that decade in our study of threats of force and American foreign policy: U.S. conventional and nuclear forces dwarf those of any adversaries, and the U.S. economy remains the largest and most robust in the world. Because of these overwhelming advantages, the United States can threaten any conceivable adversary with little danger of a major defeat or even significant retaliation. Yet coercion remains difficult. Despite the United States’ lopsided edge in raw strength, regional foes persist in defying the threats and ultimatums brought by the United States and its allies. In confrontations with Somali militants, Serb nationalists, and an Iraqi dictator, the U.S. and allied record or coercion has been mixed over recent years…. Despite its mixed record of success, however, coercion will remain a critical element of U.S. foreign policy.105 One important factor that seemed to undermine the effectiveness of U.S. coercive threats during this period was that many adversaries perceived the United States as still afflicted with “Vietnam Syndrome,” unwilling to make good on its military threats and see military operations through.106 Since the turn of the 21st Century, major U.S. security challenges have included non-state terrorist threats, the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and rapidly changing power balances in East Asia, and the United States has accordingly been reorienting but retaining its strategic reliance on threatened force. The Bush Administration’s “preemption doctrine” was premised on the idea that some dangerous actors – including terrorist organizations and some states seeking WMD arsenals – are undeterrable, so the United States might have to strike them first rather than waiting to be struck.107 On one hand, this was a move away from reliance on threatened force: “[t]he inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit” a reactive posture.108 Yet the very enunciation of such a policy – that “[t]o forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively”109 – was intended to persuade those adversaries to alter their policies that the United States regarded as destabilizing and threatening. Although the Obama administration pulled back from this rhetoric and placed greater emphasis on international institutions, it has continued to rely on threatened force as a key pillar of its strategy with regard to deterring threats (such as aggressive Iranian moves), intervening in humanitarian crises (as in Libya), and reassuring allies.110 With regard to East Asia, for example, the credible threat of U.S. military force is a significant element of U.S. strategy for deterring Chinese and North Korean aggression as well as reassuring other Asian powers of U.S. protection, to avert a destabilizing arms race.111 D. The Disconnect Between Constitutional Discourse and Strategy There is a major disconnect between the decades of work by strategists and many political scientists on American security policy and practice since the Second World War and legal analysis and scholarship of constitutional war powers during that period. Lawyers and strategists have been relying on not only distinct languages but distinct logics of military force – in short, when it comes to using U.S. military power, lawyers think in terms of “going to war” while strategists focus on potential war and processes leading to it. These framings manifest in differing theoretical starting points for considering how exercises of U.S. military might affect war and peace, and they skew the empirical insights and normative prescriptions about Presidential power often drawn from their analyses. 1. Lawyers’ Misframing Lawyers’ focus on actual uses of force – especially engagements with enemy military forces – as constitutionally salient, rather than including threats of force in their understanding of modern presidential powers tilts analysis toward a one-dimensional strategic logic, rather than a more complex and multi-dimensional and dynamic logic in which the credible will to use force is as important as the capacity to do so. As discussed above, early American constitutional thinkers and practitioners generally wanted to slow down with institutional checks decisions to go to war, because they thought that would make war less likely. “To invoke a more contemporary image,” wrote John Hart Ely of their vision, “it takes more than one key to launch a missile: It should take quite a number to start a war.”112 They also viewed the exercise of military power as generally a ratchet of hostilities, whereby as the intensity of authorized or deployed force increased, so generally did the state of hostilities between the United States and other parties move along a continuum from peace to war.113 Echoes of this logic still reverberate in modern congressionalist legal scholarship: the more flexibly the President can use military force, the more likely it is that the United States will find itself in wars; better, therefore, to clog decisions to make war with legislative checks.114 Modern presidentialist legal scholars usually respond that rapid action is a virtue, not a vice, in exercising military force.115 Especially as a superpower with global interests and facing global threats, presidential discretion to take rapid military action – endowed with what Alexander Hamilton called “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch”116 – best protects American interests. In either case the emphasis tends overwhelmingly to be placed on actual military engagements with adversaries. Strategists and many political scientists, by contrast, view some of the most significant use of military power as starting well before armed forces clash – and including important cases in which they never actually do. Coercive diplomacy and strategies of threatened force, they recognize, often involve a set of moves and countermoves by opposing sides and third parties before or even without the violent engagement of opposing forces. It is often the parties’ perceptions of anticipated actions and costs, not the actual carrying through of violence, that have the greatest impact on the course of events and resolution or escalation of crises. Instead of a ratchet of escalating hostilities, the flexing of military muscle can increase as well as decrease actual hostilities, inflame as well as stabilize relations with rivals or enemies. Moreover, those effects are determined not just by U.S. moves but by the responses of other parties to them – or even to anticipated U.S. moves and countermoves.117 Indeed, as Schelling observed, strategies of brinkmanship sometimes operate by “the deliberate creation of a recognizable risk of war, a risk that one does not completely control.”118 This insight – that effective strategies of threatened force involve not only great uncertainty about the adversary’s responses but also sometimes involve intentionally creating risk of inadvertent escalation119 – poses a difficult challenge for any effort to cabin legally the President’s power to threaten force in terms of likelihood of war or some due standard of care.120 2. Lawyers’ Selection Problems Methodologically, a lawyerly focus on actual uses of force – a list of which would then commonly be used to consider which ones were or were not authorized by Congress – vastly undercounts the instances in which presidents wield U.S. military might. It is already recognized by some legal scholars that studying actual uses of force risks ignoring instances in which President contemplated force but refrained from using it, whether because of political, congressional, or other constraints.121 The point here is a different one: that some of the most significant (and, in many instances, successful) presidential decisions to threaten force do not show up in legal studies of presidential war powers that consider actual deployment or engagement of U.S. military forces as the relevant data set. Moreover, some actual uses of force, whether authorized by Congress or not, were preceded by threats of force; in some cases these threats may have failed on their own to resolve the crisis, and in other cases they may have precipitated escalation. To the extent that lawyers are interested in understanding from historical practice what war powers the political branches thought they had and how well that understanding worked, they are excluding important cases. Consider, as an illustration of this difference in methodological starting point, that for the period of 1946-1975 (during which the exercise of unilateral Presidential war powers had its most rapid expansion), the Congressional Research Service compilation of instances in which the United States has utilized military forces abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict to protect U.S. citizens or promote U.S. interests – which is often relied upon by legal scholars studying war powers – lists only about two dozen incidents.122 For the same time period, the Blechman and Kaplan study of political uses of force (usually threats) – which is often relied upon by political scientists studying U.S. security strategy – includes dozens more data-point incidents, because they divide up many military crises into several discrete policy decisions, because many crises were resolved with threat-backed diplomacy, and because many uses of force were preceded by overt or implicit threats of force.123 Among the most significant incidents studied by Blechman and Kaplan but not included in the Congressional Research Service compilation at all are the 1958-59 and 1961 crises over Berlin and the 1973 Middle East War, during which U.S. Presidents signaled threats of superpower war, and in the latter case signaled particularly a willingness to resort to nuclear weapons.124 Because the presidents did not in the end carry out these threats, these cases lack the sort of authoritative legal justifications or reactions that accompany actual uses of force. It is therefore difficult to assess how the executive branch and congress understood the scope of the President’s war powers in these cases, but historical inquiry would probably show the executive branch’s interpretation to be very broad, even to include full-scale war and even where the main U.S. interest at stake was the very credibility of U.S. defense commitments undergirding its grand strategy, not simply the interests specific to divided Germany and the Middle East region.

Of course, one might argue that because the threatened military actions were never carried out in these cases, it is impossible to know if the President would have sought congressional authorization or how Congress would have reacted to the use of force; nonetheless, it is easy to see that in crises like these a threat by the President to use force, having put U.S. credibility on the line in addition to whatever other foreign policy stakes were at issues, would have put Congress in a bind. 3. Lawyers’ Mis-Assessment Empirically, analysis of and insights gleaned from any particular incident – which might then be used to evaluate the functional merits of presidential powers – looks very different if one focuses predominantly on the actual use of force instead of considering also the role of threatened force. Take for example, the Cuban Missile Crisis – perhaps the Cold War’s most dangerous event. To the rare extent that they consider domestic legal issues of this crisis at all, lawyers interested in the constitutionality of President Kennedy’s actions generally ask only whether he was empowered to initiate the naval quarantine of Cuba, because that is the concrete military action Kennedy took that was readily observable and that resulted in actual engagement with Soviet forces or vessels – as it happens, very minimal engagement.125 To strategists who study the crisis, however, the naval quarantine is not in itself the key presidential action; after all, as Kennedy and his advisers realized, a quarantine alone could not remove the missiles that were already in Cuba. The most consequential presidential actions were threats of military or even nuclear escalation, signaled through various means including putting U.S. strategic bombers on highest alert.126 The quarantine itself was significant not for its direct military effects but because of its communicative impact in showing U.S. resolve. If one is focused, as lawyers often are, on presidential military action that actually engaged the enemy in combat or nearly did, it is easy to dismiss this case as not very constitutionally significant. If one focuses on it, as strategists and political scientists often do, on nuclear brinkmanship, it is arguably the most significant historical exercise of unilateral presidential powers to affect war and peace.127 Considering again the 1991 Gulf War, most legal scholars would dismiss this instance as constitutionally a pretty uninteresting military conflict: the President claimed unilateral authority to use force, but he eventually sought and obtained congressional authorization for what was ultimately – at least in the short-run – a quite successful war. For the most part this case is therefore neither celebrated nor decried much by either side of legal war powers debates,128 though some congressionalist scholars highlight the correlation of congressional authorization for this war and a successful outcome.129 Political scientists look at the case differently, though. They often study this event not as a successful war but as failed coercive diplomacy, in that the United States first threatened war through a set of dramatically escalating steps that ultimately failed to persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.130 Some political scientists even see U.S. legal debate about military actions as an important part of this story, assessing that adversaries pay attention to congressional arguments and moves in evaluating U.S. resolve (an issue taken up in greater detail below) and that congressional opposition to Bush’s initial unilateralism in this case undermined the credibility of U.S. threats.131 Whether one sees the Gulf War as a case of (successful) war, as lawyers usually do, or (unsuccessful) threatened war, as political scientists usually do, colors how one evaluates the outcome and the credit one might attach to some factors such as vocal congressional opposition to initially-unilateral presidential moves. Notice also that legal analysis of Presidential authority to use force is sometimes thought to turn partly on the U.S. security interests at stake, as though those interests are purely contextual and exogenous to U.S. decision-making and grand strategy. In justifying President Obama’s 2011 use of force against the Libyan government, for example, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel concluded that the President had such legal authority “because he could reasonably determine that such use of force was in the national interest,” and it then went on to detail the U.S. security and foreign policy interests.132 The interests at stake in crises like these, however, are altered dramatically if the President threatens force: doing so puts the credibility of U.S. threats at stake, which is important not only with respect to resolving the crisis at hand but with respect to other potential adversaries watching U.S. actions.133 The President’s power to threaten force means that he may unilaterally alter the costs and benefits of actually using force through his prior actions.134 The U.S. security interests in carrying through on threats are partly endogenous to the strategy embarked upon to address crises (consider, for example, that once President George H.W. Bush placed hundred of thousands of U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf region and issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein in 1990, the credibility of U.S. threats and assurances to regional allies were put on the line).135 Moreover, interests at stake in any one crisis cannot simply be disaggregated from broader U.S. grand strategy: if the United States generally relies heavily on threats of force to shape the behavior of other actors, then its demonstrated willingness or unwillingness to carry out a threat and the outcomes of that action affect its credibility in the eyes of other adversaries and allies, too.136 It is remarkable, though in the end not surprising, that the executive branch does not generally cite these credibility interests in justifying its unilateral uses of force. It does cite when relevant the U.S. interest in sustaining the credibility of its formal alliance commitments or U.N. Security Council resolutions, as reasons supporting the President’s constitutional authority to use force.137 The executive branch generally refrains from citing the similar interests in sustaining the credibility of the President’s own threats of force, however, probably in part because doing so would so nakedly expose the degree to which the President’s prior unilateral strategic decisions would tie Congress’s hands on the matter. \* \* \* In sum, lawyers’ focus on actual uses of force – usually in terms of armed clashes with an enemy or the placement of troops into hostile environments – does not account for much vaster ways that President’s wield U.S. military power and it skews the claims legal scholars make about the allocation of war powers between the political branches. A more complete account of constitutional war powers should recognize the significant role of threatened force in American foreign policy. II. Democratic Checks on Threatened Force The previous Parts of this Article showed that, especially since the end of World War II, the United States has relied heavily on strategies of threatened force in wielding its military might – for which credible signals are a necessary element – and that the President is not very constrained legally in any formal sense in threatening war. Drawing on recent political science scholarship, this Part takes some of the major questions often asked by students of constitutional war powers with respect to the actual use of force and reframes them in terms of threatened force. First, as a descriptive matter, in the absence of formal legal checks on the President’s power to threaten war, is the President nevertheless informally but significantly constrained by democratic institutions and processes, and what role does Congress play in that constraint? Second, as a normative matter, what are the strategic merits and drawbacks of this arrangement of democratic institutions and constraints with regard to strategies of threatened force? Third, as a prescriptive matter, although it is not really plausible that Congress or courts would ever erect direct legal barriers to the President’s power to threaten war, how might legal reform proposals to more strongly and formally constrain the President’s power to use force indirectly impact his power to threaten it effectively? For reasons discussed below, I do not consider whether Congress could legislatively restrict directly the President’s power to threaten force or war; in short, I set that issue aside because assuming that were constitutionally permissible, even ardent congressionalists have exhibited no interest in doing so, and instead have focused on legally controlling the actual use of force. Political science insights that bear on these questions emerge from several directions. One is from studies of Congress’ influence on use of force decisions, which usually assume that Congress’s formal legislative powers play only a limited role in this area, and the effects of this influence on presidential decision-making about threatened force. Another is international relations literature on international bargaining138 as well as literature on the theory of democratic peace, the notion that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another.139 In attempting to explain the near-absence of military conflicts between democracies, political scientists have examined how particular features of democratic governments – electoral accountability, the institutionalized mobilization of political opponents, and the diffusion of decision-making authority regarding the use of force among executive and legislative branches – affect decision-making about war.140 These and other studies, in turn, have led some political scientists (especially those with a rational choice theory orientation) to focus on how those features affect the credibility of signals about force that governments send to adversaries in crises.141 My purpose in addressing these questions is to begin painting a more complete and detailed picture of the way war powers operate, or could operate, than one sees when looking only at actual wars and use of force. This is not intended to be a comprehensive account but an effort to synthesize some strands of scholarship from other fields regarding threatened force to inform legal discourse about how war powers function in practice and the strategic implications of reform. The answers to these questions also bear on raging debates among legal scholars on the nature of American executive power and its constraint by law. Initially they seem to support the views of those legal scholars who have long believed that in practice law no longer seriously binds the President with respect to war-making.142 That view has been taken even further recently by Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, who argue that “[l]aw does little constraint the modern executive” at all, but also observe that “politics and public opinion” operate effectively to cabin executive powers.143 The arguments offered here, however, do more to support the position of those legal scholars who describe a more complex relationship between law and politics, including that law is constitutive of the processes of political struggle.144 That law helps constitute the processes of political struggles is true of any area of public policy, though, and what is special here is the added importance of foreign audiences – including adversaries and allies, alike – observing and reacting to those politics, too. Democratic Constraints on the Power to the Threaten Force Whereas most lawyers usually begin their analysis of the President’s and Congress’s war powers by focusing on their formal legal authorities, political scientists usually take for granted these days that the President is – in practice – the dominant branch with respect to military crises and that Congress wields its formal legislative powers in this area rarely or in only very limited ways. A major school of thought, however, is that congressional members nevertheless wield significant influence over decisions about force, and that this influence extends to threatened force, so that Presidents generally refrain from threats that would provoke strong congressional opposition. Even without any serious prospect for legislatively blocking the President’s threatened actions, Congress under certain conditions can loom large enough to force Presidents to adjust their policies; even when it cannot, congressional members can oblige the President expend lots of political capital. As Jon Pevehouse and William Howell explain: When members of Congress vocally oppose a use of force, they undermine the president’s ability to convince foreign states that he will see a fight through to the end. Sensing hesitation on the part of the United States, allies may be reluctant to contribute to a military campaign, and adversaries are likely to fight harder and longer when conflict erupts— thereby raising the costs of the military campaign, decreasing the president’s ability to negotiate a satisfactory resolution, and increasing the probability that American lives are lost along the way. Facing a limited band of allies willing to participate in a military venture and an enemy emboldened by domestic critics, presidents may choose to curtail, and even abandon, those military operations that do not involve vital strategic interests. 145 This statement also highlights the important point, alluded to earlier, that force and threatened force are not neatly separable categories. Often limited uses of force are intended as signals of resolve to escalate, and most conflicts involve bargaining in which the threat of future violence – rather than what Schelling calls “brute force”146 – is used to try to extract concessions. The formal participation of political opponents in legislative bodies provides them with a forum for registering dissent to presidential policies of force through such mechanisms floor statements, committee oversight hearings, resolution votes, and funding decisions.147 These official actions prevent the President “from monopolizing the nation’s political discourse” on decisions regarding military actions can thereby make it difficult for the President to depart too far from congressional preferences.148 Members of the political opposition in Congress also have access to resources for gathering policy relevant information from the government that informs their policy preferences. Their active participation in specialized legislative committees similarly gives opponent party members access to fact-finding resources and forums for registering informed dissent from decisions within the committee’s purview.149 As a result, legislative institutions within democracies can enable political opponents to have a more immediate and informed impact on executive’s decisions regarding force than can opponents among the general public. Moreover, studies suggest that Congress can actively shape media coverage and public support for a president’s foreign policy engagements.150 In short, these findings among political scientists suggest that, even without having to pass legislation or formally approve of actions, Congress often operates as an important check on threatened force by providing the president’s political opponents with a forum for registering dissent from the executive’s decisions regarding force in ways that attach domestic political costs to contemplated military actions or even the threats to use force. Under this logic, Presidents, anticipating dissent, will be more selective in issuing¶ threats in the first place, making only those commitments that would not incite¶ widespread political opposition should the threat be carried through.151 Political¶ opponents within a legislature also have few electoral incentives to collude in an¶ executive’s bluff, and they are capable of expressing opposition to a threatened use of¶ force in ways that could expose the bluff to a threatened adversary.152 This again narrows¶ the President’s range of viable policy options for brandishing military force. Counter-intuitively, given the President’s seemingly unlimited and unchallenged¶ constitutional power to threaten war, it may in some cases be easier for members of¶ Congress to influence presidential decisions to threaten military action than presidential¶ war decisions once U.S. forces are already engaged in hostilities. It is widely believed¶ that once U.S. armed forces are fighting, congress members’ hands are often tied: policy¶ opposition at that stage risks being portrayed as undermining our troops in the field.153¶ Perhaps, it could be argued, the President takes this phenomenon into account and¶ therefore discounts political opposition to threatened force; he can assume that such¶ opposition will dissipate if he carries it through. Even if that is true, before that point¶ occurs, however, members of Congress may have communicated messages domestically¶ and communicated signals abroad that the President will find difficult to counter.154 The bottom line is that a body of recent political science, while confirming the¶ President’s dominant position in setting policy in this area, also reveals that policymaking¶ with respect to threats of force is significantly shaped by domestic politics and¶ that Congress is institutionally positioned to play a powerful role in influencing those¶ politics, even without exercising its formal legislative powers. Given the centrality of¶ threatened force to U.S. foreign policy strategy and security crises, this suggests that the¶ practical war powers situation is not so imbalanced toward the President as many assume. B. Democratic Institutions and the Credibility of Threats A central question among constitutional war powers scholars is whether robust¶ checks – especially congressional ones – on presidential use of force lead to “sound”¶ policy decision-making. Congressionalists typically argue that legislative control over¶ war decisions promotes more thorough deliberation, including more accurate weighing of¶ consequences and gauging of political support of military action.155 Presidentialists¶ usually counter that the executive branch has better information and therefore better¶ ability to discern the dangers of action or inaction, and that quick and decisive military¶ moves are often required to deal with security crises.156 If we are interested in these sorts of functional arguments, then reframing the¶ inquiry to include threatened force prompts critical questions whether such checks also¶ contribute to or detract from effective deterrence and coercive diplomacy and therefore¶ positively or negatively affect the likelihood of achieving aims without resort to war.¶ Here, recent political science provides some reason for optimism, though the scholarship¶ in this area is neither yet well developed nor conclusive. To be sure, “soundness” of policy with respect to force is heavily laden with¶ normative assumptions about war and the appropriate role for the United States in the¶ broader international security system, so it is difficult to assess the merits and¶ disadvantages of constitutional allocations in the abstract. That said, whatever their¶ specific assumptions about appropriate uses of force in mind, constitutional war powers¶ scholars usually evaluate the policy advantages and dangers of decision-making¶ allocations narrowly in terms of the costs and outcomes of actual military engagements¶ with adversaries. The importance of credibility to strategies of threatened force adds important new¶ dimensions to this debate. On the one hand, one might intuitively expect that robust democratic checks would generally be ill-suited for coercive threats and negotiations –¶ that institutional centralization and secrecy of decision-making might better equip nondemocracies¶ to wield threats of force. As Quincy Wright speculated in 1944, autocracies¶ “can use war efficiently and threats of war even more efficiently” than democracies,157¶ especially the American democracy in which vocal public and congressional opposition¶ may undermine threats.158 Moreover, proponents of democratic checks on war powers¶ usually assume that careful deliberation is a virtue in preventing unnecessary wars, but¶ strategists of deterrence and coercion observe that perceived irrationality is sometimes¶ important in conveying threats: “don’t test me, because I might just be crazy enough to¶ do it!”159 On the other hand, some political scientists have recently called into question this¶ view and concluded that the institutionalization of political contestation and some¶ diffusion of decision-making power in democracies of the kind described in the previous¶ section make threats to use force rare but especially credible and effective in resolving¶ international crises without actual resort to armed conflict. In other words, recent¶ arguments in effect turn some old claims about the strategic disabilities of democracies¶ on their heads: whereas it used to be generally thought that democracies were ineffective¶ in wielding threats because they are poor at keeping secrets and their decision-making is¶ constrained by internal political pressures, a current wave of political science accepts this¶ basic description but argues that these democratic features are really strategic virtues.160 Rationalist models of crisis bargaining between states assume that because war is¶ risky and costly, states will be better off if they can resolve their disputes through¶ bargaining rather than by enduring the costs and uncertainties of armed conflict.161¶ Effective bargaining during such disputes – that which resolves the crisis without a resort¶ to force – depends largely on states’ perceptions of their adversary’s capacity to wage an¶ effective military campaign and its willingness to resort to force to obtain a favorable¶ outcome. A state targeted with a threat of force, for example, will be less willing to resist¶ the adversary’s demands if it believes that the adversary intends to wage and is capable of¶ waging an effective military campaign to achieve its ends. In other words, if a state¶ perceives that the threat from the adversary is credible, that state has less incentive to¶ resist such demands if doing so will escalate into armed conflict. The accuracy of such perceptions, however, is often compromised by¶ informational asymmetries that arise from private information about an adversary’s¶ relative military capabilities and resolve that prevents other states from correctly¶ assessing another states’ intentions, as well as by the incentives states have to¶ misrepresent their willingness to fight – that is, to bluff.162 Informational asymmetries¶ increase the potential for misperception and thereby make war more likely; war,¶ consequentially, can be thought of in these cases as a “bargaining failure.”163 Some political scientists have argued in recent decades – contrary to previously common wisdom – that features and constraints of democracies make them better suited than non-democracies to credibly signal their resolve when they threaten force. To bolster their bargaining position, states will seek to generate credible signals of their resolve by taking actions that can enhance the credibility of such threats, such as mobilizing military forces or making “hand-tying” commitments from which leaders cannot back down without suffering considerable political costs domestically.164 These domestic audience costs, according to some political scientists, are especially high for leaders in democratic states, where they may bear these costs at the polls.165 Given the potentially high domestic political and electoral repercussions democratic leaders face from backing down from a public threat, they have considerable incentives to refrain from bluffing. An adversary that understands these political vulnerabilities is thereby more likely to perceive the threats a democratic leader does issue as highly credible, in turn making it more likely that the adversary will yield.166 Other scholars have recently pointed to the special role of legislative bodies in signaling with regard to threatened force. This is especially interesting from the perspective of constitutional powers debates, because it posits a distinct role for Congress – and, again, one that does not necessarily rely on Congress’s ability to pass binding legislation that formally confines the President. Kenneth Schultz, for instance, argues that the open nature of competition within democratic societies ensures that the interplay of opposing parties in legislative bodies over the use of force is observable not just to their domestic publics but to foreign actors; this inherent transparency within democracies – magnified by legislative processes – provides more information to adversaries regarding the unity of domestic opponents around a government’s military and foreign policy decisions.167 Political opposition parties can undermine the credibility of some threats by the President to use force if they publicly voice their opposition in committee hearings, public statements, or through other institutional mechanisms. Furthermore, legislative processes – such as debates and hearings – make it difficult to conceal or misrepresent preferences about war and peace. Faced with such institutional constraints, Presidents will incline to be more selective about making such threats and avoid being undermined in that way.168 This restraining effect on the ability of governments to issue threats simultaneously makes those threats that the government issues more credible, if an observer assumes that the President would not be issuing it if he anticipated strong political opposition. Especially when members of the opposition party publicly support an executive’s threat to use force during a crisis, their visible support lends additional credibility to the government’s threat by demonstrating that political conditions domestically favor the use of force should it be necessary.169 In some cases, Congress may communicate greater willingness than the president to use force, for instance through non-binding resolutions.170 Such powerful signals of resolve should in theory make adversaries more likely to back down. The credibility-enhancing effects of legislative constraints on threats are subject to dispute. Some studies question the assumptions underpinning theories of audience costs – specifically the idea that democratic leaders suffer domestic political costs to failing to make good on their threats, and therefore that their threats are especially credible171 – and others question whether the empirical data supports claims that democracies have credibility advantages in making threats.172 Other scholars dispute the likelihood that leaders will really be punished politically for backing down, especially if the threat was not explicit and unambiguous or if they have good policy reasons for doing so.173 Additionally, even if transparency in democratic institutions allows domestic dissent from threats of force to be visible to foreign audiences, it is not clear that adversaries would interpret these mechanisms as political scientists expect in their models of strategic interaction, in light of various common problems of misperception in international relations.174 These disputes are not just between competing theoretical models but also over the links between any of the models and real-world political behavior by states. At this point there remains a dearth of good historical evidence as to how foreign leaders interpret political maneuvers within Congress regarding threatened force. Nevertheless, at the very least, strands of recent political science scholarship cast significant doubt on the intuition that democratic checks are inherently disadvantageous to strategies of threatened force. Quite the contrary, they suggest that legislative checks – or, indeed, even the signaling functions that Congress is institutionally situated to play with respect to foreign audiences interpreting U.S. government moves – can be harnessed in some circumstances to support such strategies. C. Legal Reform and Strategies of Threatened Force Among legal scholars of war powers, the ultimate prescriptive question is whether the President should be constrained more formally and strongly than he currently is by legislative checks, especially a more robust and effective mandatory requirement of congressional authorization to use force. Calls for reform usually take the form of narrowing and better enforcement (by all three branches of government) of purported constitutional requirements for congressional authorization of presidential uses of force or revising and enforcing the War Powers Resolutions or other framework legislation requiring express congressional authorization for such actions.175

As applied to strategies of threatened force, generally under these proposals the President would lack authority to make good on them unilaterally (except in whatever narrow circumstances for which he retains his own unilateral authority, such as deterring imminent attacks on the United States). Whereas legal scholars are consumed with the internal effects of war powers law, such as whether and when it constrains U.S. government decision-making, the analysis contained in the previous section shifts attention externally to whether and when U.S. law might influence decision-making by adversaries, allies, and other international actors. In prescriptive terms, if the President’s power to use force is linked to his ability to threaten it effectively, then any consideration of war powers reform on policy outcomes and longterm interests should include the important secondary effects on deterrent and coercive strategies – and how U.S. legal doctrine is perceived and understood abroad.176 Would stronger requirements for congressional authorization to use force reduce a president’s opportunities for bluffing, and if so would this improve U.S. coercive diplomacy by making ensuing threats more credible? Or would it undermine diplomacy by taking some threats off the table as viable policy options? Would stronger formal legislative powers with respect to force have significant marginal effects on the signaling effects of dissent within Congress, beyond those effects already resulting from open political discourse? These are difficult questions, but the analysis and evidence above helps generate some initial hypotheses and avenues for further research and analysis. One might ask at this point why, though, having exposed as a hole in war powers legal discourse the tendency to overlook threatened force, this Article does not take up whether Congress should assert some direct legislative control of threats – perhaps statutorily limiting the President’s authority to make them or establishing procedural conditions like presidential reporting requirements to Congress. This Article puts such a notion aside for several reasons. First, for reasons alluded to briefly above, such limits would be very constitutionally suspect and difficult to enforce.177 Second, even the most ardent war-power congressionalists do not contemplate such direct limits on the President’s power to threaten; they are not a realistic option for reform. Instead, this Article focuses on the more plausible – and much more discussed – possibility of strengthening Congress’s power over the ultimate decision whether to use force, but augments the usual debate over that question with appreciation for the importance of credible threats. A claim previously advanced from a presidentialist perspective is that stronger legislative checks on war powers is harmful to coercive and deterrent strategies, because it establishes easily-visible impediments to the President’s authority to follow through on threats. This was a common policy argument during the War Powers Resolution debates in the early 1970s. Eugene Rostow, an advocate inside and outside the government for executive primacy, remarked during consideration of legislative drafts that any serious restrictions on presidential use of force would mean in practice that “no President could make a credible threat to use force as an instrument of deterrent diplomacy, even to head off explosive confrontations.”178 He continued: In the tense and cautious diplomacy of our present relations with the Soviet Union, as they have developed over the last twenty-five years, the authority of the President to set clear and silent limits in advance is perhaps the *most* important of all the powers in our constitutional armory to prevent confrontations that could carry nuclear implications. … [I]t is the diplomatic power the President needs most under the circumstance of modern life—the power to make a credible threat to use force in order to prevent a confrontation which might escalate.179 In his veto statement on the War Powers Resolution, President Nixon echoed these concerns, arguing that the law would undermine the credibility of U.S. deterrent and coercive threats in the eyes of both adversaries and allies – they would know that presidential authority to use force would expire after 60 days, so absent strong congressional support they could assume U.S. withdrawal at that point.180 In short, those who oppose tying the president’s hands with mandatory congressional authorization requirements to use force sometimes argue that doing so incidentally and dangerously ties his hands in threatening it. A critical assumption here is that presidential flexibility, preserved in legal doctrine, enhances the credibility of presidential threats to escalate.

## OLC CP

#### The Counsel to the President of the United States should consult the Office of Legal Counsel for legal counsel and coordination on the President’s war powers authority. The Office of Legal Counsel should advise the President that he should restrict targeted killing as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities.

#### CP is competitive and solves the case ---- Coordination with OLC can ensure executive action

BORRELLI et al 2000 - Professor of Government Chair of the Government and International Relations Department, Connecticut College (Maryanne Borrelli, Karen Hult, Nancy Kassop, “The White House Counsel’s Office”, http://whitehousetransitionproject.org/files/counsel/Counsel-OD.PDF)

The White House Counsel’s Office is at the hub of all presidential activity. Its mandate is to be watchful for and attentive to legal issues that may arise in policy and political contexts in which the president plays a role. To fulfill this responsibility, it monitors and coordinates the presidency’s interactions with other players in and out of government. Often called “the president’s lawyer,” the Counsel’s Office serves, more accurately, as the “presidency’s lawyer,” with tasks that extend well beyond exclusively legal ones. These have developed over time, depending on the needs of different presidents, on the relationship between a president and a Counsel, and on contemporary political conditions. The Office carries out many routine tasks, such as vetting all presidential appointments and advising on the application of ethics regulations to White House staff and executive branch officials, but it also operates as a “command center” when crises or scandals erupt. Thus, the more sharply polarized political atmosphere in recent years has led to greater responsibility and demands, as well as heightened political pressure and visibility, on the traditionally low-profile Counsel’s Office. The high-stakes quality of its work has led to a common sentiment among Counsels and their staff that there is “zero tolerance” for error in this office.

In sum, the Counsel’s Office might be characterized as a monitor, a coordinator, a negotiator, a recommender, and a translator: it monitors ethics matters, it coordinates the president’s message and agenda with other executive branch units, it negotiates with a whole host of actors on the president’s behalf (not the least of which is Congress), it recommends myriad actions to the president, and it translates or interprets the law (whether it is the Constitution, federal rules and regulations, treaties or legislation) for all executive branch officials. Past Counsels have lamented that there is no job description for this office, while the opening quote from Peter Wallison makes clear that even if there was, it would be all-consuming and all-inclusive of everything that goes in and out of the president’s office.

In simple terms, the Counsel’s Office performs five basic categories of functions: (1) advising on the exercise of presidential powers and defending the president’s constitutional prerogatives; (2) overseeing presidential nominations and appointments to the executive and judicial branches; (3) advising on presidential actions relating to the legislative process; (4) educating White House staffers about ethics rules and records management and monitoring adherence; and (5) handling department, agency and White House staff contacts with the Department of Justice (see Functions section). In undertaking these responsibilities, the Counsel’s Office interacts regularly with, among others, the president, the Chief of Staff, the White House Office of Personnel, the Press Secretary, the White House Office of Legislative Affairs, the Attorney General, the Office of Management and Budget (on the legislative process), the General Counsels of the departments and agencies, and most especially, the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice (see Relationships section). In addition to the Counsel, the Office usually consists of one or two Deputy Counsels, a varying number of Associate and Assistant Counsels, a Special Counsel when scandals arise, a Senior Counsel in some administrations, and support staff. Tasks are apportioned to these positions in various ways, depending on the Counsel’s choices, though most Counsels expect all Office members to share the ongoing vetting for presidential appointments (see Organization and Operations section).

Certain responsibilities within the Office are central at the very start of an administration (e.g., vetting for initial nominations and shepherding the appointment process through the Senate), while others have a cyclical nature to them (e.g., the annual budget, the State of the Union message), and still others follow an electoral cycle (e.g., determining whether presidential travel and other activities are partisan/electoral/campaign or governmental ones) (see Organization and Operations). There is, of course, the always unpredictable (but almost inevitable) flurry of scandals and crises, in which all eyes turn to the Counsel’s Office for guidance and answers. Watergate, Iran-contra, Whitewater, the Clinton impeachment, and the FBI files and White House Travel Office matters were all managed from the Counsel’s Office, in settings that usually separated scandal management from the routine work of the Office, so as to permit ongoing operations to continue with minimal distraction. Among the more regular tasks that occur throughout an administration are such jobs as directing the judicial nomination process, reviewing legislative proposals (the president’s, those from departments and agencies, and bills Congress has passed that need the Counsel’s recommendation for presidential signature or veto), editing and clearing presidential statements and speeches, writing executive orders, and determining the application of executive privilege (see both Relationships and Organization and Operations sections).

Perhaps, the most challenging task for the Counsel is being the one who has the duty to tell the president “no,” especially when it comes to defending the constitutional powers and prerogatives of the presidency. Lloyd Cutler, Counsel for both Presidents Carter and Clinton, noted that, in return for being “on the cutting edge of problems,” the Counsel needs to be someone who has his own established reputation…someone who is willing to stand up t o the President, to say, “No, Mr. President, you shouldn’t do that for these reasons.” There is a great tendency among all presidential staffs to be very sycophantic, very sycophantic. It’s almost impossible to avoid, “This man is the President of the United States and you want to stay in his good graces,” even when he is about to do something dumb; you don’t tell him that. You find some way to put it in a very diplomatic manner. (Cutler interview, pp. 3-4)

LAW, POLITICS AND POLICY

A helpful way to understand the Counsel’s Office is to see it as sitting at the intersection of law, politics and policy. Consequently, it confronts the difficult and delicate task of trying to reconcile all three of these without sacrificing too much of any one. It is the distinctive challenge of the Counsel’s Office to advise the president to take actions that are both legally sound and politically astute. A 1994 article in Legal Times warned of the pitfalls: Because a sound legal decision can be a political disaster, the presidential counsel constantly sacrifices legal ground for political advantage. (Bendavid, 1994, p. 13) For example, A.B. Culvahouse recalled his experience upon arriving at the White House as counsel and having to implement President Reagan’s earlier decision to turn over his personal diaries to investigators during the Iran-contra scandal.

Ronald Reagan’s decision to turn over his diary - that sits at the core of the presidency. …You’re setting up precedents and ceding a little power. But politically, President Reagan wanted to get it behind him. (Bendavid, 1994, p. 13)

Nonetheless, Culvahouse added, the Counsel is “the last and in some cases the only protector of the President’s constitutional privileges. Almost everyone else is willing to give those away in part inch by inch and bit by bit in order to win the issue of the day, to achieve compromise on today’s thorny issue. So a lot of what I did was stand in the way of that process...” (Culvahouse interview, p. 28)

Because of this blend of legal, political and policy elements, the most essential function a Counsel can perform for a president is to act as an “early warning system” for potential legal trouble spots before **(**and, ultimately, after) they erupt. For this role, a Counsel must keep his or her “antennae” constantly attuned. Being at the right meetings at the right time and knowing which people have information and/or the necessary technical knowledge and expertise in specific policy or legal areas are the keys to insuring the best service in this part of the position. C. Boyden Gray, Counsel for President Bush, commented: “As Culvahouse said -- I used to say that the meetings I was invited to, I shouldn’t go to. …It’s the meetings I wasn’t invited to that I’d go to.” (Gray interview, p. 26) Lloyd Cutler noted that

….the White House Counsel will learn by going to the staff meetings, et cetera, that something is about to be done that has buried within it a legal issue which the people who are advocating it either haven’t recognized or push under the rug. He says, “Wait a minute. We’ve got to check this out,” and goes to the Office of Legal Counsel and alerts them and gets their opinion. But for the existence of the White House Counsel, the Office of Legal Counsel would never have learned about the problem until it was too late. (Cutler interview, p. 4)

One other crucial part of the job where the legal overlaps with the policy and the political -- and which can spell disaster for Counsels who disregard this -- is knowing when to go to the Office of Legal Counsel for guidance on prevailing legal interpretations and opinions on the scope of presidential authority. It is then up to the White House Counsel to sift through these legal opinions, and to bring into play the operative policy and political considerations in order to offer the president his or her best recommendation on a course of presidential action. Lloyd Cutler described how this process works:

They [OLC staffers] are where the President has to go or the President’s counsel has to go to get an opinion on whether something may properly be done or not. For example, if you wish to invoke an executive privilege not to produce documents or something, the routine now is you go to the Office of Legal Counsel and you get their opinion that there is a valid basis for asserting executive privilege in this case. ...You’re able to say [to the judge who is going to examine these documents] the Office of Legal Counsel says we have a valid basis historically for asserting executive privilege here. (Cutler interview, p. 4)

C. Boyden Gray underscored the critical importance of OLC’s relationship to the Counsel’s Office: They [OLC] were the memory…We paid attention to what they did. [Vincent] Foster never conferred with them. When they [the Clinton Counsel’s Office] filed briefs on executive privilege, they had the criminal division, the civil division and some other division signing on the brief; OLC wasn’t on the brief… In some ways they [OLC] told us not to do things but that was helpful. They said no to us… I can give you a million examples. They would have said to Vince Foster, “Don’t go in and argue without thinking about it.” They would have prevented the whole healthcare debacle [referring to the Clinton Counsel’s Office’s position that Hillary Rodham Clinton was a government official for FACA purposes] …[T]he ripple effect of that one decision is hard to exaggerate: it’s hard to calculate. (Gray interview, pp. 18-19)

## Solvency

#### Obama can circumvent the plan- covert loopholes are inevitable

**Lohmann 1-28**-13 [Julia, director of the Harvard Law National Security Research Committee, BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, “Distinguishing CIA-Led from Military-Led Targeted Killings,” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/effects-of-particular-tactic-on-issues-related-to-targeted-killings/>]

The U.S. military—in particular, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and its subsidiary entity, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—is responsible for carrying out military-led targeted killings.¶ Military-led targeted killings are subject to various legal restrictions, including a complex web of statutes and executive orders. For example, because the Covert Action Statute does not distinguish among institutions undertaking covert actions, targeted killings conducted by the military that fall within the definition of “covert action” set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) are subject to the same statutory constraints as are CIA covert actions. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e). However, as Robert Chesney explains, many military-led targeted killings may fall into one of the CAS exceptions—for instance, that for traditional military activities—so that the statute’s requirements will not always apply to military-led targetings. Such activities are exempted from the CAS’s presidential finding and authorization requirements, as well as its congressional reporting rules.¶ Because such unacknowledged military operations are, in many respects, indistinguishable from traditional covert actions conducted by the CIA, this exception may provide a “loophole” allowing the President to circumvent existing oversight mechanisms without substantively changing his operational decisions. However, at least some military-led targetings do not fall within the CAS exceptions, and are thus subject to that statute’s oversight requirements. For instance, Chesney and Kenneth Anderson explain, some believe that the traditional military activities exception to the CAS only applies in the context of overt hostilities, yet it is not clear that the world’s tacit awareness that targeted killing operations are conducted (albeit not officially acknowledged) by the U.S. military, such as the drone program in Pakistan, makes those operations sufficiently overt to place them within the traditional military activities exception, and thus outside the constraints of the CAS.¶ Chesney asserts, however, that despite the gaps in the CAS’s applicability to military-led targeted killings, those targetings are nevertheless subject to a web of oversight created by executive orders that, taken together, largely mirrors the presidential authorization requirements of the CAS. But, this process is not enshrined in statute or regulation and arguably could be changed or revoked by the President at any time. Moreover, this internal Executive Branch process does not involve Congress or the Judiciary in either ex ante or ex post oversight of military-led targeted killings, and thus, Philip Alston asserts, it may be insufficient to provide a meaningful check against arbitrary and overzealous Executive actions.

#### Specifically true of congressional restrictions- he’ll circumvent the shit out of them

**Druck ‘12** [Judah A. Druck, law associate at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Cornell Law School graduate, magna cum laude graduate from Brandeis University, “Droning On: The War Powers Resolution and the Numbing Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare,” <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Druck-final.pdf>]

Of course, despite these various suits, Congress has received¶ much of the blame for the WPR’s treatment and failures. For example, Congress has been criticized for doing little to enforce the WPR¶ in using other Article I tools, such as the “power of the purse,”76 or by¶ closing the loopholes frequently used by presidents to avoid the WPR in the first place.77 Furthermore, in those situations where Congress¶ has decided to act, it has done so in such a disjointed manner as to¶ render any possible check on the President useless. For example, during President Reagan’s invasion of Grenada, Congress failed to reach¶ an agreement to declare the WPR’s sixty-day clock operative,78 and¶ later faced similar “deadlock” in deciding how best to respond to President Reagan’s actions in the Persian Gulf, eventually settling for a bill¶ that reflected congressional “ambivalence.”79 Thus, between the lack¶ of a “backbone” to check rogue presidential action and general ineptitude when it actually decides to act, Congress has demonstrated its¶ inability to remedy WPR violations.¶ Worse yet, much of Congress’s interest in the WPR is politically¶ motivated, leading to inconsistent review of presidential military decisions filled with post-hoc rationalizations. Given the political risk associated with wartime decisions,81 Congress lacks any incentive to act¶ unless and until it can gauge public reaction—a process that often¶ occurs after the fact.82 As a result, missions deemed successful by the¶ public will rarely provoke “serious congressional concern” about presidential compliance with the WPR, while failures will draw scrutiny.83¶ For example, in the case of the Mayaguez, “liberals in the Congress¶ generally praised [President Gerald Ford’s] performance” despite the¶ constitutional questions surrounding the conflict, simply because the public deemed it a success.84 Thus, even if Congress was effective at¶ checking potentially unconstitutional presidential action, it would only act when politically safe to do so. This result should be unsurprising: making a wartime decision provides little advantage for politicians, especially if the resulting action succeeds.85 Consequently,¶ Congress itself has taken a role in the continued disregard for WPR¶ enforcement.¶ The current WPR framework is broken: presidents avoid it, courts¶ will not rule on it, and Congress will not enforce it. This cycle has¶ culminated in President Obama’s recent use of force in Libya, which¶ created little, if any, controversy,86 and it provides a clear pass to future presidents, judges, and congresspersons looking to continue the¶ system of passivity and deferment.

#### Plan can’t solve future president rollback

**Fournier 5-28**-13 [Ron Fournier is the Editorial Director of National Journal. Prior to joining National Journal, he worked at the Associated Press for 20 years, most recently as Washington Bureau Chief. Starting with a Little Rock posting, covering Bill Clinton's second term as governor, Fournier moved to Washington to report on the Clinton White House. He has won numerous awards for his work, including the Society of Professional Journalists' Sigma Delta Chi Award for coverage of the 2000 elections and a four-time winner of the prestigious White House Correspondents' Association Merriman Smith Memorial Award. His 2012 piece on the decline of U.S. institutions, "In Nothing We Trust," was awarded an honorable mention in David Brook’s essay contest, the Sidney Awards, “What If the Next President Is Even Worse?” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/what-if-the-next-president-is-even-worse-20130528>]

George W. Bush in 2001 declared war on a tactic (terrorism), and empowered Big Brother to tap phones, launch drones, and indefinitely imprison people without due process.¶ Barack Obama in 2008 declared those Bush policies an overreach, and pledged to curb drone strikes, protect media freedoms, and close the prison at Guantanamo Bay. Instead, he escalated drone strikes and spied on the media. Gitmo is still open for its grim business.¶ These are facts. And yet, they are distorted by extreme and narrow-minded partisans, supporters of both Bush and Obama.¶ Conservatives contend that Bush single-handedly prevented a major terrorist strike after Sept. 11, 2001. They demagogue efforts to shift the pendulum back toward civil liberties. Last week, when Obama finally proposed a modest reassessment of the Bush doctrine, Sen. Saxby Chambliss, R-Ga., claimed the efforts "will be viewed by terrorists as a victory."¶ Liberals hypocritically gave Obama a pass for furthering the same policies they condemned in 2008. Criticism from the left was half-hearted and muted, compared with their Bush-era indignation. On Gitmo, left-wingers rightly blamed the GOP for blocking closure but didn't shame Obama into using his executive authority to shutter the pit.¶ Some progressives even tried to justify the Obama administration's efforts to criminalize the work of a Fox News reporter. Would they be so blase about a White House targeting MSNBC?¶ As Leonard Downie Jr. wrote in Sunday's Washington Post, "Hardly anything seems immune from constitutionally dangerous politicking in a polarized Washington."¶ But that's no excuse for missing the big picture, which is this: Bush and Obama shouldn't worry you nearly as much as the next president.¶ Or the one after that.¶ Think about it, liberals. What if there is a president in your lifetime who is more conservative than Bush? What if that commander in chief is empowered, as were Bush and Obama, by a national tragedy and a compliant Congress?¶ Your guy Obama has armed a president-turned-zealot with dangerous powers and precedents.¶ Think about it, conservatives. It may be maddening to listen to Obama tie himself into knots over the balance between liberty and freedom, but what if the next Democratic president sees no limit on a commander in chief's powers? What if he or she doesn't give a whit about offending the mainstream media? The IRS targeting conservatives is a scandal, but there is no evidence that it was directed by the White House. What if the next Democratic president publicly declared his or her political opponents a direct threat to national security, and openly deployed federal agents against them?¶ Before your eyes roll out of your heads, it is not unthinkable that a future president could make Bush and Obama look downright libertarian. We live in an age of rapid connectivity and hyper-celebrity, forces that create, destroy, and often resurrect public figures within the lifespan of a cicada. Does the name Justin Bieber ring a bell?¶ How about Sarah Palin? Our culture of celebrity coupled with the public's disaffection with Washington, could lead to the election of a true demagogue or reactionary. Put it this way: What if Huey Long had had access to the Internet? Or even Pat Buchanan? Don't be blinded by partisanship.

## Terror Adv

#### This advantage set makes no sense

1. Rollback now- means EU wants TOTAL ROLLBACK of drone policy- you don’t solve coop
2. No rollback now- no uniqueness to your terro radv

#### No terror threats- weakened terrorists not focused on large-scale attacks on the West- best intel

Ackerman, 13 -- Wired senior reporter

[Spencer, "Spy Chiefs Point to a Much, Much Weaker Al-Qaida," Wired, 3-13-13, www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/spy-terrorism/, accessed 9-18-13, mss]

Don’t ever expect the heads of the U.S.’ 16-agency spy apparatus to say it outright. But the testimony they provided Tuesday morning to a Senate panel described al-Qaida, the scourge of the U.S. for 12 years, as a threat that’s on the verge of becoming a spent force, if they’re not already. James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, and his colleagues at the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Counterterrorism Center and State Department, never made that contention outright to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Tuesday. But in their annual public briefing on the threats America faces, they focused on their budgets and on cyber attacks more than they did terrorism. Not only was that itself a big change in the annual exercise, what they said about the threat from al-Qaida was mostly cheerful news. Al-Qaida’s core in Pakistan is so degraded that it is “probably unable to carry out complex, large-scale attacks in the West,” Clapper testified. (.pdf) Its regional affiliates, in Iraq, Somalia and northern Africa, are focused on local attacks. Despite all the online propaganda seeking to radicalize American Muslim, homegrown jihadis will attempt “fewer than ten domestic plots per year.” Last year, the plots hit the single digits; no one died from them. Matt Olsen, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, testified that those attempts are and are likely to remain “unsophisticated.” Those al-Qaida manages to inspire may be “wayward knuckleheads,” Olsen said, but they’ll remain a challenge for the spy apparatus to monitor and disrupt. The exception is al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemen affiliate of the organization, which remains the one most inclined to attack the U.S. at home. FBI director Robert Mueller said the threat to U.S. airliners from that affiliate is “undiminished.” Attacking outside Yemen remains a priority for the organization. But Clapper said they’ll have to balance that agenda with both their aspirations in Yemen and the degree to which “they have individuals who can manage, train, and deploy operatives for U.S. operations.” To be clear, not a single spy chief said that al-Qaida is no longer a big deal. Not a single spy chief said that al-Qaida no longer threatens the United States. And not a single spy chief so much as hinted that it’s time for U.S. officials to consider the global war on terrorism finished. Ever since the Benghazi attack of September, those officials and their spy chiefs have stopped predicting that al-Qaida is on the verge of defeat. If anything, Clapper warned that the budget crunch he’s under might make it harder to spot and prevent the next al-Qaida attack. Yet the picture they presented of al-Qaida is no longer one of a determined global movement growing in strength; seeking the world’s deadliest weapons; and capable of pulling off complex, mass-casualty assaults. Benghazi, and the January attack on an Algerian oil field, look like models for the terrorist threats of the future: ones that occur far from U.S. soil, launched by unaffiliated groups that are primarily focused on a local agenda, yet sufficiently inspired by al-Qaida’s rhetoric or sympathetic to its worldview that unsecured western targets of opportunity are in its cross-hairs. Left unsaid and un-debated at the hearing: whether that diminished threat means it’s time to roll back the U.S. global wartime apparatus; or whether it’s only diminished because of an aggressive wartime apparatus that **needs to keep doing what it’s doing, lest the threat re-emerge**.

#### Not a chance of drone rollback

**Ratnesar 5-23**-13 [Romesh Ratnesar is deputy editor of Bloomberg Businessweek and a Bernard L. Schwartz Fellow at the New America Foundation, “Five Reasons Why Drones Are Here to Stay,” <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-23/five-reasons-why-drones-are-here-to-stay>]

In his much-lauded speech on counterterrorism at the National Defense University, President Obama sought to draw limits on U.S. use of unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, to target terrorists. The administration has announced plans to shift responsibility for the drone program from the CIA to the Pentagon and require that drones be used only against those who pose an imminent threat to the country. In his speech, Obama signaled an openness to the creation of a special court that would oversee future drone operations. He suggested that the number of drone strikes will drop in the “Afghan war theater”—which includes the tribal areas of Pakistan, where the vast majority of strikes have taken place (as illustrated in this comprehensive map by my colleagues at Bloomberg Businessweek.) According to Obama, the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2014 and “the progress we have made against core al Qaeda will reduce the need for unmanned strikes.”¶ There’s some reason to believe, then, that the drone campaign will slow down considerably during Obama’s second term. But it’s far too soon to herald the end of the drone war. Fiscal constraints, strategic realities, and tactical considerations—some of which Obama highlighted during his speech—mean that drones will remain a central feature of U.S. counterterrorism policies for years to come. Here are five reasons why flying robots are here to stay:¶ 1. They’re Cheap. The U.S. has around 8,000 drones in its arsenal, most of which are used for surveillance and spying. That amounts to around one-third of all military aircraft. Yet drones cost a small fraction of manned fighter jets, which still consume more than 90 percent of all Pentagon spending on air power. The most powerful drone currently used by the CIA and the military in anti-terrorist operations is the MQ-9 Reaper; it costs around $12 million per drone. A conservative estimate of the cost of an F-22, the Air Force’s most advanced war plane, is 10 times that amount. An analysis by the American Security Project concluded that, even after accounting for the dozens of personnel needed to operate drones, plus their crash rate, “the drones most widely used in U.S. operations have a slight cost advantage over fighter jets.”¶ 2. They Work. As Obama said at NDU, “dozens of highly skilled al Qaeda commanders, trainers, bomb makers, and operatives have been taken off the battlefield” by drones. Estimates of the numbers killed by U.S. drone strikes vary; according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, the strikes have killed 3,136 people, including 555 civilians. Though tragic, the ratio of civilian deaths caused by drones—about 17 percent—compares favorably with alternative forms of warfare. In conventional military conflicts, civilian deaths typically account for anywhere between 30 percent and 80 percent of all fatalities. By those standards, U.S. drones strikes have been remarkably precise—and their accuracy has improved with time. According to the New America Foundation, in the 48 drones strikes conducted in Pakistan last year, fewer than 2 percent of those killed were civilians.¶ 3. They’re Necessary. Despite their comparatively low cost and relative accuracy, killing terrorists from the sky is still less desirable than capturing them on the ground. The trouble is that al-Qaeda continues to thrive in places where government institutions and security forces are weak, embattled—or, in the case of Syria, just as unappealing as the extremists. As upheaval continues to spread across the greater Middle East, the U.S. will have even fewer local allies to count on. But after almost 12 years of bloody counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, neither the president nor the Pentagon have any desire to send U.S. troops into such seething, jihadist-infested hotspots as Yemen, Mali, or Syria. In badlands like these, drones will continue to be the least worst option.¶ 4. They’re Popular. What was perhaps most curious about Obama’s drones speech was that it was politically unnecessary. A poll taken in February found that 56 percent of Americans support drone attacks against suspected terrorists. The consensus cuts across party lines: The policy is backed by 68 percent of Republicans, 58 percent of Democrats and 50 percent of independents. The fact that drones are already being used less often—there have been 25 lethal strikes through the first five months of 2013, compared to 114 in all of 2012—coupled with their improved precision, means that public support is likely to remain strong. 5. They’re Spreading. Americans like to think they enjoy a monopoly on drone technology. They don’t. According to the Brookings Institution’s P.W. Singer, a leading authority on drones, at least 75 militaries around the world have used drones, and more than two dozen possess versions that “are armed or of a model that has been armed in the past.” The global market for drones, including those used for civilian purposes, is expected to grow massively in coming decades. It’s almost certain that states other than the U.S. will attempt to carry out lethal drone attacks against their enemies. For that reason, Obama should take the lead in establishing an international protocol governing the acceptable use of drones. Convincing other countries to sign on to such a convention might require the U.S. to further curtail its drone use. But don’t expect to get rid of them altogether.

#### No Russian miscalculation

Weitz ‘11 (Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” <http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties>, September 27, 2011)

Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States regardless of who is in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage can never be happy with having NATO be Europe's most powerful security institution, since Moscow is not a member and cannot become one. Similarly, the Russians will always object to NATO's missile defense efforts since they can neither match them nor join them in any meaningful way. In the case of Iran, Russian officials genuinely perceive less of a threat from Tehran than do most Americans, and Russia has more to lose from a cessation of economic ties with Iran -- as well as from an Iranian-Western reconciliation. On the other hand, these conflicts can be managed, since they will likely remain limited and compartmentalized. Russia and the West do not have fundamentally conflicting vital interests of the kind countries would go to war over. And as the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a great pacifier under such conditions. Another novel development is that Russia is much more integrated into the international economy and global society than the Soviet Union was, and Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record. Beyond that, there are objective criteria, such as the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the difficulty of controlling modern means of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia

Intel i/l is based off of EU alliance—that’s inevitable

Moravcsik 3 (Andrew, Professor of Government and Director of the European Union Program – Harvard University, July/August, Foreign Affairs, Lexis)

Transatlantic optimists are also right when they argue that the recent shifts need not lead inexorably to the collapse of NATO, the UN, or theEU. Historically, they note, transatlantic crises have been cyclical events, arising most often when conservative Republican presidents pursued assertive unilateral military policies. During the Vietnam era and the Reagan administration, as today, European polls recorded 80-95 percent opposition to U.S. intervention, millions of protesters flooded the streets, NATO was deeply split, and European politicians compared the United States to Nazi Germany. Washington went into "opposition" at the UN, where, since 1970, it has vetoed 34 Security Council resolutions on the Middle East alone, each time casting the lone dissent.In the recent crisis, a particularly radical American policy combined with a unique confluence of European domestic pressures -- German Chancellor Gerhard Schrsder's political vulnerability and French President Jacques Chirac's Gaullist skepticism of American power -- to trigger the crisis.Most Europeans -- like most Americans -- rejected the neoconservative claim that a preemptive war against Iraq without multilateral support was necessary or advisable. Sober policy analysis underlay the concerns of the doubters, who felt that the war in Iraq, unlike the one in Afghanistan, was not really connected to the "war on terrorism." Skeptics were also wary of the difficulties and costs likely to attend postwar reconstruction. No surprise, then, that most foreign governments sought to exhaust alternatives to war before moving forward and refused to set the dangerous precedent of authorizing an attack simply because the United States requested it. In spite of these doubts about the Bush administration's policies, however, underlying U.S. and European interests remainstrikingly convergent. It is a cliche but nonetheless accurate to assert that the Western relationship rests on shared values: democracy, human rights, open markets, and a measure of social justice. No countries are more likely to agree on basic policy, and to have the power to dosomething about it. Even regarding a sensitive area such as the Middle East, both sides recognize Israel's right to exist, advocate a Palestinian state, oppose tyrants such as Saddam Hussein, seek oil security, worry about radical Islamism, and fear terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.

No EU backlash to drones- they’re passive

**Dworkin ‘13** [Anthony, Anthony Dworkin is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, was previously the executive director of the Crimes of War Project, “Drones and Targeted Killing: Defining a European Position,” July, <http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR84_DRONES_BRIEF.pdf>]

The US use of drones for targeted killing away from any ¶ battlefield has become the focus of increasing attention ¶ and concern in Europe. In a recent opinion poll, people ¶ in all European countries sampled were opposed to the ¶ use of drones to kill extremists outside the battlefield and ¶ a large majority of European legal scholars reject the legal ¶ justification offered for these attacks.2¶ But European leaders and officials have responded to the US campaign of drone strikes in a muted and largely passive way. Although some ¶ European officials have made their disagreement with ¶ the legal claims underlying US policies clear in closeddoor dialogues and bilateral meetings, EU member state representatives have said almost nothing in public about US drone strikes.3¶ The EU has so far failed to set out ¶ any vision of its own about when the use of lethal force ¶ against designated individuals is legitimate. Nor is there any indication that European states have made a serious effort to influence the development of US policy or to begin ¶ discussions on formulating common standards for the kinds ¶ of military operations that UAVs facilitate.

#### Alt cause—detention

Archick 13 (Kristin- US government based Specialist in European Affairs providing a congressional report on US-EU counter-terrorism cooperation, May 21, “U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism”, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf)

U.S. and European officials alike maintain that the imperative to provide freedom and security at ¶ home should not come at the cost of sacrificing core principles with respect to civil liberties and ¶ upholding common standards on human rights. Nevertheless, the status and treatment of ¶ suspected terrorist detainees has often been a key point of U.S.-European tension. Especially ¶ during the former George W. Bush Administration, a number of U.S. policies were subject to ¶ widespread criticism in Europe; these included the U.S.-run detention facility at Guantánamo ¶ Bay, Cuba; U.S. plans to try enemy combatants before military commissions; and the use of ¶ “enhanced interrogation techniques.” The U.S. practice of “extraordinary rendition” (or ¶ extrajudicial transfer of individuals from one country to another, often for the purpose of ¶ interrogation) and the possible presence of CIA detention facilities in Europe also gripped ¶ European media attention and prompted numerous investigations by the European Parliament, ¶ national legislatures, and judicial bodies, among others. Some individuals held at Guantánamo ¶ and/or allegedly subject to U.S. rendition have been European citizens or residents. ¶ Many European leaders and analysts viewed these U.S. terrorist detainee and interrogation ¶ policies as being in breach of international and European law, and as degrading shared values ¶ regarding human rights and the treatment of prisoners. Moreover, they feared that such U.S. ¶ policies weakened U.S. and European efforts to win the battle for Muslim “hearts and minds,” ¶ considered by many to be a crucial element in countering terrorism. The Bush Administration, ¶ however, defended its detainee and rendition polices as important tools in the fight against ¶ terrorism, and vehemently denied allegations that such policies violated U.S. human rights ¶ commitments. The Bush Administration officials acknowledged European concerns about ¶ Guantánamo and sought agreements with foreign governments to accept some Guantánamo ¶ detainees, but maintained that certain prisoners were too dangerous to be released. ¶ U.S.-EU frictions over terrorist detainee policies have subsided to some degree since the start of ¶ the Obama Administration. EU and other European officials welcomed President Obama’s ¶ announcement in January 2009 that the United States intended to close the detention facility at ¶ Guantánamo within a year. They were also pleased with President Obama’s executive order ¶ banning torture and his initiative to review Bush Administration legal opinions regarding ¶ detention and interrogation methods. In March 2009, the U.S. State Department appointed a ¶ special envoy to work on closing the detention facility, tasked in particular with persuading ¶ countries in Europe and elsewhere to accept detainees cleared for release but who could not be ¶ repatriated to their country of origin for fear of torture or execution. Some EU members accepted ¶ small numbers of released detainees, but others declined. At the same time, the Obama Administration has faced significant challenges in its efforts to close ¶ Guantánamo. Some observers contend that U.S. officials have been frustrated by the reluctance of ¶ other countries, including some in Europe, to take in more detainees. Congressional opposition to ¶ elements of the Administration’s plan for closing Guantánamo, and certain restrictions imposed ¶ by Congress (including on the Administration’s ability to transfer detainees to other countries ¶ amid concerns that some released detainees were engaging in terrorist activity), have also ¶ presented obstacles. Consequently, the Obama Administration has not fulfilled its promise to shut ¶ down Guantánamo. The Administration asserts that it remains committed to closing the detention ¶ facility, but in March 2011, President Obama signed an executive order that in effect creates a ¶ formal system of indefinite detention for those detainees at Guantánamo not charged or convicted ¶ but deemed too dangerous to free. The Administration also announced in March 2011 an end to ¶ its two-year freeze on new military commission trials for Guantánamo detainees. In January ¶ 2013, the duties of the State Department’s special envoy were assumed by a different office; ¶ many observers have interpreted this latest move as signaling that the Administration recognizes ¶ that closing Guantánamo is unlikely in the near future. Press reports indicate that 166 detainees ¶ currently remain at Guantánamo.46¶ Some European policymakers continue to worry that as long as Guantánamo remains open, it ¶ helps serve as a recruiting tool for Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Some European officials have also ¶ voiced concern about those detainees at Guantánamo who have been on hunger strikes since ¶ February 2013, and recent clashes between prison guards and some detainees. In mid-April 2013, ¶ during a plenary session, the European Parliament discussed the current situation at Guantánamo; ¶ a number of MEPs representing several political groups introduced a joint resolution that ¶ expresses concern for those on hunger strike, calls upon the United States to close the ¶ Guantánamo detention facility, and recalls the willingness of EU member states to assist U.S. ¶ authorities in shutting down Guantánamo.47¶ Many Europeans also remain concerned about the past role of European governments in U.S. ¶ terrorist detainee policies and practices. In September 2012, the European Parliament passed a ¶ non-binding resolution (by 568 votes to 34, with 77 abstentions) calling upon EU member states ¶ to investigate whether CIA detention facilities had existed on their territories.48 The resolution ¶ urged Lithuania, Poland, and Romania in particular to open or resume independent investigations, ¶ and called on several other member states to fully disclose all relevant information related to ¶ suspected CIA flights on their territory.Meanwhile, some U.S. and European officials worry that ¶ allegations of U.S. wrongdoing and rendition-related criminal proceedings against CIA officers in ¶ some EU states (stemming from the Bush era) continue to cast a long shadow and could put vital ¶ U.S.-European intelligence cooperation against terrorism at risk.49

## Norms Adv

**No South China Sea or Senkaku conflict or escalation – their evidence is media exagerration** –

**Kania 13** – The Harvard Political Review is a journal of politics and public policy published by the Institute of Politics, cites Andrew Ring, a former Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Fellow, and Peter Dutton, Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College (Elsa, 01/11, “The South China Sea: Flashpoints and the U.S. Pivot,” http://harvardpolitics.com/world/the-south-china-sea-flashpoints-and-the-u-s-pivot/)

Equilibrium and Interdependence? One paradox at the heart of the South China Sea is the uneasy equilibrium that has largely been maintained. **Despite** the occasional confrontation and **frequent** diplomatic **squabbling, the situation has never escalated into full-blown physical conflict**. The main stabilizing factor has been that the countries involved have too much to lose from turmoil, and so much to gain from tranquility. Andrew Ring—former Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Fellow—emphasized that “With respect to the South China Sea, we all have the same goals” in terms of regional stability and development. With regional **trade flows and interdependence** critical to the region’s growing economies, conflict could be devastating. Even for China—the actor with by far the most to gain from such a dispute—taking unilateral action would **irreparably tarnish its image** in the eyes of the international community. With the predominant narrative of a “rising” and “assertive China”—referred to as a potential adversary by President Obama in the third presidential debate—China’s behavior in the South China Sea may be sometimes **exaggerated or sensationalized**. Dr. Auer, former Naval officer and currently Director of the Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation at the Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies, told the HPR that “China has not indicated any willingness to negotiate multilaterally” and remains “very uncooperative.” Across its maritime territorial disputes—particularly through recent tensions with Japan in the East China Sea—Auer sees China as having taken a very aggressive stance, and he claims that “Chinese behavior is not understandable or clear.” Nonetheless, in recent incidents, such as a standoff between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal this past April, as Bonnie Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, emphasized, “this is not an either or.” Multiple parties are responsible for the tensions, yet the cycle of action and reaction is **often obscured**. Nonetheless, Glaser believes that “The Chinese have in every one of these cases overreacted—they have sought to take advantage of the missteps of other countries,” responding with disproportionate coercion. In addition, China has begun to use methods of “economic coercion” to assert its interests against trade partners. A Tipping Point? Has the dynamic in the South China Sea shifted recently? Perhaps not in a fundamental sense. But with the regional military buildup, governments have developed a greater capacity to pursue longstanding objectives. According to Peter Dutton, Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, “China’s recent behavior in the East China Sea and assertive policy in the South China Sea” is “a serious concern.” He believes that China’s willingness to resort to force in defense of its territorial claims has been increasing over time, partially as a consequence of its rising power. As such, Dutton sees the situation as reaching a “tipping point in which China is…no longer satisfied with shelving the dispute.” Is confrontation or resolution imminent? Worryingly, Dutton observes, “the international dynamic in the region is motivated largely by fear and anger.” However, **the use of unilateral military force would be a lose-lose for China**,” particularly in terms of its credibility, both among its neighbors and in the international community. The Pivot in the South China Sea From a U.S. perspective, a sustained American presence in the region has long been the underpinning of peace and stability. However, excessive U.S. intervention could disrupt the delicate balance that has been established. Although the U.S. has always sought to maintain a position of neutrality in territorial disputes, remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that referred to the South China Sea as the “West Philippine Sea” led China to challenge U.S. impartiality. If the U.S. engages with its regional allies without seeking enhanced engagement with China, then U.S. actions in the region may be perceived by China as efforts at containment. Moreover, as the U.S. strengthens ties to partners in the region, there is risk of entanglement if conflict were to break out. There has long been an undercurrent of tension between the Philippines and China—most recently displayed in the standoff over the Scarborough Shoal in May 2012. Shortly thereafter, in a visit to Washington D.C., President Aquino sought U.S. commitment to military support of the Philippines in the event of conflict with China on the basis of the 1952 Mutual Defense Treaty. However, despite providing further military and naval support, the U.S. has refrained from making concrete commitments. Although the U.S. would not necessarily be dragged into a dispute, if a confrontation did break out, it might feel compelled to respond militarily to maintain the credibility of commitments to allies and partners in the region. Strong ties to the U.S. and enhanced military capacity could also provoke more confrontational behavior from U.S. partners. Yet, Ring emphasizes that the U.S. navy and military are also unique in the “ability to facilitate military cooperation and communication among all of the claimants” and particularly to “be that bridge…uniquely situated to build some flows of communication” **that could facilitate a peaceful resolution to future incidents.**

#### China won’t use drones aggressively- rationality checks

**Erickson and Strange 5-29**-13 [Andrew Erickson is an associate professor at the Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard University's Fairbank Centre, Austin Strange is a researcher at the Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, “China has drones. Now how will it use them?” <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/China-has-drones-Now-how-will-it-use-them-30207095.html>]

Drones, able to dispatch death remotely, without human eyes on their targets or a pilot's life at stake, make people uncomfortable - even when they belong to democratic governments that presumably have some limits on using them for ill. (On May 23, in a major speech, US President Barack Obama laid out what some of those limits are.) An even more alarming prospect is that unmanned aircraft will be acquired and deployed by authoritarian regimes, with fewer checks on their use of lethal force.¶ Those worried about exactly that tend to point their fingers at China. In March, after details emerged that China had considered taking out a drug trafficker in Myanmar with a drone strike, a CNN blog post warned, "Today, it's Myanmar. Tomorrow, it could very well be some other place in Asia or beyond." Around the same time, a National Journal article entitled "When the Whole World Has Drones" teased out some of the consequences of Beijing's drone programme, asking, "What happens if China arms one of its remote-piloted planes and strikes Philippine or Indian trawlers in the South China Sea?"¶ Indeed, the time to fret about when China and other authoritarian countries will acquire drones is over: they have them. The question now is when and how they will use them. But as with its other, less exotic military capabilities, Beijing has cleared only a technological hurdle - and its behaviour will continue to be constrained by politics.¶ China has been developing a drone capacity for over half a century, starting with its reverse engineering of Soviet Lavochkin La-17C target drones that it had received from Moscow in the late 1950s. Today, Beijing's opacity makes it difficult to gauge the exact scale of the programme, but according to Ian Easton, an analyst at the Project 2049 Institute, an American think-tank devoted to Asia-Pacific security matters, by 2011 China's air force alone had over 280 combat drones. In other words, its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles is already bigger and more sophisticated than all but the United States'; in this relatively new field Beijing is less of a newcomer and more of a fast follower. And the force will only become more effective: the Lijian ("sharp sword" in Chinese), a combat drone in the final stages of development, will make China one of the very few states that have or are building a stealth drone capacity.¶ This impressive arsenal may tempt China to pull the trigger. The fact that a Chinese official acknowledged that Beijing had considered using drones to eliminate the Myanmar drug trafficker, Naw Kham, makes clear that it would not be out of the question for China to launch a drone strike in a security operation against a non-state actor. Meanwhile, as China's territorial disputes with its neighbours have escalated, there is a chance that Beijing would introduce unmanned aircraft, especially since India, the Philippines and Vietnam distantly trail China in drone funding and capacity, and would find it difficult to compete. Beijing is already using drones to photograph the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands it disputes with Japan, as the retired Chinese major-general Peng Guangqian revealed earlier this year, and to keep an eye on movements near the North Korean border.¶ Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China's rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, according to recent public statements from China's Defence Ministry.¶ What about using drones outside of Chinese-claimed areas? That China did not, in fact, launch a drone strike on the Myanmar drug criminal underscores its caution. According to Liu Yuejin, the director of the anti-drug bureau in China's Ministry of Public Security, Beijing considered using a drone carrying a 20-kilogram TNT payload to bomb Kham's mountain redoubt in northeast Myanmar. Kham had already evaded capture three times, so a drone strike may have seemed to be the best option. The authorities apparently had at least two plans for capturing Kham. The method they ultimately chose was to send Chinese police forces to lead a transnational investigation that ended in April 2012 with Kham's capture near the Myanmar-Laos border. The ultimate decision to refrain from the strike may reflect both a fear of political reproach and a lack of confidence in untested drones, systems, and operators.¶ The restrictive position that Beijing takes on sovereignty in international forums will further constrain its use of drones. China is not likely to publicly deploy drones for precision strikes or in other military assignments without first having been granted a credible mandate to do so. The gold standard of such an authorisation is a resolution passed by the UN Security Council, the stamp of approval that has permitted Chinese humanitarian interventions in Africa and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. China might consider using drones abroad with some sort of regional authorisation, such as a country giving Beijing explicit permission to launch a drone strike within its territory. But even with the endorsement of the international community or specific states, China would have to weigh any benefits of a drone strike abroad against the potential for mishaps and perceptions that it was infringing on other countries' sovereignty - something Beijing regularly decries when others do it. The limitations on China's drone use are reflected in the country's academic literature on the topic. The bulk of Chinese drone research is dedicated to scientific and technological topics related to design and performance. The articles that do discuss potential applications primarily point to major combat scenarios -such as a conflagration with Taiwan or the need to attack a US aircraft carrier - which would presumably involve far more than just drones. Chinese researchers have thought a great deal about the utility of drones for domestic surveillance and law enforcement, as well as for non-combat-related tasks near China's contentious borders. Few scholars, however, have publicly considered the use of drone strikes overseas.¶ Yet there is a reason why the United States has employed drones extensively despite domestic and international criticism: it is much easier and cheaper to kill terrorists from above than to try to root them out through long and expensive counterinsurgency campaigns. Some similar challenges loom on China's horizon. Within China, Beijing often considers protests and violence in the restive border regions, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, to constitute terrorism. It would presumably consider ordering precision strikes to suppress any future violence there. Even if such strikes are operationally prudent, China's leaders understand that they would damage the country's image abroad, but they prioritise internal stability above all else. Domestic surveillance by drones is a different issue; there should be few barriers to its application in what is already one of the world's most heavily policed societies. China might also be willing to use stealth drones in foreign airspace without authorisation if the risk of detection were low enough; it already deploys intelligence-gathering ships in the exclusive economic zones of Japan and the United States, as well as in the Indian Ocean.¶ Still, although China enjoys a rapidly expanding and cutting-edge drone fleet, it is bound by the same rules of the game as the rest of the military's tools. Beyond surveillance, the other non-lethal military actions that China can take with its drones are to facilitate communications within the Chinese military, support electronic warfare by intercepting electronic communications and jamming enemy systems, and help identify targets for Chinese precision strike weapons, such as missiles. Beijing's overarching approach remains one of caution - something Washington must bear in mind with its own drone programme.

#### No China-Japan war- MAD and economics check

**Katz 13**, Richard, Editor of the semiweekly The Oriental Economist Alert and the monthly The Oriental Economist Report, both reports on Japan, “Mutual Assured Production: Why Trade Will Limit Conflict Between China and Japan,” July/August, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139451/richard-katz/mutual-assured-production?page=show>

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union carefully avoided triggering a nuclear war because of the assumption of “mutual assured destruction”: each knew that any such conflict would mean the obliteration of both countries. Today, even though tensions between China and Japan are rising, an economic version of mutual deterrence is preserving the uneasy status quo between the two sides. Last fall, as the countries escalated their quarrel over an island chain that Japan has controlled for more than a century, many Chinese citizens boycotted Japanese products and took to the streets in anti-Japanese riots. This commotion, at times encouraged by the Chinese government, led the Japanese government to fear that Beijing might exploit Japan’s reliance on China as an export market to squeeze Tokyo into making territorial concessions. Throughout the crisis, Japan has doubted that China would ever try to forcibly seize the islands—barren rocks known in Chinese as the Diaoyu Islands and in Japanese as the Senkaku Islands -- if only because the United States has made it clear that it would come to Japan’s defense. Japanese security experts, however, have suggested that China might try other methods of intimidation, including a prolonged economic boycott. But these fears have not materialized, for one simple reason: China needs to buy Japanese products as much as Japan needs to sell them. Many of the high-tech products assembled in and exported from China, often on behalf of American and European firms, use advanced Japanese-made parts. China could not boycott Japan, let alone precipitate an actual conflict, without stymieing the export-fueled economic miracle that underpins Communist Party rule. For the moment, the combination of economic interdependence and Washington’s commitment to Japan’s defense will likely keep the peace. Still, an accidental clash of armed ships around the islands could lead to an unintended conflict. That is why defense officials from both countries have met with an eye to reducing that particular risk. With no resolution in sight, those who fear an escalation can nonetheless take solace in the fact that China and Japan stand to gain far more from trading than from fighting.

#### No-one will model united states restraint

**Etzioni ‘13** [Amitai, professor of international relations at George Washington University, “The Great Drone Debate,” March-April, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430_art004.pdf>]

Other critics contend that by the United States using drones, it leads other countries into making and using them. For example, Medea Benjamin, the cofounder of the anti-war activist group CODEPINK and author of a book about drones argues that, “The proliferation of drones should evoke reﬂection on the precedent that the United States is setting by killing anyone it wants, anywhere it wants, on the basis of secret information. Other nations and non-state entities are watching—and are bound to start acting in a similar fashion.”60 Indeed scores of countries are now manufacturing or purchasing drones. There can be little doubt that the fact that drones have served the United States well has helped to popularize them. However, it does not follow that United States should not have employed drones in the hope that such a show of restraint would deter others. First of all, this would have meant that either the United States would have had to allow terrorists in hardto-reach places, say North Waziristan, to either roam and rest freely—or it would have had to use bombs that would have caused much greater collateral damage. Further, the record shows that even when the United States did not develop a particular weapon, others did. Thus, China has taken the lead in the development of anti-ship missiles and seemingly cyber weapons as well. One must keep in mind that the international environment is a hostile one. Countries—and especially non-state actors— most of the time do not play by some set of selfconstraining rules. Rather, they tend to employ whatever weapons they can obtain that will further their interests. The United States correctly does not assume that it can rely on some non-existent implicit gentleman’s agreements that call for the avoidance of new military technology by nation X or terrorist group Y—if the United States refrains from employing that technology.

#### Drone prolif doesn’t escalate or cause terrorism

**Singh ’12** [Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security, an independent and non-partisan organization that focuses on researching and analyzing national security and defense policies, also a research assistant at the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) North America, is a War and Peace Fellow at the Dickey Center, a global research organization, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race,” 8-13-12, <http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/>]

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones.¶ As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings.¶ Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use.¶ In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.”¶ Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey.¶ Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory.¶ States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement.¶ This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active.¶ What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy.¶ In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region.¶ Non-state actors, on the other hand, have even more reasons to steer clear of drones:¶ – First, they are wildly expensive. At $15 million, the average weaponized drone is less costly than an F-16 fighter jet, yet much pricier than the significantly cheaper, yet equally damaging options terrorist groups could pursue.¶ – Those alternatives would also be relatively more difficult to trace back to an organization than an unmanned aerial vehicle, with all the technical and logistical planning its operation would pose.¶ – Weaponized drones are not easily deployable. Most require runways in order to be launched, which means that any non-state actor would likely require state sponsorship to operate a drone. Such sponsorship is unlikely given the political and diplomatic consequences the sponsoring state would certainly face.¶ – Finally, drones require an extensive team of on-the-ground experts to ensure their successful operation. According to the U.S. Air Force, 168 individuals are needed to operate a Predator drone, including a pilot, maintenance personnel and surveillance analysts.¶ In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology.¶ Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team.¶ Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones.¶ What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use.¶ Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best.¶ Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations.¶ Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### Drone prolif is slow and the impact is small

**Zenko ’13** [Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” January, Council Special Report No. 65, online]

Based on current trends, it is unlikely that most states will have, within ten years, the complete system architecture required to carry out¶ distant drone strikes that would be harmful to U.S. national interests.¶ However, those candidates able to obtain this technology will most¶ likely be states with the financial resources to purchase or the industrial¶ base to manufacture tactical short-range armed drones with limited¶ firepower that lack the precision of U.S. laser-guided munitions; the¶ intelligence collection and military command-and-control capabilities needed to deploy drones via line-of-sight communications; and crossborder¶ adversaries who currently face attacks or the threat of attacks¶ by manned aircraft, such as Israel into Lebanon, Egypt, or Syria; Russia¶ into Georgia or Azerbaijan; Turkey into Iraq; and Saudi Arabia into¶ Yemen. When compared to distant U.S. drone strikes, these contingencies¶ do not require system-wide infrastructure and host-state support.¶ Given the costs to conduct manned-aircraft strikes with minimal threat¶ to pilots, it is questionable whether states will undertake the significant¶ investment required for armed drones in the near term.

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## Transparency CP

### CP solves

**We’ll link turn the question of signal**

**Transparency’s a prerequisite to drone leadership**

**Ingersoll and Kelley 13**, Geoffrey, writes for Business Insider, Masters in Journalism from New York University, English Degree from Penn State, and Michael, writes for Business Insider, Master’s in Journalism from Medill, BA in Philosophy from Northwestern, “America Is Setting A Dangerous Precedent For The Drone Age,” January 9th, <http://www.businessinsider.com/america-is-setting-a-dangerous-precedent-for-the-drone-age-2013-1#ixzz2ZctC6wBI>

The decisions America makes today regarding drone policy could come back to haunt it sooner than later. Micah Zenko of the Council of Foreign Relations makes this argument in a new report: A major risk is that of proliferation. Over the next decade, the U.S. near-monopoly on drone strikes will erode as more countries develop and hone this capability. In this uncharted territory, U.S. policy provides a powerful precedent for other states and nonstate actors that will increasingly deploy drones with potentially dangerous ramifications. Jim Michaels of USA Today reports that 75 countries, including Iran and China, have developed or acquired drone technology in the wake of America's prolific program. The situation places the U.S. in a possibly very brief window of leadership — and transparency is the key first step to this leadership. U.S. policy is to consider "all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants ... unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent." America targets these individuals using a "disposition matrix" that serves to keep track of the ever-evolving procedures and legal justifications for placing suspects on the U.S. "kill list." And the Obama administration refuses to reveal its methods or justifications for bombing a target, indicated by a recent ruling to deny a FOIA request regarding the targeted killing of the 16-year-old American-born son of former Al-Qaeda propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki. From Judge Colleen McMahon's opinion: I find myself stuck in a paradoxical situation in which I cannot solve a problem because of contradictory constraints and rules - a veritable Catch-22. I can find no way around the thicket of laws and precedents that effectively allow the Executive Branch of our Government to proclaim as perfectly lawful certain actions that seem on their face incompatible with our Constitution and laws, while keeping the reasons for their conclusion a secret. So the U.S. has the benefit of the doubt, even when it carries out "signature strikes" in which the identities of those killed on the ground is unknown and the decision to strike hinges upon recognition of certain undisclosed behaviors and tendencies. That's a powerful precedent. Imagine China conducting strikes inside Japan, or its own borders (e.g. Tibet) while using the current administration's same opaque, one-size fits all statement that each strike only happens after "rigorous standards and process of review" — essentially, "nevermind the evidence, trust us." That wouldn't fly, but right now America is not in a very strong position to criticize such a situation. That's why, as Zenko argues, the U.S. must reform its policies or risk losing its moral and strategic advantage. A few months ago, the election spurred Obama to codify its rules and regulations regarding drone strikes because "there was concern that the levers might no longer be in our hands," one anonymous official told Scott Shane of the New York Times. Well that time is approaching, and it won't be a Mitt Romney or Marco Rubio in control. It'll be North Korea's Kim Jung Un, China's Hu Jintao, or Iran's Ahmed Ahmadinejad. Which means that it may be time to show the drone "playbook" so extrajudicial killings don't become a blindly accepted aspect of international foreign policy.

**it outweighs legal restrictions**

Roberts 13 (Kristin, When the Whole World Has Drones, National Journal, 21 March 2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321, da 8-1-13) PC

But even without raising standards, tightening up drone-specific restrictions in the standing control regime, or creating a new control agreement (which is never easy to pull off absent a bad-state actor threatening attack), just the process of lining up U.S. policy with U.S. practice would go a long way toward establishing the kind of precedent on use of this technology that America—in five, 10, or 15 years—might find helpful in arguing against another’s actions.¶ A not-insignificant faction of U.S. defense and intelligence experts, Dennis Blair among them, thinks norms play little to no role in global security. And they have evidence in support. The missile-technology regime, for example, might be credited with slowing some program development, but it certainly has not stopped non-signatories—North Korea and Iran—from buying, building, and selling missile systems. But norms established by technology-leading countries, even when not written into legal agreements among nations, have shown success in containing the use and spread of some weapons, including land mines, blinding lasers, and nuclear bombs.¶ Arguably more significant than spotty legal regimes, however, is the behavior of the United States. “History shows that how states adopt and use new military capabilities is often influenced by how other states have—or have not—used them in the past,” Zenko argued. Despite the legal and policy complexity of this issue, it is something the American people have, if slowly, come to care about. Given the attention that Rand Paul’s filibuster garnered, it is not inconceivable that public pressure on drone operations could force the kind of unforeseen change to U.S. policy that it did most recently on “enhanced interrogation” of terrorists.¶ The case against open, transparent rule-making is that it might only hamstring American options while doing little good elsewhere—as if other countries aren’t closely watching this debate and taking notes for their own future policymaking. But the White House’s refusal to answer questions about its drone use with anything but “no comment” ensures that the rest of the world is free to fill in the blanks where and when it chooses. And the United States will have already surrendered the moment in which it could have provided not just a technical operations manual for other nations but a legal and moral one as well.

**Transparency solves hearts and minds**

**Sennett 12**, Amy, recent graduate of Harvard Law School and a litigation associate at Arnold & Porter LLP in Washington, “Book Review: Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power by David E. Sanger,” September 30th, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/09/confront-and-conceal-obamas-secret-wars-and-surprising-use-of-american-power/

Perhaps most importantly, however, when Obama and his administration fail to discuss his policies, they **miss an opportunity to shape the hearts and minds of those around the world**. American officials in Afghanistan and Pakistan have been particularly frustrated by the refusal of the Obama administration to discuss the drone program, leaving it to local media to report, often falsely, on raids that eliminate dangerous terrorist cells. In addition, the failure to engage with the international legal community to establish the legitimate boundaries for the use of drones and cyberwarfare forgoes a means of ensuring that the same tools are not turned against the U.S. in the future. Both Sanger and Klaidman have been criticized for a lack of sources from the military in their narratives. But the challenge of 21st century American foreign policy seems to be less the ability of the U.S. military to achieve tactical goals and more about the ability of the U.S. legal and political system to adapt to changing realities. In a discussion with Sanger, Legal Adviser Koh posed the hypothetical question: “If someone sitting in a room in one country types something into a keyboard and something happens elsewhere, is it subject to the laws of armed conflict?” Answering his own question, he said, “To the extent that we have articulated principles, we have made it clear that we think that the laws of armed conflict in fact apply to cyber operations in war and we have to do a translation exercise of how they apply. But this translation exercise is really at a nascent stage.” For a president so concerned with crafting his own legacy, this lack of transparency is perhaps the most surprising element of his foreign policy. Obama did not want to inherit Bush policies and has been careful not to make certain of them his own, such as enhanced interrogation, while embracing and ramping up others, notably drone strikes. But he is also forward looking, weighing the power of his precedent in a new administration. In a 2009 meeting with advisers, Obama voiced concerns about what a future president may do with the power to indefinitely detain suspected terrorists. “You never know who is going to be president four years from now,” Obama said. “I have to think about how Mitt Romney would use that power.”

**Transparency solves international backlash**

**Byman 13**, Daniel, Professor in the Security Studies Program of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice,” Foreign Affairs, July/August

The spread of drones cannot be stopped, but the United States can still influence how they are used. The coming proliferation means that Washington needs to set forth a clear policy now on extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings of terrorists—and stick to it. Fortunately, Obama has begun to discuss what constitutes a legitimate drone strike. But the definition remains murky, and this murkiness will undermine the president’s ability to denounce other countries’behavior should they start using drones or other means to hunt down enemies. By keeping its policy secret, Washington also makes it easier for critics to claim that the United States is wantonly slaughtering innocents. More transparency would make it harder for countries such as Pakistan to make outlandish claims about what the United States is doing. Drones actually protect many Pakistanis, and Washington should emphasize this fact. By being more open, the administration could also show that it carefully considers the law and the risks to civilians before ordering a strike. Washington needs to be especially open about its use of signature strikes. According to the Obama administration, signature strikes have eliminated not only low-level al Qaeda and Taliban figures but also a surprising number of higher-level officials whose presence at the scenes of the strikes was unexpected. Signature strikes are in keeping with traditional military practice; for the most part, U.S. soldiers have been trained to strike enemies at large, such as German soldiers or Vietcong guerrillas, and not specific individuals. The rise of unconventional warfare, however, has made this usual strategy more difficult because the battlefield is no longer clearly defined and enemies no longer wear identifiable uniforms, making combatants harder to distinguish from civilians. In the case of drones, where there is little on-the-ground knowledge of who is who, signature strikes raise legitimate concerns, especially because the Obama administration has not made clear what its rules and procedures for such strikes are. Washington should exercise particular care with regard to signature strikes because mistakes risk tarnishing the entire drone program. In the absence of other information, the argument that drones are wantonly killing innocents is gaining traction in the United States and abroad. More transparency could help calm these fears that Washington is acting recklessly.

**CIA drone focus trades off with intel**

**Keller 13**, Bill, Op-Ed columnist for The New York Times, “Cowboys and Eggheads,” April 14th, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/15/opinion/keller-cowboys-and-eggheads.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&utm\_source=feedly&\_r=1&&pagewanted=all

But Mazzetti’s important thought is not that war is a dirty business; it is that by turning our premier intelligence agency into a killing machine, we may have paid a price in national vigilance. Alone among the many U.S. intelligence outfits (the number has grown to 16 or 17 depending on how you count) the C.I.A. has the job of supplying the president with the deep strategic intelligence that anticipates dangers and shapes American policy. The agency has always housed both covert operations and the more traditional gathering and analysis of information — “cowboys and eggheads,” as one agency-watcher put it. The worry is that the eggheads have become so caught up in serving the cowboys tactical intelligence about high-profile assassination targets that they have less bandwidth to devote to longer-term threats. “The C.I.A.’s raison d’être is preventing big strategic surprises,” said Amy Zegart, an intelligence specialist at the Hoover Institution. “They do not exist to kill third-rate terrorists running around failed states.” Gregory Treverton, a RAND Corporation expert who is a former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council, said that as hundreds of analysts flood into the subject of the moment, they are assigned to narrower and narrower slices of the problem. There is less standing back and figuring out how it adds up, what might happen next. “All the creativity is going to, can we identify, locate and take out the bad guys,” Treverton said. But unless somebody is asking where the bad guys came from and what drives them, we are fighting the symptom rather than the disease. We have learned, to our peril, how much it matters when intelligence lets us down. The C.I.A., having been hollowed out in the ’90s after the end of the cold war, failed to see the signs of what would be 9/11. Then the C.I.A. got the ostensible Iraqi weapons threat terribly wrong, drowning out more skeptical voices in the intelligence units of the State Department and Energy Department, and paving the way to a colossal blunder of a war. At least twice before in recent memory the C.I.A. has been consumed by secret warfare that had unhappy endings. In the 1980s the agency joined forces with mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan against Soviet occupiers; the Soviets were routed, the Americans moved on, and the mujahedeen turned their jihad on us. At the same time, the agency was secretly, illegally backing the Nicaraguan contra rebels; that venture ended in defeat, indictments and embarrassment. Jeffrey Smith, who has worked on intelligence issues as a Senate staffer, a State Department lawyer and the general counsel of the C.I.A., points out that it’s not just the spy agencies that have their attention monopolized by these ventures, but their clients in the Pentagon, the State Department and the White House. “The problem with these big covert action programs,” a senior official once told Smith, “is that they become the policy of the United States.” “When you start these programs, everybody is enthusiastic about them,” Smith said. “But to run them right takes a huge focus of senior leadership.” And other things get neglected. By most accounts, including the assessment of intelligence insiders, academics and journalists who cover the subject, the conglomerate of intelligence agencies is in much better shape than it was before 9/11. That’s a low bar, but credit where credit is due. The agencies are better staffed and better at sharing information. It’s hard for an outsider to tell until something goes wrong, but high-priority topics like Iran’s nuclear program and China’s development of cyberweapons seem to be getting the emphasis they deserve. Gary Samore, who worked in the Clinton Administration and then returned to oversee nuclear weapons-related intelligence for President Obama until January, said he felt well served by the agency’s collection and analysis. “Of course the C.I.A. missed all the revolutions in the Arab world,” he said. “But we always miss the revolutions. We missed the collapse of the Soviet Union, we missed the revolution in Iran, we missed the overthrow in the Philippines. ... It’s a normal human condition. We all expect continuity — until there’s change.” He’s right, but when change does happen you hope the agency will be quick to catch up with unfolding events and provide the president with cleareyed reporting that will help position the U.S. to its best advantage. That requires the difficult, patient cultivation of sources on the ground, including the opposition. In the Muslim world, Mazzetti and some experts suspect, the C.I.A. had not acquired a wealth of sources in the opposition, and that may be partly because in places like Egypt and Libya the agency was focused on cozying up to the official spy agencies, hoping to tap into their information about Qaeda operatives. The concern that essential intelligence has suffered from the paramilitary preoccupation is shared by some of the president’s own advisers. According to a Washington Post report last month, the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board warned in a secret report last year that spy agencies were paying insufficient attention to China and the Middle East and other potential trouble spots and should shift emphasis back toward traditional intelligence work. The panel included Chuck Hagel, who has since become secretary of defense. “Who knows what you’re missing?” said Lee Hamilton, former chairman of the House Intelligence Committee and another member of the advisory board (he emphasized he was speaking only for himself). Hamilton supports the president’s power to authorize targeted killing, but he worries that “the tail is wagging the dog.” He points out that traditional intelligence analysis has become more urgent because in our digitized world the profusion of data is overwhelming.

**Key to drone success**

**Anderson ’13** [Kenneth, professor of international law at American University and a member of the Task Force on National Security and Law at the Hoover Institution, “The Case for Drones,” Commentary135.6 (Jun 2013): 14-23, Proquest, online]

Are drone technology and targeted killing really so strategically valuable? The answer depends in great part not on drone technology, but on the quality of the intelligence that leads to a particular target in the first place. The drone strike is the final kinetic act in a process of intelligence-gathering and analysis. The success- and it is remarkable success- of the CIA in disrupting al-Qaeda in Pakistan has come about not because of drones alone, but because the CIA managed to establish, over years of effort, its own ground-level, human-intelligence networks that have allowed it to identify targets independent of information fed to it by Pakistan's intelligence services. The quality of drone-targeted killing depends fundamentally on that intelligence, for a drone is not much use unless pointed toward surveillance of a particular village, area, or person. It can be used for a different kind of targeting altogether: against groups of fighters with their weapons on trucks headed toward the Afghan border. But these so-called signature strikes are not, as sometimes represented, a relaxed form of targeted killing in which groups are crudely blown up because nothing is known about individual members. Intelligence assessments are made, including behavioral signatures such as organized groups of men carrying weapons, suggesting strongly that they are "hostile forces" (in the legal meaning of that term in the U.S. military's Standing Rules of Engagement). That is the norm in conventional war. Targeted killing of high-value terrorist targets, by contrast, is the end result of a long, independent intelligence process. What the drone adds to that intelligence might be considerable, through its surveillance capabilities- but much of the drone's contribution will be tactical, providing intelligence that assists in the planning and execution of the strike itself, in order to pick the moment when there might be the fewest civilian casualties.

**Transferring authority solves transparency – The CP legally requires Obama to disclose a memo called “Joint Program 3-60” – they’ve conceded that solves transparency – that’s zenko**

**The CP spills over to further reform and boosts transparency**

**Zenko 13**¸ Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow with the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to the Pentagon,” April, http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434

The main obstacle to acknowledging the scope, legality, and oversight of U.S. targeted killings beyond traditional or "hot" battlefields is the division of lead executive authority between the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—a subunit of the Department of Defense (DOD) Special Operations Command—and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In particular, the U.S. government cannot legally acknowledge covert actions undertaken by the CIA. The failure to answer the growing demands for transparency increases the risk that U.S. drone strikes will be curtailed or eliminated due to mounting domestic or international pressure. To take a meaningful first step toward greater transparency, President Barack Obama should sign a directive that consolidates lead executive authority for planning and conducting nonbattlefield targeted killings under DOD. One Mission, Two Programs U.S. targeted killings are needlessly made complex and opaque by their division between two separate entities: JSOC and the CIA. Although drone strikes carried out by the two organizations presumably target the same people, the organizations have different authorities, policies, accountability mechanisms, and oversight. Splitting the drone program between the JSOC and CIA is apparently intended to allow the plausible deniability of CIA strikes. Strikes by the CIA are classified as Title 50 covert actions, defined as "activities of the United States Government . . . where it is intended that the role . . . will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include traditional . . . military activities." As covert operations, the government cannot legally provide any information about how the CIA conducts targeted killings, while JSOC operations are guided by Title 10 "armed forces" operations and a publicly available military doctrine. Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Targeting, details steps in the joint targeting cycle, including the processes, responsibilities, and collateral damage estimations intended to reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties. Unlike strikes carried out by the CIA, JSOC operations can be (and are) acknowledged by the U.S. government. The different reporting requirements of JSOC and the CIA mean that congressional oversight of U.S. targeted killings is similarly murky. Sometimes oversight is duplicated among the committees; at other times, there is confusion over who is mandated to oversee which operations. CIA drone strikes are reported to the intelligence committees. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), has confirmed that the SSCI receives poststrike notifications, reviews video footage, and holds monthly meetings to "question every aspect of the program." Representative Mike Rogers (R-MI), chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), has said that he reviews both CIA and JSOC counterterrorism airstrikes. JSOC does not report to the HPSCI. As of March 2012, all JSOC counterterrorism operations are reported quarterly to the armed services committees. Meanwhile, the foreign relations committees—tasked with overseeing all U.S. foreign policy and counterterrorism strategies—have formally requested briefings on drone strikes that have been repeatedly denied by the White House. However, oversight should not be limited to ensuring compliance with the law and preventing abuses, but rather expanded to ensure that policies are consistent with strategic objectives and aligned with other ongoing military and diplomatic activities. This can only be accomplished by DOD operations because the foreign relations committees cannot hold hearings on covert CIA drone strikes. Consolidating Executive Authority In 2004, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the "lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department" to avoid the "creation of redundant, overlapping capabilities and authorities in such sensitive work." The recommendation was never seriously considered because the CIA wanted to retain its covert action authorities and, more important, it was generally believed such operations would remain a rarity. (At the time, there had been only one nonbattlefield targeted killing.) Nearly a decade later, there is increasing bipartisan consensus that consolidating lead executive authority for drone strikes would pave the way for broader strategic reforms, including declassifying the relevant legal memoranda, explicitly stating which international legal principles apply, and providing information to the public on existing procedures that prevent harm to civilians. During his February 2013 nomination hearing, CIA director John O. Brennan welcomed the transfer of targeted killings to the DOD: "The CIA should not be doing traditional military activities and operations."

### a/t: links to politics

**Obama doesn’t spend capital**

Sovacool 9

Dr. Benjamin K. Sovacool 2009 is a Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at the Centre on Asia and Globalization., Kelly E. Sovacool is a Senior Research Associate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of SingaporeArticle: Preventing National Electricity-Water Crisis Areas in the United States, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 2009 34 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 333,

¶ Executive Orders also save time in a second sense. The President does not have to expend scarce political capital trying to persuade Congress to adopt his or her proposal. Executive Orders thus save ¶ ¶ presidential attention for other topics. Executive Orders bypass congressional debate and opposition, along with all of the horsetrading and compromise such legislative activity entails.¶ ¶ 292¶ ¶ Speediness of implementation can be especially important when challenges require rapid and decisive action. After the September ¶ ¶ 11, 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, for ¶ ¶ instance, the Bush Administration almost immediately passed ¶ ¶ Executive Orders forcing airlines to reinforce cockpit doors and ¶ ¶ freezing the U.S. based assets of individuals and organizations ¶ ¶ involved with terrorist groups.¶ ¶ 293¶ ¶ These actions took Congress ¶ ¶ nearly four months to debate and subsequently endorse with ¶ ¶ legislation. Executive Orders therefore enable presidents to ¶ ¶ rapidly change law without having to wait for congressional action ¶ ¶ or agency regulatory rulemaking.

**XO’s don’t spend political capital**

**Warshaw 6** (Shirley Anne Warshaw, MAD QUALZ! An authority on the American presidency, presidential elections, the president's Cabinet, and organizational decision structures for presidential policy making, Warshaw is a frequent speaker and commentator on network radio, television, and print media on presidential leadership and related topics, including CNN, BBC, CBS, NPR, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, Washington Post, New York Times, Reuters, Associated Press, Christian Science Monitor, USA Today, Wall Street Journal, and others. Warshaw has written several books on presidential decision-making, Gettysburg College, The Administrative Strategies of President George W. Bush, http://www.ou.edu/special/albertctr/extensions/spring2006/Warshaw.pdf

As presidents segue from the campaign into governance, they develop various strategies for moving their policy agenda forward. The most common strategy for presidents to secure their policy goals has been to submit their legislative proposals to Congress, building on the tools of public persuasion and party supremacy. When presidents capture public support, as President George W. Bush did with his tax cut proposal, Congress follows with legislative approval. However, in recent administrations, particularly since the Reagan administration, presidents have often bypassed Congress using administrative actions. They have opted for a strategy through administrative actions that is less time-consuming and **clearly less demanding of their political capital**. Using an array of both formal and informal executive powers, presidents have effectively directed the executive departments to implement policy without any requisite congressional authorization. In effect, presidents have been able to govern without Congress. The arsenal of administrative actions available to presidents includes the power of appointment, perhaps **the most important of the arsenal, executive orders**, executive agreements, proclamations, signing statements, and a host of national security directives. 1 More than any past president, George W. Bush has utilized administrative actions as his primary tool for governance.

**They avoid horse-trading and expenditure of political capital**

**Howell, 2005,** [William G., Presidential Studies Quarterly, Ph.D., university of Chicago, “Unitlateral Power: a Brief Overview”, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-5050927/Unilateral-powers-a-brief-overview.html] The actions that Bush and his modern predecessors have taken by fiat do not fit easily within a theoretical framework of executive power that emphasizes weakness and dependence, and offers as recourse only persuasion. For at least two reasons, the ability to act unilaterally is conceptually distinct from the array of powers presidents rely upon within a bargaining framework. First, when presidents act unilaterally, they move policy first and thereby place upon Congress and the courts the burden of revising a new political landscape. If they choose not to retaliate, either by passing a law or ruling against the president, then the president's order stands. Only by taking (or credibly threatening to take) positive action can either adjoining institution limit the president's unilateral powers. Second, when the president acts unilaterally, he acts alone. Now of course, he relies upon numerous advisers to formulate the policy, to devise ways of protecting it against congressional or judicial encroachment, and to oversee its implementation (more on this below). But in order to issue the actual policy, the president need not rally majorities, compromise with adversaries, or wait for some interest group to bring a case to court. The president, instead, can strike out on his own. Doing so, the modern president is in a unique position to lead, to break through the stasis that pervades the federal government, and to impose his will in new areas of governance. sThe ability to move first and act alone, then, distinguishes unilateral actions from other sources of influence. Indeed, the central precepts of Neustadt's argument are turned upside down, for unilateral action is the virtual antithesis of persuasion. Here, presidents just act; their power does not hinge upon their capacity to "convince [political actors] that what the White House wants of them is what they ought to do for their sake and for their authority" (Neustadt 1990, 30). To make policy, presidents need not secure the formal consent of Congress. Instead, presidents simply set public policy and dare others to counter. And as long as Congress lacks the votes (usually two thirds of both chambers) to overturn him, the president can be confident that his policy will stand.

**Empirics go negative**

**Kassop 2** [Nancy, Chair of the Political Science Department @ State University of New York, The Presidency and the Law: The Clinton Legacy, ed. Alder, p. 6]

As a president facing an opposition party in Congress, it is not surprising that President Clinton made bold use of executive orders as a means of circumventing the uncertainties of a legislature that was unlikely to be friendly to his initiatives. Here, too, as in war powers, Clinton followed in the paths of his Republican predecessors, who also operated under conditions of divided government. Thus, Clinton may not have blazed new trails for his successors by his use of executive orders to accomplish indirectly **what he was unwilling to spend political capital on to accomplish directly.**

## Cred DA

### 2NC OV

#### DA o/w and turns the affirmative

#### (A) Instability inevitable—

DUNN 2007 – PhD, former Assistant Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Ambassador to the 1985 Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (Lewis Dunn, Proliferation Papers, “Deterrence Today: Roles, Challenges, and Responses.”)

On the one hand, among many U.S. defense experts and officials it has become almost a cliché to state that an alleged *asymmetry of stakes* between the United States (and/or other outsiders) and a regional nuclear power would make it much more difficult to provide credible nuclear security assurances along the lines suggested above. That purported asymmetry of stakes also is widely seen by those same experts and officials as putting the United States (or other outsiders) at a fundamental disadvantage in any crisis with a regional power and shifting the deterrence balance in its favor. Emphasis on the impact of a perceived asymmetry of stakes partly reflects a view that the intensity of the stakes in any given crisis or confrontation is dependent most on what has been called “the proximity effect”: stakes’ intensity is a function of geography. Concern about an asymmetry of stakes also gains support from the fact that a desire to deter the United States or other outsiders probably is one incentive motivating some new or aspiring nuclear . This line of argument should not be accepted at face value. To the contrary, in two different ways, the stakes for the United States (and other outsiders) in a crisis or confrontation with a regional nuclear adversary would be extremely high. To start, what is at stake is the likelihood of cascades of proliferation in Asia and the Middle East. Such proliferation cascades almost certainly would bring greater regional instability, global political and economic disruption, a heightened risk of nuclear conflict, and a jump in the risk of terrorist access to nuclear weapons. Equally important, nuclear blackmail let alone **nuclear use against U.S.** and other outsiders’ forces, those of U.S. regional allies and friends, or any of their homelands would greatly heighten the stakes for the United States and other outsiders. **Perceptions of** American **resolve** and credibility **around the globe**, the likelihood that an initial nuclear use would be followed by a virtual **collapse of a** six-decades’ plus **nuclear taboo**, and the danger of runaway proliferation all would be at issue. So viewed, **how** the United States and others respond is likely to have a far-reaching impact on their own security as well as longer term global security and stability.

#### (B) DA comes faster than the aff solves

Zeisberg, ‘4 [Mariah Zeisberg, PhD in Politics from Princeton, Postdoc Research Associate at the Political Theory Project of Brown University; “INTERBRANCH CONFLICT AND CONSTITUTIONAL MAINTENANCE: THE CASE OF WAR POWERS”; June 2004; found in Word document, can be downloaded from [www.brown.edu/Research/ppw/files/Zeisberg%20Ch5.doc](http://www.brown.edu/Research/ppw/files/Zeisberg%20Ch5.doc)]

The first significant argument of pro-Presidency insularists is that flexibility is a prime value in the conduct of foreign affairs, and especially war. Implicit in this argument is the recognition that the executive is functionally superior to Congress in achieving flexibility and swiftness in war operations, a recognition I share. The Constitution cannot be meant to curtail the very flexibility that may be necessary to preserve the nation; and yet, according to the insularists, any general norm which would include Congress in decision-making about going to war could only undermine that flexibility. Writing on the War Powers Act, Eugene Rostow predicts that it would, “put the Presidency in a straightjacket of a rigid code, and prevent new categories of action from emerging, in response to the necessities of a tense and unstable world.” In fact, Rostow believes, “[t]he centralization of authority in the president is particularly crucial in matters of national defense, war, and foreign policy, where a unitary executive can evaluate threats, consider policy choices, and mobilize national resources with a speed and energy that is far superior to any other branch.” Pro-presidency insularists are fond of quoting Hamilton, who argued that “[o]f all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.” This need for flexibility, some insularists argue, is especially acute given modern conditions, where devastating wars can develop quickly. Today, “many foreign states have the power to attack U.S. forces - and some even the U.S. mainland - almost instantly,” and in such a world it is impracticable to require the President to seek advance authorization for hostilities. Such a requirement would simply be too risky to U.S. security. We furthermore face a nuclear age, and the system of deterrence that operates to contain that threat requires that a single person be capable of responding to nuclear attack with nuclear weapons immediately. Rostow writes, “the requirement for advance authorization would collapse the system of deterrence, making preemptive strikes by our enemies more likely.” Hence, “modern conditions” require the President to “act quickly, and often alone.” While this does not mean that Congress has no role to play in moments of crisis, it does mean that Congress should understand its role largely in terms of cooperating with the President to support his negotiations and decisions regarding relationships with foreign powers. Rostow writes, “Congress should be able to act effectively both before and after moments of crisis or potential crisis. It may join the President in seeking to deter crisis by publicly defining national policy in advance, through the sanctioning of treaties or other legislative declarations. Equally, Congress may participate formally in policymaking after the event through legislative authorization of sustained combat, either by means of a declaration of war, or through legislative action having more limited legal and political consequences. Either of these devices, or both in combination, should be available in situations where cooperation between the two branches is indicated at many points along an arc ranging from pure diplomacy at one end to a declaration of war at the other.” In other words, for Congress to understand itself as having any justifiable role in challenging executive security determinations, especially at moments of crisis, would be to undermine the strength that the executive requires in order to protect the nation. Conflict in this domain represents political degradation.

####  (C) Tie-breaker –

ROSS 1999 - Douglas Ross, Professor of Political Science – Simon Fraser University, Winter 1998/1999, International Journal, Vol. 54, No. 1, “Canada’s Functional Isolationism And The Future Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction”, Lexis

Thus, an easily accessible tax base has long been available for spending much more on international security than recent governments have been willing to contemplate. Negotiating the landmines ban, discouraging trade in small arms, promoting the United Nations arms register are all worthwhile, popular activities that polish the national self-image. But they should all be supplements to, not substitutes for, a proportionately equitable commitment of resources to the management and prevention of international conflict – and thus the containment of the WMD threat. Future American governments will not ‘police the world’ alone. For almost fifty years the Soviet threat compelled disproportionate military expenditures and sacrifice by the United States. That world is gone. Only by enmeshing the capabilities of the United States and other leading powers in a co-operative security management regime where the burdens are widely shared does the world community have any plausible hope of avoiding warfare involving nuclear or other WMD.

#### (D) We control escalation and miscalc ladder

Caves ’10, John P. Caves, Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University, “Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent”, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada514285>

Perceptions of a compromised U.S. nuclear deterrent as described above would have profound policy implications, particularly if they emerge at a time when a nucleararmed great power is pursuing a more aggressive strategy toward U.S. allies and partners in its region in a bid to enhance its regional and global clout. ■ A dangerous period of vulnerability would open for the United States and those nations that depend on U.S. protection while the United States attempted to rectify the problems with its nuclear forces. As it would take more than a decade for the United States to produce new nuclear weapons, ensuing events could preclude a return to anything like the status quo ante. ■ The assertive, nuclear-armed great power, and other major adversaries, could be willing to challenge U.S. interests more directly in the expectation that the United States would be less prepared to threaten or deliver a military response that could lead to direct conflict. They will want to keep the United States from reclaiming its earlier power position. ■ Allies and partners who have relied upon explicit or implicit assurances of U.S. nuclear protection as a foundation of their security could lose faith in those assurances. They could compensate by accommodating U.S. rivals, especially in the short term, or acquiring their own nuclear deterrents, which in most cases could be accomplished only over the mid- to long term. A more nuclear world would likely ensue over a period of years. ■ Important U.S. interests could be compromised or abandoned, or a major war could occur as adversaries and/or the United States miscalculate new boundaries of deterrence and provocation. At worst, war could lead to state-on-state employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on a scale far more catastrophic than what nuclear-armed terrorists alone could inflict. Continuing Salience of Nuclear Weapons Nuclear weapons, like all instruments of national security, are a means to an end— national security—rather than an end in themselves. Because of the catastrophic destruction they can inflict, resort to nuclear weapons should be contemplated only when necessary to defend the Nation’s vital interests, to include the security of our allies, and/or in response to comparable destruction inflicted upon the Nation or our allies, almost certainly by WMD. The retention, reduction, or elimination of nuclear weapons must be evaluated in terms of their contribution to national security, and in particular the extent to which they contribute to the avoidance of circumstances that would lead to their employment. Avoiding the circumstances that could lead to the employment of nuclear weapons involves many efforts across a broad front, many outside the military arena. Among such efforts are reducing the number of nuclear weapons to the level needed for national security; maintaining a nuclear weapons posture that minimizes the likelihood of inadvertent, unauthorized, or illconsidered use; improving the security of existing nuclear weapons and related capabilities; reducing incentives and closing off avenues for the proliferation of nuclear and other WMD to state and nonstate actors, including with regard to fissile material production and nuclear testing; enhancing the means to detect and interdict the transfer of nuclear and other WMD and related materials and capabilities; and strength ening our capacity to defend against nuclear and other WMD use. For as long as the United States will depend upon nuclear weapons for its national security, those forces will need to be reliable, adequate, and credible. Today, the United States fields the most capable strategic nuclear forces in the world and possesses globally recognized superiority in any conventional military battlespace. No state, even a nuclear-armed near peer, rationally would directly challenge vital U.S. interests today for fear of inviting decisive defeat of its conventional forces and risking nuclear escalation from which it could not hope to claim anything resembling victory. But power relationships are never static, and current realities and trends make the scenario described above conceivable unless corrective steps are taken by the current administration and Congress. Consider the challenge posed by China. It is transforming its conventional military forces to be able to project power and compete militarily with the United States in East Asia, 1 and is the only recognized nuclear weapons state today that is both modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces. 2 It weathered the 2008 financial crisis relatively well, avoiding a recession and already resuming robust economic growth. 3 Most economists expect that factors such as openness to foreign investment, high savings rates, infrastructure investments, rising productivity, and the ability to leverage access to a large and growing market in commercial diplomacy are likely to sustain robust economic growth for many years to come, affording China increasing resources to devote to a continued, broadbased modernization and expansion of its military capabilities. In contrast, the 2008 financial crisis was the most severe for the United States since the Great Depression, 4 and it led in 2009 to the largest Federal budget deficit—by far—since the Second World War 5 (much of which is financed by borrowing from China). Continuing U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are expensive, as will be the necessary refurbishment of U.S. forces when those con flicts end. Those military expenses, however, are expected to be eclipsed by the burgeoning entitlement costs of the aging U.S. “baby boomer” generation. 6 As The Economist recently observed: China’s military build-up in the past decade has been as spectacular as its economic growth. . . . There are growing worries in Washington, DC, that China’s military power could challenge America’s wider military dominance in the region. China insists there is nothing to worry about. But even if its leadership has no plans to displace American power in Asia . . . America is right to fret this could change. 7 As an emerging nuclear-armed near peer like China narrows the wide military power gap that currently separates it from the United States, Washington could find itself more, rather than less, reliant upon its nuclear forces to deter and contain potential challenges from great power competitors. The resulting security dynamics may resemble the Cold War more than the U.S. “unipolar moment” of the 1990s and early 2000s. Concerns about Longterm Reliability With continuing U.S. dependence upon nuclear forces to deter conflict and contain challenges from (re-)emerging great power(s), perceptions of the reliability, adequacy, and credibility of those forces will determine how well they serve those purposes. Perception is all important when it comes to nuclear weapons, which have not been operationally employed since 1945 and not tested (by the United States) since 1992, and, hopefully, will never have to be employed or tested again. If U.S. nuclear forces are to deter other nuclear-armed great powers, the individual weapons must be perceived to work as intended (reliability), the overall forces must be perceived as adequate to deny the adversary the achievement of his goals regardless of his actions (adequacy), and U.S. leadership must be perceived as prepared to employ the forces under conditions that it has communicated via its declaratory policy (credibility) These perceptions must be, of course, those of the leadership of adversaries that we seek to deter (as well as of the allies that we seek to assure), but they also need to be those of the U.S. leadership lest our leaders fail to convey the confidence and resolve necessary to shape adversaries’ perceptions to achieve deterrence. Weapons reliability is the essential foundation for deterrence since there can be no adequacy or credibility without it.

### 2NC Link

**Extend yoo—kills presidential flexibility**

**We’ll isolate several links to statutory restriction:**

**1) Flexibility – legislation ties the President’s had and ensures military ineffectiveness**

**Scowcroft 93**

(Brent, Arnold, National Security Adviser Under Bush I and Ford, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in Bush I, The Washington Post, “Foreign Policy Straightjacket”, 10/20/1993, p. lexis)

Maneuvering in the complex environment of a Somalia -- or of a Haiti, Bosnia or the other crises that loom on and just over the horizon -- requires the agility of a ballet dancer, not the Mack truck of legislation. In a world that increasingly places a premium on a rapidly adaptable foreign policy, codifying highly detailed requirements in a public law is a recipe for ineffectiveness. It undermines the president's ability to threaten, cajole and pressure our adversaries by publicizing the costs we will and won't pay and by broadcasting the conditions and constraints under which our forces will operate. At the same time, it leaves our friends and allies, whose cooperation we seek, to wonder whether Congress will permit the president to follow through on his promises and commitments. Finally, it stays on the books, continuing to tie the president's hands as circumstances change and Congress's attention shifts to other priorities. Now more than ever, trying to legislate foreign policy is simply a bad idea.

**2) Delay – Increased congressional involvement bogs down warfighting**

**Boylan & Phelps 1 – asst prof of poli sci @ Winthrop U & prof of poli sci @ Northern Arizona University**

(Timothy & Glenn, Parameters Spring 2001, The War Powers Resolution: A Rationale for Congressional Inaction)

The House and Senate debates of 10-12 January 1991 concerned the question of congressional authorization versus continued sanctions. One side argued that extending the deadline meant that Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis could improve their defenses and become better entrenched in Kuwait. If military action took place at a later date, this delay would translate into increased American casualties.[18] The opposing side did not rule out the use of force, but believed that continued sanctions would weaken Iraq's hand. A longer wait, it was thought, would better prepare coalition forces for warfare in the desert. Underlying this debate was a disquiet about the legitimacy and applicability of sending US military troops into battle by order of the United Nations.[19] But few members challenged the legitimacy of Congress in delaying this great debate until the last hour. One exception was Representative Bill Green, who concluded:¶ By inserting ourselves into the process at this late date, our ability to participate in a meaningful way is severely limited and could severely cripple the recently begun process of providing for collective security through the United Nations . . . .¶ The 101st Congress, in its waning days, did not lack opportunities to affect this process. By the time we had adjourned on October 28, 1990, we had approved a defense authorization and appropriations bill that provided funds for the stationing of troops in the Persian Gulf. Since that deployment had been in accordance with article 51 of the UN Charter and UN Resolution 655 concerning the naval and maritime blockade, our vote plainly endorsed that deployment.¶ I supported those efforts, joining over 400 of my colleagues in approving an additional $978 million for Persian Gulf related operations.¶ . . . [B]y waiting until this later hour, we have rendered ourselves extraneous to any positive policy role, unless we are prepared to try to force a change in the position taken by the United Nations.[20]¶ This admission highlights Congress's odd treatment of the War Powers Resolution. The weeks of late summer and early autumn of 1990 showed Congress wrangling over reporting and timing procedure, and delaying debate on the tough substantive issues surrounding the invasion of Kuwait. Rather than promoting consultation, the War Powers Resolution helped to delay and inhibit debate and decision. Perhaps Congress might have found a way to push a final decision to January without recourse to the War Powers Resolution. But the ability to find some other strategy of delay does not excuse the current one. This episode illustrates the larger theme--the history of the War Powers Resolution has not been just one of surprises or consequences unintended by its framers. Congress has purposely used the resolution to offer the show of debate and deliberation, while avoiding engagement with substantive policy. This is not simply a question of political adaptation. It is a clear demonstration of constitutional abdication.

#### 3) Confusion – congressional involvement creates murky lines of authority – undermines warfighting

**Wall 12 – senior official @ Alston & Bird**

**(Andru,** Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert Action, Harvard National Security Journal)

Congress’s failure to provide necessary interagency authorities and budget authorizations threatens our ability to prevent and wage warfare. Congress’s stubborn insistence that military and intelligence activities inhabit separate worlds casts a pall of illegitimacy over interagency support, as well as unconventional and cyber warfare. The U.S. military and intelligence agencies work together more closely than perhaps at any time in American history, yet Congressional oversight and statutory authorities sadly remain mired in an obsolete paradigm. After ten years of war, Congress still has not adopted critical recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission regarding congressional oversight of intelligence activities. Congress’s stovepiped oversight sows confusion over statutory authorities and causes Executive Branch attorneys to waste countless hours distinguishing distinct lines of authority and funding. Our military and intelligence operatives work tirelessly to coordinate, synchronize, and integrate their efforts; they deserve interagency authorities and Congressional oversight that encourages and supports such integration.

**4) Perception– Congressional interference sends the signal to our enemies that we don’t have the political will for warfighting**

**Newton 12 – prof of law @ Vanderbilt**

(Michael, CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW·VOL. 45, Inadvertent Implications of the War Powers Resolution)

The corollary to this modern reality, and the second of three inadvertent implications of the Resolution, is that our enemies now focus on American political will as the Achilles heel of our vast capabilities. Prior to the War Powers Resolution, President Eisenhower understood that it was necessary to “seek the cooperation of the Congress. Only with that can we give the reassurance needed to deter aggression.”62 President Clinton understood the importance of clear communication with the Congress and the American people in order to sustain the political legitimacy that is a vital element of modern military operations. Justifying his bombing of targets in Sudan, he argued that the “risks from inaction, to America and the world, would be far greater than action, for that would embolden our enemies, leaving their ability and their willingness to strike us intact.”63 In his letter to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” the president reported that the strikes “were a necessary and proportionate response to the imminent threat of further terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities” and “were intended to prevent and deter additional attacks by a clearly identified terrorist threat.”64 The following day, in a radio address to the nation, the president explained his decision to take military action, stating, “Our goals were to disrupt bin Laden’s terrorist network and destroy elements of its infrastructure in Afghanistan and Sudan. And our goal was to destroy, in Sudan, the factory with which bin Laden’s network is associated, which was producing an ingredient essential for nerve gas.”65 Citing “compelling evidence that the bin Laden network was poised to strike at us again” and was seeking to acquire chemical weapons, the president declared that we simply could not ignore the threat posed, and hence ordered the strikes.66 Similarly, President Clinton understood that intervention in Bosnia could not be successful absent some national consensus, which had been slow to form during the long Bosnian civil war.67 Secretary of State George Schultz provided perhaps the most poignant and pointed example of this truism in his testimony to Congress regarding the deployment of US Marines into Lebanon to separate the warring factions in 1982. On September 21, 1983, he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and provided a chilling premonition of the bombing that would come only one month later and kill 241 Americans, which was the bloodiest day in the Marine Corps since the battle of Iwo Jima.68 Seeking to bolster legislative support and to better explain the strategic objectives, he explained that: It is not the mission of our marines or of the [Multinational Force in Lebanon] as a whole to maintain the military balance in Lebanon by themselves. Nevertheless, their presence remains one crucial pillar of the structure of stability. They are an important deterrent, a symbol of the international backing behind the legitimate Government of Lebanon, and an important weight in the scales. To remove the marines would put both the Government and what we are trying to achieve in jeopardy. This is why our domestic controversy over the war powers has been so disturbing. Uncertainty about the American commitment can only weaken our effectiveness. Doubts about our staying power can only cause political aggressors to discount our presence or to intensify their attacks in hopes of hastening our departure. An accommodation between the President and Congress to resolve this dispute will help dispel those doubts about our staying power and strengthen our political hand.69 Following the spectacularly successful terrorist attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut, President Reagan withdrew the Marines. Osama bin Laden later cited this as an example of American weakness that could not withstand the jihadist fury he sought.70 The legal battles over the scope and effect of the War Powers Resolution have highlighted the focus on national political will as the fulcrum of successful military operations by requiring assurances that military operations are limited in nature, duration, and scope, and therefore well within the president’s constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief and chief executive. President Obama’s report to Congress in the context of the Libya operations in 2011 cited precedent from air strikes in Bosnia that took just over two weeks and involved more than 2,300 US sorties and the deployment of US forces in Somalia in 1992 and Haiti in 1993.71 The White House released a memorandum from the OLC, similar to previous interventions, explaining how the authorization to use such force was constitutional on the basis that “‘war’ within the meaning of the [Constitution’s] Declaration of War Clause” does not encompass all military engagements, but only those that are “prolonged and substantial . . . typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.”72 President Obama consistently maintained that the US role in Libya was limited, unlikely to expose any US persons to attack (especially given the role of missiles and drones and the utter inability of Qaddafi’s forces to strike back with conventional means), and likely to end expeditiously.73 By that logic, it did not require authorization from Congress. The administration ultimately adopted a legal analysis that the US military’s activities fell short of “hostilities,” and thus, the president needed no permission from Congress to continue the mission after the expiration of the sixty-day reporting window specified in the War Powers Resolution.74 The president’s reasoning rested on previous OLC opinions that what counts as war depends on “a fact- specific assessment of the ‘anticipated nature, scope, and duration’ of the planned military operations.”75 Present justifications for bypassing the War Powers Resolution hinge on interpretations that it requires “prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.”76 The OLC engaged in similar reasoning in the Bosnia intervention in 1995, explaining that in deciding whether the proposed deployment into Bosnia amounted to a “‘war’ in the constitutional sense, considerable weight was given to the consensual nature and protective purposes of the operation.”77 That deployment was similarly intended to be a limited mission but that mission, in contrast to the present one, was in support of an agreement that the warring parties had reached and it was at the invitation of the parties that led to the belief that little or no resistance to the deployment would occur. Though some scholars argued that the Libya OLC Memorandum defended its reasoning for why the operation did not amount to “war,” it did not address whether the administration believed that it will have to stop operations upon expiration of the sixty-ninety-day clock under the War Powers Resolution.78 The deadline passed with little fanfare. The memorandum also relied upon quite distinguishable precedent to serve as a guiding point in this intervention. Professor Goldsmith argued the opinion broke “new ground . . . in its extension of the ‘no war’ precedents beyond the Bosnia and Haiti situations—which involved consensual peacekeeping-like introductions of ground troops but no significant uses of force—to cover two weeks of non-consensual aerial bombardments.”79 Thus, even as it incentivizes short term, limited deployments, the War Powers Resolution embeds an inevitable constitutional collision between the coordinate branches. Our enemies can rely upon constitutional carping from Congress, and in fact can adapt tactics and statements that seek to undermine political will in the US Congress and among the American people from the first days of an operation. The Resolution helps to ensure that such debates over the national political will take center stage sooner rather than later, and an asymmetric enemy can in theory erode our political will even before it solidifies.

#### AUMF revisions crush counter-terror- crushes flexibility, announces our vulnerabilities, and snowballs

Corn, 13 Geoffrey, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, Testimony at the Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee Subject: "The Law of Armed Conflict, the Use of Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force" May 16th, Federal News Service, Nexis

Because I do not believe there is inconsistency between the nature of U.S. operations to date and these inherent limitations, I do not believe it is necessary at this point in time to modify the AUMF. Instead, I believe that Congress should continue to engage in oversight to remain fully apprised of the strategic, operational, and at times tactical decisionmaking processes that result in the employment of U.S. combat power pursuant to the statute, enabling Congress to ensure that such use falls within the scope of an authorization targeted at al Qaeda, intended to protect the Nation from future terrorist attacks, and that these operations reflect unquestioned commitment to the principles of international law that regulate the use of military force during any armed conflict. I believe the AUMF effectively addresses the belligerent threat against the United States posed by terrorist groups. I emphasize the term ‘‘belligerent’’ for an important reason. It is obvious that the AUMF has granted authority to use the Nation’s military power against threats falling within its scope. Therefore, only those organizations that pose a risk of sufficient magnitude to justify invoking the authority associated with armed conflict should be included within that scope as a result of their affiliation with al Qaeda. Determining what groups properly fall within this scope is, therefore, both critical and challenging. The AUMF provides the President with the necessary flexibility to tailor U.S. operations to the evolving nature of this unconventional enemy, maximizing the efficacy of U.S. efforts to deny al Qaeda the freedom of action they possessed in Afghanistan prior to Operation Enduring Freedom. In reaction to this evolution, the United States has employed combat power against what the prior panel referred to as associated forces or co-belligerents of al Qaeda, belligerent groups assessed to adhere to the overall terrorist objectives of the organization and engage in hostilities alongside al Qaeda directed against the United States or its interests. The focused on shared ideology, tactics, and indicia of connection between high-level group leaders seems both logical and legitimate for including these offshoots of al Qaeda within the scope of the AUMF as co-belligerents, a determination that, based on publicly available information, has to date been limited to groups seeking the sanctuary of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas, Yemen, or Somalia. If Congress does, however, choose to revise the AUMF, I do not believe that the revision should incorporatean exclusive list of defined co-belligerent groups, a geographic scope limitation, or some external oversight of targeting decisions**,** all of which would undermine the efficacy of U.S. operations by signaling to the enemy limits on U.S. operational and tactical reach**.** It is an operational and tactical axiom that insurgent and non- state threats rarely seek the proverbial toe-to-toe confrontation with clearly superior military forces. Al Qaeda is no different. Indeed, their attempts to engage in such tactics in the initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom proved disastrous. Incorporating such limitations into the AUMF would, therefore, be inconsistent with the operational objective of seizing and retaining the initiative against this unconventional enemy and the strategic objective of preventing future terrorist attacks against the United States. Finally, I believe to target decisionmaking during armed conflict is a quintessential command function and that the President, acting in his own capacity or through subordinate officers, should make these decisions. He and his subordinates bear an obligation to ensure compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict and other principles of international law when employing U.S. combat power. Every subordinate officer in the chain of command is sworn to uphold and defend the constitution which, by implication, also requires compliance with this law. I believe the level of commitment to ensuring such compliance in structure, process, education, training, and internal oversight is more significant today than at any time in our Nation’s history. As one familiar with all these aspects of the compliance process, I am discouraged by the common assertion that there is insufficient oversight for targeting decisions. Furthermore, I believe few people better understand the immense moral burden associated with a decision to order lethal attack than experienced military leaders who never take these decisions lightly. If our confidence in these leaders to make sound military decisions is sufficient to entrust to them the lives of our sons and daughters—and on this point, again I must admit my self-interest as my son is a second-year cadet in the U.S. Air Force Academy and my brother is a serving colonel in the United States Army—I believe it must be sufficient to judge when and how to employ lethal combat power against an enemy. These leaders spend their entire professional careers immersed in the operational, moral, ethical, and legal aspects of employing combat power. I just do not believe some external oversight mechanism or a Federal judge is more competent to make these extremely difficult and weighty judgments as the people that this Nation entrusts for that responsibility. Finally, I would like to make one comment on the very hotly discussed issue of associated forces and the scope of the AUMF. In my view, when the administration refers to an associated or affiliated force, it is referring to a process of mutation that this organization undergoes. Obviously, we are dealing with an enemy that is going to seek every asymmetrical tactic to avoid the capability of the United States to disrupt or disable its operations. Part of that tactic, I think is to recruit and grow affiliated organizations. I certainly understand the logic of wanting to include those organizations within the scope of a revised AUMF. My concern echoes that of Senator Inhofe, which is the risk is if you open that Pandora’s box, what other changes to this authority might be included in the statute which I believe could denigrate or limit the effectiveness of U.S. military operations. And so while I believe Congress absolutely has an important function to ensure that the use of force under the statute is consistent with the underlying principles that frame the enactment of the AUMF, which is to defeat al Qaeda as an entity in the corporate sense and protect the United States from future terrorist attacks, I do not believe at this point in time it is necessary to modify the statute.

#### AUMF revisions crush counter-terror-

#### 1. Freedom of action- revisions signal to the enemy limits of US tactical reach- tells terrorists where we can’t hit them back- that’s Corn.

#### 2. Precedent- AUMF is strong now- revisions snowball

Inhofe 13 [Senator James M. Inhofe is a senior United States senator from Oklahoma, ranking member of the United States Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and was its chairman from 2003 to 2007, “HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE ¶ LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, THE USE OF ¶ MILITARY FORCE, AND THE 2001 AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE,” 5-16-13, <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2013/05%20May/13-43%20-%205-16-13.pdf>]

Since the attacks on September 11, the Authorization of the Use ¶ of Military Force, commonly called the AUMF, has provided a ¶ strong legal basis for our counterterrorism efforts around the ¶ world. It has been used by the Supreme Court as a primary justification for its rulings, permitting the holding of detainees at ¶ Guantanamo Bay and the military detention of American citizens ¶ who have joined al Qaeda. There is also consensus among the three branches of Government ¶ that the AUMF continues to provide adequate authorization for ¶ military force against al Qaeda and its affiliates. After 10 years, a ¶ court battle is in rigorous debate. Here in Congress, I believe many ¶ would argue that AUMF has been and continues to be an effective ¶ tool in our efforts to keep America safe. ¶ As then general counsel of the Department of Defense, Jay Johnson said—now, this is just a year ago—quote, 10 years later, the ¶ AUMF remains on the books and is still a viable authorization ¶ today. I have no reason to disagree with him. That is why I am ¶ greatly concerned that changes to the AUMF could have significant, unintended consequences and undermine our ¶ counterterrorism efforts. ¶ As this committee has heard from our most distinguished military and civilian leaders in recent months, al Qaeda continues to ¶ prove resilient. They are expanding their areas of operation in ¶ places like north Africa and the Middle East where they remain intent on attacking Americans. ¶ I know there are members that feel the way that I do, that ¶ AUMF is an important resource and we need to at least maintain ¶ this baseline authority which underpins our ability to keep America safe, and because I know they value this resource, I look forward to hearing the arguments regarding this. ¶ And I say that—this is my view. This is one of the rare times ¶ in my career that I come to a hearing where I am not convinced ¶ on either side, and maybe we are doing the right thing right now. ¶ I do worry about the unintended consequences. I think once you ¶ open it up, there may be members that have their own agenda that ¶ we might not agree with and might not prove best for America that ¶ would take advantage of the fact that it has opened up. We have ¶ a saying in Oklahoma that ‘‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.’’ Well, I ¶ do not think it is broke, but maybe we will find out today that it ¶ is.

#### 3. Rollback- implies congressional disapproval leads to judicial rollback

Barnes, 12 -- J.D. Candidate, Boston University School of Law

[Beau, “Reauthorizing the ‘War on Terror’: The Legal and Policy Implications of the AUMF’s Coming Obsolescence,” Military Law Review, Vol 211, 2012, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2150874, accessed 8-21-13, mss]

**The scope of the AUMF is** also **important for** any future **judicial opinion** that might rely in part on Justice Jackson’s Steel Seizure concurrence.23 Support from Congress places the President’s actions in Jackson’s first zone, where executive power is at its zenith, because it “includes all that [the president]~~he~~ possesses in [their]~~his~~ own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”24 Express or **implied congressional disapproval, discernible by identifying the outer limits of** the **AUMF’s authorization, would place the President’s “power . . . at its lowest ebb**.”25 In this third zone, executive claims “must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.”26 Indeed, Jackson specifically rejected an overly powerful executive, observing that the Framers did not intend to fashion the President into an American monarch.27 Jackson’s concurrence has become the most significant guidepost in debates over the constitutionality of executive action in the realm of national security and foreign relations.28 Indeed, some have argued that it was given “the status of law”29 by then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist in Dames & Moore v. Regan.30 Speaking for the Court, Rehnquist applied Jackson’s tripartite framework to an executive order settling pending U.S. claims against Iran, noting that “[t]he parties and the lower courts . . . have all agreed that much relevant analysis is contained in [Youngstown].”31 More recently, Chief Justice John Roberts declared that “Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite scheme provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive action in [the area of foreign relations law].”32 Should a future court adjudicate the nature or extent of the President’s authority to engage in military actions against terrorists, an applicable statute would confer upon such executive action “the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation.”33 The AUMF therefore exercises a profound legal influence on the future of the United States’ struggle against terrorism, and its precise scope, authorization, and continuing vitality matter a great deal.

#### 4. Revisions create uncertainty

Stimson, 13 -- former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs [Charles, "Law of Armed Conflict and the Use of Military Force," www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2013/05/the-law-of-armed-conflict, accessed 8-20-13, mss]

Fourth, Congress must build on the AUMF, not replace it. To replace the AUMF would be risky and unwise at this time, because doing so would cast uncertainty on the legal basis for so many aspects of our campaign against al Qaeda. Any modification to the core AUMF grant of authority is risky for that reason. Over time, the AUMF will obsolete itself, as al Qaeda and the Taliban fade into oblivion, and when that process is finally complete, the AUMF will no longer have any purpose or meaning. We are not yet at that day, however. Therefore Congress may need to build on the AUMF, expanding its authority to reach new threats, rather than altering it at this time.

#### Collapses counter-terror

Barnes, 12 -- J.D. Candidate, Boston University School of Law

[Beau, “Reauthorizing the ‘War on Terror’: The Legal and Policy Implications of the AUMF’s Coming Obsolescence,” Military Law Review, Vol 211, 2012, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2150874, accessed 8-23-13, mss]

Any approach to reauthorizing the AUMF should identify which specific “incidents of warfare” it contemplates.200 **Uncertainty regarding the extent of authority diminishes the potential for military success**; those charged with fighting the global armed conflict against terrorist groups should know precisely what is authorized. Moreover, policy clarity is a virtue in a democracy, allowing the citizenry to more effectively monitor the actions of its military. The reauthorized AUMF should specifically include authorization for both detention and the lethal use of force, as well as clear standards for both. These standards, discussing, for example, how targeting decisions are made, should be public and describe the differences in their application to U.S. citizens and noncitizens. 201 The government need not disclose the specific weaponry employed or tactics used, but it should indicate when lethal force will be used against a threat that is not strictly imminent. To monitor potential abuses, internal executive branch oversight should be intensified, empowering either an independent board or inspector general to investigate abuses of targeting authority. In the detention context, meaningful review should be available for those detained; the word of the Executive Branch alone should not be sufficient to render an individual detainable.

## Norms Adv

### SCS/Senkaku

**Kania 13**

#### China creates stability

Carlson ’13 (Allen Carlson is an Associate Professor in Cornell University’s Government Department. He was granted his PhD from Yale University’s Political Science Department. His undergraduate degree is from Colby College. In 2005 his Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era was published by Stanford University Press. He has also written articles that appeared in the Journal of Contemporary China, Pacific Affairs, Asia Policy, and Nations and Nationalism. In addition, he has published monographs for the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and the East-West Center Washington. Carlson was a Fulbright-Hays scholar at Peking University during the 2004-2005 academic year. In 2005 he was chosen to participate in the National Committee’s Public Intellectuals Program, and he currently serves as an adviser to Cornell’s China Asia Pacific Studies program and its East Asia Program. Carlson is currently working on a project exploring the issue of nontraditional security in China’s emerging relationship with the rest of the international system. His most recent publications are the co-edited Contemporary Chinese Politics: New Sources, Methods and Field Strategies (Cambridge University Press, 2010) and New Frontiers in China’s Foreign Relations (Lexington, 2011). China Keeps the Peace at Sea China Keeps the Peace at Sea Why the Dragon Doesn't Want War Allen Carlson February 21, 2013)

At times in the past few months, China and Japan have appeared almost ready to do battle over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands --which are administered by Tokyo but claimed by both countries -- and to ignite a war that could be bigger than any since World War II. Although Tokyo and Beijing have been shadowboxing over the territory for years, the standoff reached a new low in the fall, when the Japanese government nationalized some of the islands by purchasing them from a private owner. The decision set off a wave of violent anti-Japanese demonstrations across China. In the wake of these events, the conflict quickly reached what political scientists call a state of equivalent retaliation -- a situation in which both countries believe that it is imperative to respond in kind to any and all perceived slights. As a result, it may have seemed that armed engagement was imminent. Yet, months later, nothing has happened. And despite their aggressive posturing in the disputed territory, both sides now show glimmers of willingness to dial down hostilities and to reestablish stability. Some analysts have cited North Korea's recent nuclear test as a factor in the countries' reluctance to engage in military conflict. They argue that the detonation, and Kim Jong Un's belligerence, brought China and Japan together, unsettling them and placing their differences in a scarier context. Rory Medcalf, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, explained that "the nuclear test gives the leadership in both Beijing and Tokyo a chance to focus on a foreign and security policy challenge where their interests are not diametrically at odds." The nuclear test, though, is a red herring in terms of the conflict over the disputed islands. In truth, the roots of the conflict -- and the reasons it has not yet exploded -- are much deeper. Put simply, China cannot afford military conflict with any of its Asian neighbors. It is not that China believes it would lose such a spat; the country increasingly enjoys strategic superiority over the entire region, and it is difficult to imagine that its forces would be beaten in a direct engagement over the islands, in the South China Sea or in the disputed regions along the Sino-Indian border. However, Chinese officials see that even the most pronounced victory would be outweighed by the collateral damage that such a use of force would cause to Beijing's two most fundamental national interests -- economic growth and preventing the escalation of radical nationalist sentiment at home. These constraints, rather than any external deterrent, will keep Xi Jinping, China's new leader, from authorizing the use of deadly force in the Diaoyu Islands theater. For over three decades, Beijing has promoted peace and stability in Asia to facilitate conditions amenable to China's economic development. The origins of the policy can be traced back to the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping repeatedly contended that to move beyond the economically debilitating Maoist period, China would have to seek a common ground with its neighbors. Promoting cooperation in the region would allow China to spend less on military preparedness, focus on making the country a more welcoming destination for foreign investment, and foster better trade relations. All of this would strengthen the Chinese economy. Deng was right. Today, China's economy is second only to that of the United States. The fundamentals of Deng's grand economic strategy are still revered in Beijing. But any war in the region would erode the hard-won, and precariously held, political capital that China has gained in the last several decades. It would also disrupt trade relations, complicate efforts to promote the yuan as an international currency, and send shock waves through the country's economic system at a time when it can ill afford them. There is thus little reason to think that China is readying for war with Japan. At the same time, the specter of rising Chinese nationalism, although often seen as a promoter of conflict, further limits the prospects for armed engagement. This is because Beijing will try to discourage nationalism if it fears it may lose control or be forced by popular sentiment to take an action it deems unwise. Ever since the Tiananmen Square massacre put questions about the Chinese Communist Party's right to govern before the population, successive generations of Chinese leaders have carefully negotiated a balance between promoting nationalist sentiment and preventing it from boiling over. In the process, they cemented the legitimacy of their rule. A war with Japan could easily upset that balance by inflaming nationalism that could blow back against China's leaders. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which a uniformed Chinese military member is killed during a firefight with Japanese soldiers. Regardless of the specific circumstances, the casualty would create a new martyr in China and, almost as quickly, catalyze popular protests against Japan. Demonstrators would call for blood, and if the government (fearing economic instability) did not extract enough, citizens would agitate against Beijing itself. Those in Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound in Beijing, would find themselves between a rock and a hard place. It is possible that Xi lost track of these basic facts during the fanfare of his rise to power and in the face of renewed Japanese assertiveness. It is also possible that the Chinese state is more rotten at the core than is understood. That is, party elites believe that a diversionary war is the only way to hold on to power -- damn the economic and social consequences. But Xi does not seem blind to the principles that have served Beijing so well over the last few decades. Indeed, although he recently warned unnamed others about infringing upon China's "national core interests" during a foreign policy speech to members of the Politburo, he also underscored China's commitment to "never pursue development at the cost of sacrificing other country's interests" and to never "benefit ourselves at others' expense or do harm to any neighbor." Of course, wars do happen -- and still could in the East China Sea. Should either side draw first blood through accident or an unexpected move, Sino-Japanese relations would be pushed into terrain that has not been charted since the middle of the last century. However, understanding that war would be a no-win situation, China has avoided rushing over the brink. This relative restraint seems to have surprised everyone. But it shouldn't. Beijing will continue to disagree with Tokyo over the sovereign status of the islands, and will not budge in its negotiating position over disputed territory. However, it cannot take the risk of going to war over a few rocks in the sea. On the contrary, in the coming months it will quietly seek a way to shelve the dispute in return for securing regional stability, facilitating economic development, and keeping a lid on the Pandora's box of rising nationalist sentiment. The ensuing peace, while unlikely to be deep, or especially conducive to improving Sino-Japanese relations, will be enduring.

#### Cooperation and lack of motivation prevents conflict

Pradt ’12 (Tilman, PhD candidate at the Freie Universität of Berlin, “ASIA'S NEW GREAT GAME? THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA,” Political Reflection, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2012)

Hence, are we attending the beginning of a new round of The Great Game in Asia, this time in the location of the SCS? As this text briefly surveyed, there are various interests at stake and several big and great powers involved, arguably too many for such a small area (especially, when concentrating on the bottleneck of the SCS, the Strait of Malac-ca). But by analyzing the motivations behind the big players’ engagement (i.e., the United States, China, and India) there is reason to believe that a potentially tragic zero-sum Great Game is still avoidable.¶ First, the US has not a real interest in permanently (and substantially) upgrading its military presence in the region. Given the still severing US budget situation and the persistent security situation in the Middle East and Central Asia, policy-makers in Washington are trying to reduce its forces de-ployed to foreign areas not to enlarge them by opening up a new theatre. Plus, the US is mainly interested in the security of the sea lanes and its guaranteed free passage, therefore President Obama’s push on the littoral states to solve their SCS disputes. The US is not interested in confront-ing China directly but to put pressure on Beijing to be more conciliatory in case of the SCS dis-putes. The deployment of US Marines to Darwin is merely presenting the stick not using it (imagine Beijing’s reactions to the US establishing a mili-tary base in Vietnam).¶ Beijing, on the other hand, will now take pains to somehow ease the situation in the SCS and to regain trust among its neighbours of the ASEAN. China has to accept that the US will now sit at the table of future rounds of territorial discussions and China no longer can use its relative power in bilateral negotiations with small ASEAN states. This is probably hard to swallow for Chinese policy-makers given their repeatedly stated premise that the SCS disputes shall be solely discussed among the regional states con-cerned. But in this changed situation, the contin-ued refusal to accept multilateral discussions will provoke further military build-up and confronta-tion in the SCS.¶ Finally, India got only involved because of perceived Chinese assertiveness in the Indian Ocean. India’s military build-up and assumed ambitions towards the SCS is a response to Chi-na’s actions in what India perceives as its territori-al waters. A reciprocal withdrawal will avoid fu-ture naval confrontations among the two Asian heavyweights.

#### No war over islands

Shuo ‘12 (Wang Shuo, managing editor of Caixin Media: the top English-language magazine covering business and finance in China, "Closer Look: Why War Is Not an Option", english.caixin.com/2012-09-12/100436770.html, September 12, 2012)

It is highly unlikely that China will fight a hot war with any of its neighbors over territorial disputes, but it should still reexamine who its friends really are There won't be a war in East Asia. The United States has five military alliances in the western Pacific: with South Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore, and American battleships are busy patrolling the seas. Without a go-ahead from Washington, there is no possibility of a hot war between battleships of sovereign countries here. As to conflicts between fishing boats and patrol boats, that's not really a big deal. The Chinese have to ponder several questions: If the country has battleship wars with Japan, can it win without using ground-based missiles? Will the war escalate if missiles are deployed? What will happen if the war continues with no victory in sight? In the last few days, one country bought islands, and the other announced the base points and the baselines of its territorial waters. But look closely, China and Japan have at least two things in common in this hostile exchange: At home they fan up nationalism, and in the international arena no activities have exceeded the scope of previous, respective claims on sovereignty. This means there is no possibility of a war in East Asia, not even remotely. From the East Sea to the South Sea, China has reached a new low in relations with Asian neighbors. It's hard to remove the flashpoints in territorial disputes, but the country can surely reduce their impacts. And the key is relations with the United States.

#### No escalation

Rogers ‘12 (Will, CNAS Energy fellow, “Navigating U.S. Policy in the South China Sea”, http://www.cnas.org/node/8960, September 5, 2012)

"Access to the South China Sea's potential petroleum resources is increasingly viewed as zero-sum and is a key driver of the region's territorial contest. But conflict over those energy reserves is far from inevitable. States compete for access to natural resources all over the world without escalation to political or military conflict. U.S. policy in the region must help tilt the balance away from competition over these resources by encouraging states to pursue joint development and other cooperative activities that will enable all countries in the region to benefit from the sea's natural resource wealth."

#### ASEAN solves

Cooley ‘12 (Brendan, Fall, A Sea Change or a Wave of Backlash? The South China Sea and Changing Power Dynamics in Southeast Asia. Peace, War and Defense Program The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Global Security Studies, Volume 3, Issue 4

<http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Cooley%20South%20China%20Sea.pdf>, Fall 2012)

The disputes could take a very different path, however. Continued aggression by China, or continued fears about the consequences of its rise might unite ASEAN against their northern neighbor. This contingency has some historical precedent. Although ASEAN members have divergent interests and their own conflicting claims in the South China Sea, China’s occupation of Philippines-claimed Mischief Reef in the Spratlys in 1994 united the regional organization against China’s aggression.61 62 ASEAN’s collective strength, and the commitment of diplomatic, economic, and military support from outside players would limit Chinese influence, and continue the multipolar competition for influence in the region. The disputes are likely to take a path between these two poles, which could take many forms. The players may find enough political capital to allow international law to resolve the conflicts, greatly reducing (but probably not eliminating) internal and external tensions in the region. The claimants could also agree to bilateral or multilateral treaties that resolve the conflicts in a mutually beneficial manner, or agree to establish a multilateral institutional framework to govern these commons. This framework might include joint regulation of fishing and oil exploration efforts, provide an international law enforcement mechanism, or allow for joint naval patrols of the sea.63 This section of the paper will explore under what conditions the disputes might follow one track over another.

### No Chinese Drone Agression

#### Chinese drone use will be restrained- aggression modeling is hype

**Anderson ‘13** [Brian, former Legal Assistant at ZS Associates, editor for Motherboard, “Just a Little Heads Up: China Can Also Kill People with Drones,” March, <http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/china-can-also-kill-people-with-drones>]

When the US decides to engage weaponized drones in its shadow wars throughout Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, or wherever else, it does so by bringing those government's to the table, by seeking their support (or at the least, their begrudging, behind-closed-doors approval) of its targetted killing plans. Failing that, it goes ahead with the strikes anyway by claiming that, say, Pakistan's government won't play ball or is simply too inept, militarily, to smash threats. ¶ China could've done the same with a drone hit on Naw Kham, the Myanmese drug lord suspected of being behind the 2011 river attacks. It could have either sought the support of Naypyidaw or "credibly claimed," as J. Dana Stuster points out at Foreign Policy, that Myanmar, to borrow language from the Obama administration memo, was "unwilling or unable to suppress the threat posed by the individual being targeted."¶ So too could it have pulled the imminency card. Kham is a ruthless drug trafficker by all accounts. As Liu Yuejin, director of the public security ministry's anti-drug bureau, told the Global Times, Kham was at-large somewhere in the opium-producing Golden Triangle at the time of China's mulling over whether to use an unmanned aerial vehicle to pulverize the region with 20kg of TNT. For as much sleep China already loses over shoring up its homeland security, it could've easily undergirded a lethal strike with the white paper's nebulous and much-criticized definition of an "imminent threat of violent attack" on domestic soil. ¶ True, China presumably would've drawn the rebuke of the West had it actually gone through with drone-striking Kham, though it's not like the People's Republic has ever really cared much for marching to anything but its own drum when it comes to, well, just about anything. With Beidou and the Wing Loon, China's global-positioning service and Reaper-style hunter-killer drone, respectively, growing sharper and sharper, the opportunity was there for the taking. ¶ But the only thing to stop China was China itself. The plan to use the killer drone to track and kill Kham was axed "because we were ordered to catch him alive," Liu told the Global Times. Kham, who was captured last April, now faces the death penalty. ¶ If anything, pulling the plug suggests that China still would rather take pains to capture bad guys alive than kill them outright. Beijing may just end up killing Kham in the end, of course, after who knows what sort of interrogations or jailtime handlings.¶ But the initial restraint is pretty remarkable. Whereas the US probably would've gone the other way--indeed, it's doing so more and more, insisting that its drone strikes abroad are permissible because nine times out of 10 capture simply is not feasible--Chinese authorities trekked out into the bush outside the country's borders to find the man. To think: for all the well-warranted criticism China gets for human rights abuses and agressive behaviors along its borders, it comes out here looking cleaner than the U.S., turning down the quick-and-painless drone option in favor of capturing a suspect and bringing him before the courts, justice served, thank you very much. It could've taken a page from the Obama's administration drone memos, but it didn't.

### 2NC- No modeling/inevitable

#### Social science proves no modeling- US signals are dismissed

Zenko ‘13 [Micah, Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action Douglas Dillon fellow, "The Signal and the Noise," Foreign Policy, 2-2-13, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/20/the\_signal\_and\_the\_noise, accessed 6-12-13, mss]

Later, Gen. Austin observed of cutting forces from the Middle East: "Once you reduce the presence in the region, you could very well signal the wrong things to our adversaries." Sen. Kelly Ayotte echoed his observation, claiming that President Obama's plan to withdraw 34,000 thousand U.S. troops from Afghanistan within one year "leaves us dangerously low on military personnel...it's going to send a clear signal that America's commitment to Afghanistan is going wobbly." Similarly, during a separate House Armed Services Committee hearing, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter ominously warned of the possibility of sequestration: "Perhaps most important, the world is watching. Our friends and allies are watching, potential foes -- all over the world." These routine and unchallenged assertions highlight what is perhaps the most widely agreed-upon conventional wisdom in U.S. foreign and national security policymaking: the inherent power of signaling. This psychological capability rests on two core assumptions: All relevant international audiences can or will accurately interpret the signals conveyed, and upon correctly comprehending this signal, these audiences will act as intended by U.S. policymakers. Many policymakers and pundits fundamentally believe that the Pentagon is an omni-directional radar that uniformly transmits signals via presidential declarations, defense spending levels, visits with defense ministers, or troop deployments to receptive antennas. A bit of digging, however, exposes cracks in the premises underlying signaling theories. There is a half-century of social science research demonstrating the cultural and cognitive biases that make communication difficult between two humans. Why would this be any different between two states, or between a state and non-state actor? Unlike foreign policy signaling in the context of disputes or escalating crises -- of which there is an extensive body of research into types and effectiveness -- policymakers' claims about signaling are merely made in a peacetime vacuum. These signals are never articulated with a precision that could be tested or falsified, and thus policymakers cannot be judged misleading or wrong. Paired with the faith in signaling is the assumption that policymakers can read the minds of potential or actual friends and adversaries. During the cycle of congressional hearings this spring, you can rest assured that elected representatives and expert witnesses will claim to know what the Iranian supreme leader thinks, how "the Taliban" perceives White House pronouncements about Afghanistan, or how allies in East Asia will react to sequestration. This self-assuredness is referred to as the illusion of transparency by psychologists, or how "people overestimate others' ability to know them, and...also overestimate their ability to know others." Policymakers also conceive of signaling as a one-way transmission: something that the United States does and others absorb. You rarely read or hear critical thinking from U.S. policymakers about how to interpret the signals from others states. Moreover, since U.S. officials correctly downplay the attention-seeking actions of adversaries -- such as Iran's near-weekly pronouncement of inventing a new drone or missile -- wouldn't it be safer to assume that the majority of U.S. signals are similarly dismissed? During my encounters with foreign officials, few take U.S. government pronouncements seriously, and instead assume they are made to appease domestic audiences.

#### No reverse modeling- norms can’t solve

**Saunders 5-4**-13 [Paul J. Saunders is executive director of The Center for the National Interest and associate publisher of The National Interest. He served in the State Department from 2003 to 2005, “We Won't Always Drone Alone,” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/we-wont-always-drone-alone-8177>]

A broader and deeper challenge is how others—outside the United States—will use drones, whether armed or unarmed, and what lessons they will draw from Washington’s approach. Thus far, the principal lesson may well be that drones can be extremely effective in killing your opponents, wherever they are, without risking your own troops and without sending soldiers or law enforcement personnel across another country’s borders. It seems less likely that others will adopt U.S.-style legal standards and oversight procedures, or that they will always ask other governments before sending drones into their airspace.¶ Based on their actions, it is almost as if Obama administration officials believe that the United States and its allies will have a long-term monopoly on drones. How else can one explain their exuberant confidence in launching drone attacks? However, the administration’s dramatic expansion in drone strikes—and their apparent effectiveness—will only further shorten Washington’s reign as the drone capital of the world by increasing the incentives to others eager to develop, refine or buy the technology.¶ Have Obama administration officials given any thought to what the world might look like when armed drones are more widespread and when Americans or U.S. allies and partners could become targets? To an outsider, there is little evidence of this kind of thinking in the administration’s use of drones.¶ This is a serious problem. According to an unclassified July 2012 report by the Government Accountability Office, at least 76 countries already have acquired unmanned aerial vehicles, known as UAVs or drones; the report also states that “countries of concern” are attempting to acquire advanced UAVs from foreign suppliers as well as seeking illegal access to U.S. technology. And a 2012 special report by the United Kingdom’s Guardian newspaper indicated that China has 10 or more models, though not all are armed. Other sources identify additional varieties in China. At least 50 countries are trying to build 900 different types of drones, the GAO writes.¶ More generally, the administration’s expanding use of drones is a powerful endorsement of not only the technology, but of the practice of targeted killing as an instrument of foreign and security policy. Having provided this powerful impetus, the United States should not be surprised if others—with differing legal standards and more creative efforts at self-justification—seize upon it once they have the necessary capabilities. According to the GAO, this is already happening—in government-speak, “while only a limited number of countries have fielded lethal or weaponized UAVs, this threat is anticipated to grow.” From this perspective, it is ironic that a president so critical of his predecessor’s unilateralism would practice it himself—particularly in a manner that other governments will find much easier to emulate than the Bush administration’s larger-scale use of force. How does the Obama administration plan to respond if and when China or Russia uses armed UAVs to attack groups they define as terrorists?

#### Restrictions won’t be modeled- precedent already set

**Jacobson 2-12**-13 [Mark R. Jacobson is a senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. From 2009 to 2011, he served with NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, “Column: Key Assumptions About Drones Are Based on Misconceptions,” <http://www.vnews.com/opinion/4393278-95/drones-drone-armed-civilian>]

Armed drones are neither as simple as model airplanes nor as complex as high-performance fighter jets. Of course, a remote-controlled helicopter that you can build in your garage is certainly not as capable as the $26.8 million MQ-9 Reaper, the primary U.S. hunter-killer drone. But drones are much less expensive than fighter aircraft, and in an age of increasing austerity, it is tempting for nations to consider replacing jets with drones. More than 50 countries operate surveillance drones, and armed drones will quickly become standard in military arsenals. The challenge is to consider what international rules, if any, should govern the use of armed drones. The United States is setting the precedent; our approach may define the global rules of engagement. Of course, we cannot expect other nations to adopt the oversight and restrictions we have. What doors are we opening for other nations’ use of drones? What happens when terrorist groups acquire them? The United States must prepare for being the prey, not just the predator.

#### US drone model is irrelevant

**Wittes and Singh ’12** [Benjamin Wittes is a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution where he co-directs the Harvard Law School-Brookings Project on Security and Law, specializes in the legal issues surrounding international security and the war on terrorism, member of the Hoover Institution’s Task Force on National Security and the Law, Ritika Singh is a research assistant on law and national security issues at the Brookings Institution. She graduated with majors in International Affairs and Government from Skidmore College, “Drones Are a Challenge — and an Opportunity,” 1-11-12, <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/11/benjamin-wittes-ritika-singh/drones-are-challenge-opportunity>]

Yes, as Cortright says, a great many other countries are getting into the drone game too—but this is less because the United States is paving the way than because this logic is obvious to those countries too. And this same logic, combined with the reality that robotic technologies are getting cheaper and easier to acquire even as their power increases, means that proliferation will happen irrespective of what the United States does. Indeed, the question is not whether we will live in a world of highly proliferated technologies of robotic attack. It is whether the United States is going to be ahead of this curve or behind it.

#### Perceived benefits are all that matter

**Barry ’12** [Tom Barry is the Director of the TransBorder Project at the Center for International Policy, “Drone Proliferation: Other Chapters and Other Challenges,” 1-17-12, <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/17/tom-barry/drone-proliferation-other-chapters-other-challenges>]

Thus far, in Congress and in the executive branch, we see mostly uncritical advocacy for increased drone deployment—on vivid display at the annual drone fairs sponsored jointly by the House Unmanned Systems Caucus and the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International.[5]¶ It is widely accepted—in Congress, in the media, and by the public—that drone warfare has been an unqualified success. This perceived success—unsullied by the type of concerns raised by Cortright such as drone blowback—is key in driving drone proliferation around the world and at home. Representative Candice Miller, the Michigan Republican who chairs the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security of the House Homeland Security Committee, is a self-declared “huge supporter” of UAVs and advocates deploying the “fantastic technology” that the U.S. military uses “in theater” at home.¶ “The UAVs are coming,” declared Miller in a recent oversight hearing, “and now you see our military sitting in a cubicle sometimes in Nevada, drinking a Starbucks, running these things in theater and being incredibly, incredibly successful.”

#### US tech sales make prolif inevitable

**Abdurazak and Advani 6-18**-13 [Faeza Abdurazak holds a MSc in International Relations from Nanyang Technological University and is a research assistant at the Middle East Institute, and Rohan Advani, Middle East Institute, “Drones Further Worsen Image of the U.S. in the Middle East, Say Panellists,” <http://www.mei.nus.edu.sg/blog/drones-further-worsen-image-of-the-u-s-in-the-middle-east-say-panellists>]

Unintended consequences of drone warfare include retaliation from, and the radicalization of, the local populace, as well as operational and strategic confusion – all of which reinforces the self-fulfilling prophecy of the “War on Terror.” Support for the policy and the proliferation of drones is also rapidly increasing, as the industry – expected to be valued at $82 billion by 2025 – continues to provide jobs in an economically fragile environment. As the drone lobby gains power, we may see economic factors being prioritized over strategic goals; in essence, a further expansion of the military-industrial complex.

#### Unarmed drones make their impacts inevitable

**Cortright ’12** [David, Director of Policy Studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, has conducted research for the foreign ministries of Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands and has consulted and advised agencies of the United Nations, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the International Peace Academy, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, holds an M.A. from New York University, and completed doctoral studies at the Union Institute in residence at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C., “Beneficial Drones?” Feb. 2, <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/02/02/david-cortright/beneficial-drones>]

Human rights activists Andrew Stobo Sniderman and Mark Harris argue in the New York Times that surveillance drones can and should be used in defense of human rights. Drones could provide detailed real-time evidence of crimes against humanity, such as Syrian government attacks against civilians or genocidal violence in Sudan. Increased awareness of such crimes could help to save lives, the authors claim. Surveillance drones are reportedly being used by a conservation group to monitor illegal Japanese whaling. Graphic scenes of the killing of whales and dolphins could intensify the public outcry against such abuses.¶ Should we learn to stop worrying and love the drone? Not exactly. It is important to distinguish between drones as weapons systems and their use for surveillance. The latter purpose could be more justifiable, especially in defense of human rights, but serious questions arise. By what authority would governments or nongovernmental groups have the right to conduct surveillance over the territory of a sovereign state? Sniderman and Harris acknowledge that sending drones to spy on Syria would violate national and international laws. What limitations should be placed on such surveillance? Would those being spied upon have the right to fire upon the drones, perhaps prompting retaliation and leading to a drone-against-drone scenario of robotic war? Would images of wrongdoing provided by drones be admissible in legal proceedings? Should they be used by broadcast media?

#### Drones are locked in- plan can’t solve

**McDonald 1-11**-13 [Jack, lecturer at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, completed his PhD thesis on targeted killings, has worked with The Centre for Defence Studies, “Losing perspective on proliferation,” <http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2013/01/losing-perspective-on-proliferation/>]

The control of UAV technology is, however, a problem. In short, it isn’t that amenable to control in any meaningful sense of the word. If one wishes to “control” the proliferation of technology automating human behaviour and actions, then there would need to be some form of global bar on research in that area.\* I imagine that MIT and Google might have a problem this idea. Similarly, if someone wants to control the design and building of small unmanned aircraft, well, too late, that horse bolted a long time ago. Of course, you could lock up every amateur geek enthusiast, but that would be a bit pointless. The point is, the technology to build UAVs is embedded into our society to a far greater degree than nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons and small arms are. UAVs are effectively an extension of the industrial revolution (mechanisation, automation, replacement of human action by machine). I’m writing this on a laptop that was probably made by a large number of robots. UAVs need to be put into perspective – despite their dangers they can’t make human life as we know it extinct and they likely can’t be controlled by treaty. A little less rhetoric and a little more thought from critics of military UAVs might produce a better critique.

#### It’s impossible to control drone use

**Byman ’13** [Daniel L. Byman, Research Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice,” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman>]

Controlling the spread of drone technology will prove impossible; that horse left the barn years ago. Drones are highly capable weapons that are easy to produce, and so there is no chance that Washington can stop other militaries from acquiring and using them. Nearly 90 other countries already have surveillance drones in their arsenals, and China is producing several inexpensive models for export. Armed drones are more difficult to produce and deploy, but they, too, will likely spread rapidly. Beijing even recently announced (although later denied) that it had considered sending a drone to Myanmar (also called Burma) to kill a wanted drug trafficker hiding there.

#### US tech sales and economic benefits make prolif inevitable

**CRG ’12** [The Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG) is an independent research and media organization based in Montreal, a registered non-profit organization in the province of Quebec, Canada, “Mapping Drone Proliferation: UAVs in 76 Countries,” September 18, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/mapping-drone-proliferation-uavs-in-76-countries>]

The report goes on: “Currently, there are over 50 countries developing more than 900 different UAV systems. This growth is attributed to countries seeing the success of the United States with UAVs in Iraq and Afghanistan and deciding to invest resources into UAV development to compete economically and militarily in this emerging area.”¶ While the report fails to highlight the danger of growing drone proliferation to global peace and security it does emphasize the danger of drone proliferation to “US interests”. The report states that “the use of UAVs by foreign parties to gather information on U.S. military activities has already taken place” and “the significant growth in the number of countries that have acquired UAVs, including key countries of concern, has increased the threat to the United States.”¶ Despite this, the report states “the U.S. government has determined that selected transfers of UAV technology support its national security interests”, thus highlighting the contradiction at the heart of current arms control measures. ‘Private sector representatives’ told the reports authors that “UAVs are one of the most important growth sectors in the defense industry and provide significant opportunities for economic benefits if U.S. companies can remain competitive in the global UAV market.”

### 2NC- No impact

#### Prolif doesn’t cause wars- restraint wins out

**Goure ’12** [ Daniel Goure, PhD in international relations and Russian studies from the Johns Hopkins University, is a vice president of the Lexington Institute, was a member of the Defense Department’s Transition Team, served as director of the Office of Strategic Competitiveness for the Secretary of Defense and was a senior analyst with the Center for Naval Analyses, Science Applications International Corporation, SRS Technologies, R&D Associates and System Planning Corporation, has been a consultant for the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, has been an adjunct professor in graduate programs at the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University, and an adjunct professor at National Defense University, “Drones and the Changing Nature of Warfare: Hold the Presses!” <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/13/daniel-goure/drones-changing-nature-warfare-hold-presses>]

Despite the proliferation of drones, particularly by the United States, at best it can be argued that the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UASs) is changing tactics, particularly with respect to operations on land. The predominant mission of drones today is to collect information, primarily electro-optical data in the form of pictures and full motion video. The overwhelming majority of drone flying hours are conducted by systems such as Aerovironment’s Wasp, Puma, and Raven; Insitu’s ScanEagle; and Textron’s Shadow for the purpose of providing overwatch for maneuvering Army and Marine Corps units. Even the vaunted Predator, a variant of which, the MQ-9 Reaper, is the platform employed for armed strikes, is predominantly employed for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. The larger systems such as Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk and Lockheed Martin’s stealthy RQ-170 Sentinel are intended solely to gather intelligence.¶ Armed drones serve a niche function. They are useful in situations where real-time tactical intelligence is required in order to launch a weapon and the operating environment is extremely benign. Because they can loiter in the area of a suspected target, waiting for positive identification and the proper time to strike with the least possibility of inflicting collateral damage, they are far less lethal than any other aerial weapons system.¶ Attempts to connect an increased tendency to use force are supported neither by the evidence nor by logic. The frequency and intensity of conflicts has declined even as the ability to conduct remote combat has increased exponentially. There were only a handful of drones available to the U.S. military when Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom began. The lack of unmanned systems appears to have posed no obstacle to the decision to initiate either operation.¶ It is difficult to accord any serious influence over the conduct of air operations in past or current conflicts to the presence of armed drones. In the era before drones, the U.S. imposed ten year long no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. In addition, the number of drone sorties in total is but a tiny fraction of all aerial sorties. Armed drone sorties constitute only a small fraction of total drone missions. Cortright notes that since 2009 there have been 239 drone strikes into Pakistan. However, for the month of January 2011, Coalition forces in Afghanistan flew 387 sorties in which guns were fired or munitions expended.[2] These statistics suggest a clear preference on the part of the military for manned aerial systems and not drones in the conduct of tactical air operations. Cortright also reports that 145 drone strikes were conducted during Operation Odyssey Dawn—the liberation of Libya. Actually this is an incorrect statement. While drones were used over Libya, these were not armed flights, hence they were sorties and not strikes. But this is good example of the breathless quality of much of the analysis today of the implications of drones for warfare. Look at the numbers. The U.S. alone conducted some 3,500 sorties during Operation Odyssey Dawn. So drones amounted to 4% of the total. By the way, the United States and United Kingdom also launched 228 Tomahawk cruise missiles during this operation, 112 on the first night of the conflict. If we are to accord to weapon systems influence over the decision to use force, then in the case of Libya, precedence must be given based simply on the number of sorties conducted to cruise missiles, aerial refueling tankers, tactical fighters, and even cargo planes before we come to the little-used drone.¶ The availability of unmanned aerial systems in no way makes conflict more likely or more brutal. Quite the opposite, in fact, seems to be the case. The presumption that were it not for the availability of drones, the U.S. would refrain from conducting military operations against terrorists based in Pakistan is highly dubious. We have an example of an alternative military option: Operation Enduring Freedom. As Joshua Goldstein pointed out in a recent article, the use of armed drones in Pakistan may have prevented the use of far bloodier means. “Armed drones now attack targets that in the past would have required an invasion with thousands of heavily armed troops, displacing huge numbers of civilians and destroying valuable property along the way.”[3] According to Robert Woodward’s reporting on President Obama’s decision to deploy additional forces to Afghanistan in 2009, a number of senior advisors proposed a lower-cost, smaller deployment based on increased use of special operations forces and unmanned aerial vehicles.

## Terror Advg

### 2NC Winning

#### Terror threat low now- weakened terrorists not focused on large-scale attacks on the West- best intel

Ackerman, a wired senior reporter

#### Winning the war on terror now- new Philippine model proves

**Michaels 3-31**-11 [Jim, military writer for USA Today, “Philippines a model for counterinsurgency,” <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-03-30-secretwar30_ST_N.htm>]

Standing on a hilltop camp carved out of dense jungle, Lt. Cmdr. Craig Replogle, a U.S. Navy SEAL, peered at a distant hill where the Philippine military had recently overrun militant camps. "We continually monitor where they are," he said of Abu Sayyaf, a once-powerful insurgent group linked to al-Qaeda. Though not widely known, the Philippines once threatened to become a hub of al-Qaeda. In the 1990s, before Osama bin Laden became a household name in America, top al-Qaeda leaders such as 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed were in this Pacific island chain developing ambitious plans to strike at America and the West. Since 9/11, the small U.S. contingent here has given the Philippine military the tools and know-how to decimate Abu Sayyaf on its own and have created what some military experts say is a model for how to stop Islamic insurgencies before they require an invasion force to defeat. "Nobody understands it better than the soldiers that have experience in the Philippines," said Army Brig. Gen. Edward Reeder, commander of the Army's Special Forces Command at Fort Bragg, N.C. "They understand counterinsurgency. "Is it a future model for counterinsurgencies? Absolutely." Minimal danger, cost The Philippine mission is a rarity in the U.S. war on terror: a largely successful counterinsurgency at minimal cost in lives and dollars. Seventeen U.S. troops have died since the task force was established here: three in bombings, and the remainder in a helicopter crash or other non-combat incidents. In that time, the number of Abu Sayyaf militants went from a peak of 1,200 in 2001 to about 400 today, according to the Philippine military. Under an agreement with the Philippine government, the U.S. forces cannot engage in combat. However, with the help of U.S. intelligence, the Philippine military has killed or captured 28 Abu Sayyaf leaders, according to the Special Forces task force. Twenty-four remain at large. Perhaps even more critically, the main Muslim separatist group is in talks with the Philippine government, leaving Abu Sayyaf more isolated than ever. "Almost all the key leaders have been killed or captured," Philippine Lt. Col. Roland Rodil said. The operation costs $50 million a year to maintain the small military contingent of about 600 U.S. servicemembers. The war in Afghanistan is costing U.S. taxpayers about $2 billion a week. The Philippine mission is unique in that the U.S. is dealing with a friendly and relatively effective government and military. Still, military analysts and military officers say the Philippines is a useful guide for fighting insurgencies. The aim is to swoop into countries and help them extinguish an Islamic insurgency before it gains the strength of a Taliban. Defense Secretary Robert Gates signaled as much in a recent speech to cadets at West Point. The U.S. military must focus on capabilities that can "prevent festering problems from growing into full-blown crises which require costly — and controversial — large-scale American military intervention," he said. Such a problem was festering here for decades. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed lived in the Philippines in 1994 and 1995. From there he and Ramzi Yousef, who masterminded the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, concocted an ambitious plan to blow up airliners over the Pacific. The plot was uncovered in 1995 only by chance after a chemical fire in Manila drew the attention of Philippine police. The U.S. task force was created here shortly after 9/11 at the invitation of the Philippine government. A key resource the Americans brought with them was high-tech intelligence against an insurgency hunkered in tough terrain among cowed locals. "Americans help us a lot because of the accurate grid coordinates they have," said Lt. Col. Eugene Boquio, commander of the Philippines' 4th Scout Ranger Battalion. His soldiers, living in a rough hewn camp carved out of the jungle, recently launched an offensive against Abu Sayyaf camps in a remote part of this island. "All those locations were given to us by Americans," Boquio said. The U.S. Special Forces here have to be careful to avoid getting into situations that could expose them to combat. They assist in training and provide other support, such as specialized night fighting skills. Recently the U.S. and Philippine forces have been emphasizing development projects to win over the locals, an important precept of the U.S. military's counterinsurgency doctrine. The U.S. State Department's Agency for International Development is spending $100 million to boost the Philippines economy and build government institutions, much of it in the Muslim-dominated southern Philippines. The efforts have quietly thwarted al-Qaeda's efforts to gain a foothold in Asia. "We blunted it," said Navy Capt. Robert Gusentine, commander of the Special Forces task force based in the southern Philippines.

#### US winning the war on terror- no WMD attacks

Oswald 5/30, Rachel Oswald, staff editor for the National Journal and the Global Security Newswire, “Despite WMD fears, terrorists are focused on conventional attacks,” May 30, 2013, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/despite-wmd-fears-terrorists-are-focused-on-conventional-attacks-20130417?page=1&utm_source=feedly>

WASHINGTON – The United States has spent billions of dollars to prevent terrorists from obtaining a weapon of mass destruction even as this week’s [bombings in Boston](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/police-scrutinize-remnants-boston-blasts/) further show that a nuclear weapon or lethal bioagent is not necessary for causing significant harm.¶ Organized group plots against the U.S. homeland since Sept. 11, 2001 have all involved conventional means of attack. Beyond that have been a handful of instances in which individuals used the postal system to deliver disease materials -- notably [this week’s ricin letters](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/lab-confirms-ricin-letter-sent-senator/) to President Obama and at least one senator and the 2001 anthrax mailings.¶ Terrorism experts offer a range of reasons for why al-Qaida or other violent militants have never met their goal of carrying out a biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological attack on the United States or another nation. These include:¶ -- substantive efforts by the United States and partner nations to secure the most lethal WMD materials;¶ -- improved border security and visa checks that deny entry to possible foreign-born terrorists;¶ -- a lack of imagination and drive on the part of would-be terrorists to pursue the kind of novel but technically difficult attacks that could lead to widespread dispersal of unconventional materials;¶ -- a general haplessness on the part of the native-born U.S. extremists who have pursued WMD attacks, specifically involving weaponized pathogens;¶ -- elimination of most of al-Qaida’s original leadership, notably those members with the most experience orchestrating large-scale attacks abroad; and¶ -- the Arab Spring uprisings have likely drawn down the pool of terrorists with the proper training and focus to organize WMD attacks abroad as they have opted instead to join movements to overthrow governments in places such as Syria and Yemen.¶ “We killed a lot of people. That was one thing,” said Randall Larsen, founding director of the Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center, referring to the deaths in recent years of al-Qaida chief Osama bin Laden and any number of his direct or philosophical adherents.¶ Bin Laden is known to have exhorted his followers to seek weapons of mass destruction for use in attacks against the West. Leading al-Qaida propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki of the group’s Yemen affiliate, who was killed in a 2011 U.S. drone strike, used his Inspire magazine to [encourage sympathizers](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/al-qaeda-magazine-urges-chemical-biological-strikes-us/) to develop and carry out their own chemical and biological attacks.¶ Al-Qaida also had separate efforts in [Afghanistan](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/al-qaeda-operatives-discussed-wmd-attacks-while-training-prior-to-911-report-says/) and [Malaysia](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-officials-worried-by-release-of-al-qaeda-bioweapons-operative/) that worked on developing anthrax for use in attacks before they were broken up or abandoned following the September 2001 attacks.¶ In the last decade, the technological means to carry out new kinds of improvised WMD attacks such as those involving [laboratory-engineered pathogens](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/synthetic-pathogens-might-pose-bioterror-threat-scientists-warn/) has become much more available. However, it can take some time for bad actors to recognize how these new technologies can open the doorway to heretofore unseen massively disruptive terrorist attacks, according to Larsen.¶ Passenger airplanes were flying across the United States for decades before any terrorists realized that they would make a highly destructive improvised weapon when flown at high speeds into skyscrapers filled with thousands of people, Larsen noted.¶ A 2012 analysis by terrorism experts at the New America Foundation detailed a number of disrupted unconventional weapon plots against the country that counterintuitively were much more likely to involve home-grown antigovernment groups and lone-wolf actors than Muslim extremists. "In the past decade, there is no evidence that jihadist extremists in the United States have acquired or attempted to acquire material to construct CBRN weapons," according to authors Peter Bergen and Jennifer Rowland.¶ They documented a [number of failed domestic plots](http://homegrown.newamerica.net/), often involving cyanide or ricin. Only former Army microbiologist Bruce Ivins was successful in actually carrying out such an effort, killing five people with anthrax spores in 2001.¶ “Right-wing and left-wing extremist groups and individuals have been far more likely to acquire toxins and to assemble the makings of radiological weapons than al-Qaida sympathizers,” they said.

#### Drones are winning the war for us now – Kerry’s statements

Levine and Karimi 8/2, Adam Levine and Faith Karimi, “Kerry says Pakistan drone strikes to end ‘very soon’,” August 2, 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/01/politics/pakistan-drones>

Following talks with the Pakistani government, Secretary of State John Kerry said the United States is making progress in the war on terror, and hopes to end the use of drone strikes "very soon."¶ The secretary of state told a Pakistani television station that President Barack Obama has a "very real timeline" for ending the strikes.¶ He did not provide specifics on the timeline.¶ "We hope it's going to be very, very soon," Kerry said Thursday, according to a transcript provided by the State Department.¶ "I believe that we're on a good track. I think the program will end as we have eliminated most of the threat and continue to eliminate it," Kerry said.¶ He added that the cessation depends on "a number of factors" and that Washington is working on it with the Pakistani government.¶ A State Department statement later addressed Kerry's remarks.¶ "Today, the secretary referenced the changes that we expect to take place in that program over the course of time, but there is no exact timeline to provide," the statement said.¶ However, it said, the goal is to get to a place where threats are eliminated and drones are not needed.¶ "Now, we're all realistic about the fact that there is a threat that remains and that we have to keep up ... the fight in this and other places around the world," Marie Harf, a State Department spokeswoman, said. "So this was in no way indicating a change in policy. It's really been reinforcing things I think we've said for months on this."¶ The United States ramped up strikes in the tribal region in the first few years of Obama's presidency. But the number of strikes in Pakistan has since dropped partly because of al Qaeda's decline in the country and more U.S. focus on threats from al Qaeda groups in other countries, such as Yemen.¶ In May, Obama defended the use of drone strikes as a necessary evil, but one that must be used with more temperance as the United States' security situation evolves.¶ America prefers to capture, interrogate and prosecute terrorists, but there are times when this isn't possible, Obama said in a speech at the National Defense University in Washington.¶ Terrorists intentionally hide in remote locations and putting boots on the ground is often out of the question, he said.¶ However, he urged caution and discipline.¶ "To say a military tactic is legal, or even effective, is not to say it is wise or moral in every instance," Obama said at the time. "For the same progress that gives us the technology to strike half a world away also demands the discipline to constrain that power -- or risk abusing it."¶ Increased oversight is important, but not easy, Obama said.¶ Drone strikes in the tribal regions bordering Afghanistan have drawn heated opposition in Pakistan because of civilian casualties.¶ The drone strikes have further roiled relations between the two nations, which flared following a 2011 raid by U.S. commandos on a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that killed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.¶

#### Terrorism has decreased drastically – we are winning and there is no impact

Bump 4/16, Philip Bump, writer for the Atlantic Wire, “In Fact, the US has been Winning the War on Terror,” April 16, 2013, <http://news.yahoo.com/fact-u-winning-war-terror-200054845.html>

Terror in the United States have evolved since 1970: once the tool of left-wing radicals, then right-wing radicals, terrorist attacks are now uncommon, often unsuccessful, and not nearly as deadly. We have heard a lot in recent days that the Boston Marathon bombing is the sort of attack we should expect. But historic data suggests it largely isn't. The University of Maryland is home to a project called START, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. The project has tracked every terror attack around the world from 1970 to the end of 2011 and provides a database of their research [at their website](http://www.start.umd.edu/start/). (START[defines a terror attack](http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/) as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.") After seeing [the Washington Post cite its data](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/04/16/eight-facts-about-terrorism-in-the-united-states/), we took a look at what the full database shows about terror attacks. Relative to the rest of the world, the United States has had a high number of terror attacks since 1970.¶ The countries that have experienced the most terror attacks over the past four decades are those you might suspect: Iraq, Colombia, India, and Pakistan. Others may be less expected for all but experienced foreign policy buffs: Spain, Peru, Turkey. The United States is 14th on the list — ahead of Chile, Guatemala, and Lebanon.¶ But there used to be far more attacks in the United States than there are now.¶ The number of attacks has plummeted since the early 1970s, when radical groups attacked police and businesses. There was a slight resurgence during the mid-1990s, when anti-abortion activists began attacking clinics and supporters. The spike in May of 2002 was the result of [a series of 18 pipe bombs](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luke_Helder) placed in mailboxes in the Midwest.¶ Most attacks in the United States have been in New York, California, and Florida.¶ California, New York, and Florida have, combined, seen as many terror attacks since 1970 as all of the rest of the states (and D.C.) combined. Massachusetts is eighth on the list, but it has seen fewer than 1/11th the attacks that California has.¶ The number of people killed and injured varies widely — but most attacks have zero fatalities.¶ In only 11 percent of attacks was anyone killed. Excluding one attack, all of the terror attacks since 1970 have averaged .19 deaths per attack, making any event with a fatality an aberration. The one exception that skews that number was 9/11. Including that attack raises that figure to 1.46 fatalities per attack. 9/11 comprises 86.6 percent of all terror-attack deaths in the U.S. since 1970. (It also necessitates that the scale used for deaths and injuries be logarithmic.)¶ People are slightly more likely to be wounded in attacks. An average of just over one person is wounded in each attack. The increase in fatalities visible in 2009 is almost entirely due to the shooting at Fort Hood.¶ Businesses are the most common target of attacks.¶ The target of attacks changes over time, but since 1970, more attacks have targeted businesses than anything else. Attacks on private citizens, which one would assume includes the attack in Boston, are third-most common.¶ Bombs are used in attacks most frequently.¶ Almost half of all terror attacks in the United States since 1970 have used bombs. Relatively few attacks have employed firearms as a primary strategy.¶ These trends are not static, but more recent attacks don't stray too far from the pattern. [In a report released last December](http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/START_IUSSDDataTerroristAttacksUS_1970-2011.pdf), START articulates data about attacks since 2001.¶ There were a total of 207 terrorist attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2011.¶ Total attacks declined from a high of 40 in 2001 to nine in 2011.¶ Between 2001 and 2011, we recorded a total of 21 fatal terrorist attacks in the United States.¶ The highest proportion of unsuccessful attacks since 1970 occurred in 2011, when four out of nine recorded attacks were unsuccessful. …¶ The most common weapons used in terrorist attacks in the United States from 2001 to 2011 were incendiary devices (53 percent of all weapons used) and explosives (20 percent of all weapons used).¶ Successful attacks are more and more rare; attacks that result in fatalities, rarer still. The attack in Boston did enormous physical and psychological damage. We can be somewhat consoled that it is an aberration.¶

#### Winning the war now – fragmented leadership and small operations

Shaughnessy 12, Larry Shaughnessy, senior contributor for CNN politics, “Panetta: American beating Al-Qaeda but hasn’t won yet,” November 20th, 2012, <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/20/panetta-america-beating-al-qaeda-but-hasnt-won-yet/>

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta spelled out the future battle against al Qaeda, praising what has been done so far but warning much more work remains.¶ Speaking about the September 11 attacks in a speech at the Center for a New American Security, a Washington-based think tank, Panetta said, "We will do everything possible to ensure that such an attack never happens again. That means counterterrorism will continue as a key mission for our military and intelligence professionals as long as violent extremists pose a direct threat to the United States."¶ He said efforts against the core al Qaeda group have been largely successful. "Al Qaeda's leadership ranks have been decimated. This includes the loss of four of al Qaeda's five top leaders in the last 2½ years alone - Osama bin Laden, Shaikh Saeed al-Masri, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman and Abu Yahya al-Libi."¶ But he pointed out that al Qaeda remains a threat outside Afghanistan and Pakistan, in places like Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere.¶ "We know that al Qaeda, its affiliates and adherents are looking to establish a foothold in other countries in the Middle East and North and West Africa - including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Boko Haram group in Nigeria. The international community and our regional partners share our concern about Mali, where al Qaeda affiliated groups have taken control of territories in the North and pose an emerging threat. We are also concerned about Libya, where violent extremists and affiliates of al Qaeda attacked and killed innocent Americans in Benghazi," Panetta said.¶ "With respect to that attack, let me be clear: We will work with the Libyan government to bring to justice those who perpetrated these attacks."¶ Panetta said the solution to defeating al Qaeda's outlying affiliates is unconventional warfare. "This campaign against al Qaeda will largely take place outside declared combat zones, using a small-footprint approach that includes precision operations."¶ "We are continuing to ramp up Special Operations Forces, which have doubled in size from 37,000 on 9/11 to 64,000 today. SOF will grow to 72,000 by 2017. We are expanding our fleet of Predator and Reaper UAVs over what we have today."¶ But he went on to say the real permanent solution to extremist terrorism means more than guns and bombs. "But to truly protect America, we must sustain and in some areas deepen our engagement in the world – our military, intelligence, diplomatic and development efforts are key to doing that."¶

### 2NC No Russia War

#### No accidents or miscalculation

Ball ‘6 (Desmond, Special Professor at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, “The Probabilities of ‘On the Beach,’” May, rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/sdsc/wp/wp\_sdsc\_401.pdf, 2006)

The prospects of a nuclear war between the United States and Russia must now be deemed fairly remote. There are now no geostrategic issues that warrant nuclear competition and no inclination in either Washington or Moscow to provoke such issues. US and Russian strategic forces have been taken off day-to-day alert and their ICBMs ‘de-targeted’, greatly reducing the possibilities of war by accident, inadvertence or miscalculation. On the other hand, while the US-Russia strategic competition is in abeyance, there are several aspects of current US nuclear weapons policy which are profoundly disturbing. In December 2001 President George W. Bush officially announced that the United States was withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, one of the mainstays of strategic nuclear arms control during the Cold War, with effect from June 2002, and was proceeding to develop and deploy an extensive range of both theatre missile defence and national missile defence (NMD) systems. The first anti-missile missile in the NMD system, designed initially to defend against limited missile attacks from China and North Korea, was installed at Fort Greely in Alaska in July 2004. The initial system, consisting of sixteen interceptor missiles at Fort Greely and four at Vandenberg Air Force in California, is expected to be operational by the end of 2005. The Bush Administration is also considering withdrawal from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and resuming nuclear testing. (The last US nuclear test was on 23 September 1992). In particular, some key Administration officials believe that testing is necessary to develop a ‘new generation’ of nuclear weapons, including low-yield, ‘bunker-busting’, earth-penetrating weapons specifically designed to destroy very hard and deeply buried targets (such as underground command and control centres and leadership bunkers).

#### Empirics disprove accidents escalate

Quinlan ‘9 (Sir Michael Quinlan, Former Permanent Under-Secretary of State UK Ministry of Defense, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects, p. 63-69, The book reflects the author's experience across more than forty years in assessing and forming policy about nuclear weapons, mostly at senior levels close to the centre both of British governmental decision-making and of NATO's development of plans and deployments, with much interaction also with comparable levels of United States activity in the Pentagon and the State department, 2009)

 There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally dropping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear detonation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experience would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low. It might be further nested that the mechanisms needed to set of such an explosion are technically demanding, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, as well as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments immure widespread arid diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense. Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch—extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote. Precisely because any nuclear weapon processor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase of caution. In was occasion conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of it initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers, as pages 63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction.

### 2NC EU Alliance

#### Europe won’t fight over US drones- hypocrisy fears

**Dworkin ‘13** [Anthony, Anthony Dworkin is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, was previously the executive director of the Crimes of War Project, “Drones and Targeted Killing: Defining a European Position,” July, <http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR84_DRONES_BRIEF.pdf>]

Meanwhile, European governments are increasingly ¶ acquiring armed drones for their own military forces and, ¶ in some cases, encountering strong public or political ¶ opposition. German Defence Minister Thomas de Maizière’s ¶ announcement of his wish to purchase armed UAVs for the ¶ Bundeswehr prompted campaigning groups to launch an ¶ appeal entitled “No Combat Drones” and provoked criticism ¶ from opposition parties. In the UK, the shift of control of ¶ British drones from Nevada to a Royal Air Force base in ¶ Lincolnshire led to a demonstration of several hundred ¶ people. Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland are among other ¶ EU member states that are seeking or considering the ¶ purchase of armed drones, and European defence consortia ¶ are exploring the possibility of manufacturing both ¶ surveillance and armed UAVs in Europe. To defuse public ¶ suspicion of drones in Europe, EU governments have an ¶ interest in reducing the controversy provoked by US actions ¶ and developing a clearer European line about when lethal ¶ strikes against individuals are permissible.

### 2NC Alt Cause- Detention

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#### Detention o/w drones

Smith 7 (JULIANNE, DIRECTOR AND SENIOR ¶ FELLOW, EUROPE PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND ¶ INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, April 17, “EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION IN U.S.¶ COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY: THE IMPACT ON¶ TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS”, http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/34712.pdf)

As a European analyst, who spends a considerable amount of ¶ time in Europe meeting with policymakers and addressing a variety of public audiences, I can confirm that the issue of extraordinary rendition, along with press revelations about secret prisons ¶ in Europe, have cast a rather dark shadow on our relationship with ¶ our European allies. While transatlantic intelligence and law enforcement cooperation does continue, European political leaders are ¶ coming under increasing pressure to distance themselves from the ¶ United States. Over time, I do believe that this could pose a threat ¶ to joint intelligence activity with our European allies. ¶ Now it is well known that America’s image in Europe has declined quite steadily over the last couple of years, and some of the ¶ reasons for that were cited earlier this afternoon, in part due to the ¶ decision of the United States to go to Iraq, human rights abuses ¶ at Abu Ghraib and allegations of torture at Guantanamo bay. But ¶ we seemed to move away from some of these dark days in the ¶ transatlantic relationship as we moved into 2005, as both sides of ¶ the Atlantic I think, both Europe and the United States, made a ¶ conscious effort to renew transatlantic ties. ¶ When it was alleged, however, later in 2005—at the end of 2005 ¶ that the United States was detaining top terror suspects in socalled ‘‘black sites’’ in eight countries and that the CIA was flying ¶ terror suspects between secret prisons and countries in the Middle ¶ East that have been known to torture detainees, the United States ¶ image in Europe took another dive. ¶ On the particular issues of rendition, as we have heard earlier, ¶ Europeans appear to have two primary concerns, one, Washington’s ¶ unwillingness to grant due process to terror suspects and, two, violation of suspects’ human rights during interrogation. ¶ Now the allegations that have been submitted and the resulting ¶ investigation by the European Parliament have in many ways in ¶ my mind confirmed Europeans’ worst fears. Many Europeans, particularly at the public level, believe that they have plenty of evidence right now to prove a long-suspected gap between United ¶ States stated policies and U.S. action. As a result, U.S. promises ¶ not to torture terror suspects and to uphold the fundamental pillars of international law are no longer seen as credible. ¶ The question is, does any of this matter? President Bush has ¶ noted on several occasions that making policy is not a popularity ¶ contest, and he is right about that. But when political leads in other countries start to feel that standing shoulder to shoulder ¶ with the United States is a political liability, I think that low ¶ favorability ratings can indeed hinder America’s ability to solve ¶ global challenges with its many partners and allies around the ¶ world; and I would cite a couple of reasons for this. ¶ First, as we have seen with the tensions over the issue of rendition, this particular issue has put unnecessary strain, in my ¶ mind, on what has been, in many cases, a very positive relationship. In fact, it is distracting the two sides from the core task at ¶ hand; and that is, of course, combating terrorism. ¶ Second, as I mentioned earlier, European political leaders are ¶ under pressure from their publics to keep the United States at ¶ arm’s length. I don’t know that this pressure will ever halt counterterrorism cooperation with our European allies in full or certainly ¶ not in the near term, but there are signs that negative public opinion is making it more difficult for our European allies to cooperate ¶ with the United States. One only has to look at the latest European responses to United States requests for more support in Afghanistan to find one such example. ¶ Finally, I would point out that the United States and Europe are ¶ facing a long list of challenges above and beyond terrorism, things ¶ like energy security, nonproliferation, brewing regional crises, ¶ Darfur; and the list goes on and on. In many of these areas, the ¶ United States are asking—we are asking Europe to do more. ¶ But differences in our counterterrorism relationship with Europe ¶ have affected our relationship at other levels. Again, negative public sentiment toward the United States will never succeed in halting our cooperation with Europe entirely, but it does make asking ¶ for greater European support in other areas that much more challenging. ¶ Just to conclude, I would point out—and I feel very strongly—¶ that Europe is one of America’s most important partners in combating radical extremism, and there is certainly no shortage of success stories in the many things we have done together, particularly ¶ over the past 6 years in this area. But I do feel—again based on ¶ my experience traveling back and forth to Europe on a regular ¶ basis—that this relationship that we share is currently played with ¶ mistrust and divisions over strategy and tactics.

### 2NC No Rollback

#### Controversy won’t end drone strikes

**Krumova 6-19**-13 [Kremena, Foreign Correspondent of Epoch Times, “Drones Will Remain, Despite Controversies,” <http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/118191-drones-will-remain-despite-controversies/>]

As American drones strike terrorist targets, a fire of criticism bears down on the United States.¶ American-Pakistani relations have deteriorated, as Pakistan demands an end to drone strikes. Reports have shown the United States has sometimes been unable to precisely identify people killed by its drones. U.S. President Barack Obama has promised to scale down the use of drones. ¶ The polemical questions of morality related to their use might seem a sure sign these unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as “drones,” are going out of fashion. Yet policy experts say they’re here to stay.¶ “Drones will not go out of fashion,” Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, wrote in an email. “Their loiter time is the most useful attribute, together with their relatively low cost and lack of risk to the country operating them.”¶ Lethal drones, unmanned aircraft equipped with bombs, have become the most popular means of countering terrorism since 9/11. ¶ In combat zones, drones bring many advantages: they can be sent into hostile areas without risking pilots’ lives; they loiter for hours, without the limits of shift schedules for human personnel and without the limits of human endurance; they are able to gather and analyze huge amounts of intelligence data; last, but not least, they are relatively cheaper than manned aircraft, with basic models starting at $4.5 million. ¶ According to the nonpartisan policy institute New America Foundation, drone attacks aimed at suspected militants are estimated to have killed between 1,900–3,200 people in Pakistan from 2004 to 2012.¶ As it turns out, in some cases it was not clear whom the drones killed. Earlier this month, NBC News published a review of classified CIA files, revealing that between September 2010 and November 2011, 114 drone strikes killed as many as 613 people, some of whom were not clearly identified. Some were vaguely identified—in 26 attacks those killed are listed as “other militants,” and in four others as “foreign fighters.” In some cases, the death toll for a single attack changed from report to report. ¶ Criticism of the drones escalated further last week as the new Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif warned, “This daily business of drones has to stop immediately.” His comment came after the killing of a major Taliban leader in the North Waziristan region. ¶ Drone use may, nonetheless, continue to rise. ¶ C. Holland Taylor, chairman of LibForAll Foundation at the International Institute of Qur’anic Studies wrote in an email: “I do not believe the overall tempo of drone strikes around the world will significantly decrease anytime soon. In fact, it may increase, with more nations bringing drones to bear on their perceived enemies.”¶ A decade ago, when U.S. President George Bush began his war against terrorism, America was the sole owner of 50 drones. Now, the United States has at least 7,500. And the United States is no longer alone. ¶ According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, more than 70 countries now own some type of drone, with a few of them possessing armed drones.¶ Drones have only been used to lethally strike targets in six countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, according to an American Security Project report.¶ Terrorism Shift¶ But global terrorism is changing, and drones cannot serve as the sole solution.¶ During a speech at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., in May, Obama described the new American counterterrorism approach. He admitted that, while the use of drones is effective, legal, and saves lives, the new realities dictate a new approach. ¶ “In an age when ideas and images can travel the globe in an instant, our response to terrorism can’t depend on military or law enforcement alone,” Obama said.¶ He described the current terrorism landscape as one in which the core of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the path to defeat, and where the use of drones will be “heavily constrained.”¶ Because American drones have been so effective, Taylor said, the rest of the world has been able to heavily constrain its drone use. ¶ “If you speak privately with European counter-terrorism experts, they frankly acknowledge that while their governments publicly criticize the use of drones, the primary reason there has not been a successful terrorist attack in Europe in recent years is precisely because of American drones operating over Waziristan and elsewhere,” Taylor said.

#### No drone rollback

**RT 2-3**-13 [“US Won’t Scale Back Drone Warfare, Says Panetta,” <http://www.eurasiareview.com/03022013-us-wont-scale-back-drone-warfare-says-panetta/>]

The US is engaged in a global war on terror, and drone strikes are an effective tool to eliminate Al-Qaeda militants planning terror attacks on America, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told AFP, adding that drone operations should stay covert.¶ The US will not curtail its extrajudicial assassinations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, Panetta said in a farewell interview: “We are in a war. We’re in a war on terrorism and we’ve been in that war since 9/11.”¶ “The whole purpose of our operations were aimed at those who attacked this country and killed 3,000 innocent people in New York [on 9/11] as well as 200 people here at the Pentagon,” he said.¶ US Air Force Drone¶ US Air Force Drone¶ Over a decade has passed since the beginning of the global war on terror; in that time, two countries were occupied by the US, and the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, Osama Bin Ladenm was shot dead by American marines. Still, the war on terror must continue, Panetta said.¶ “I think it depends on the nature of the threat that we’re confronting,” he explained.¶ Since terror threats continue to originate in Muslim countries – from Afghanistan in 2001 to Yemen in 2013 – it is unlikely the US will scale back its drone program in the foreseeable future.¶ Though US drones assassinate Al-Qaeda operatives in these countries without a court verdict or any form of due process, Panetta said that those governments are “pursuing the same goal” as the US. He said that the Yemeni government, for example, is strongly in favor of the US drone program.¶ But in October 2012, Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik claimed that the majority of the people killed by American drones in Pakistan are civilians.¶ A US study in September 2012 revealed that only 2 percent of those killed in drone strike in Pakistan are actually top militants.¶ “I think we had a responsibility to use whatever technology we could to be able to go after those who not only conducted that attack but were planning to continue to attack this country,” Panetta said.¶ The departing US Secretary of Defense also rejected the idea that overseas drone operations should be turned over from CIA control to the US military, which would require open reporting on every operation: “When you got those kind of operations where, because of the nature of the country you’re in or the nature of the situation you’re dealing with, it’s got to be covert.”¶ An avid supporter of drone warfare, Panetta was largely responsible for the dramatic increase in drone attacks in Pakistan when he served as head of the CIA from 2009 to 2011. As the CIA director, he likely knew that the Hellfire missiles shot from drones have killed hundreds – if not thousands – of civilians, including children.¶ But the drone program has only expanded in recent years. At the start of 2013, the CIA escalated its use of drones in Pakistan, launching seven deadly strikes during the first 10 days of 2013 and killing at least 40 people, 11 of whom may have been civilians.

#### Drones will continue far in the future- Obama will waffle

**Mazetti and Landler 8-2**-13 [Mark Mazzetti, Pulitzer Prize-winning correspondent for The New York Times, Mark Landler is a White House correspondent for The New York Times, “Despite Administration Promises, Few Signs of Change in Drone Wars,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/us/politics/drone-war-rages-on-even-as-administration-talks-about-ending-it.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>]

There were more drone strikes in Pakistan last month than any month since January. Three missile strikes were carried out in Yemen in the last week alone. And after Secretary of State John Kerry told Pakistanis on Thursday that the United States was winding down the drone wars there, officials back in Washington quickly contradicted him. More than two months after President Obama signaled a sharp shift in America’s targeted-killing operations, there is little public evidence of change in a strategy that has come to define the administration’s approach to combating terrorism.¶ Most elements of the drone program remain in place, including a base in the southern desert of Saudi Arabia that the Central Intelligence Agency continues to use to carry out drone strikes in Yemen. In late May, administration officials said that the bulk of drone operations would shift to the Pentagon from the C.I.A.¶ But the C.I.A. continues to run America’s secret air war in Pakistan, where Mr. Kerry’s comments underscored the administration’s haphazard approach to discussing these issues publicly. During a television interview in Pakistan on Thursday, Mr. Kerry said the United States had a “timeline” to end drone strikes in that country’s western mountains, adding, “We hope it’s going to be very, very soon.”¶ But the Obama administration is expected to carry out drone strikes in Pakistan well into the future. Hours after Mr. Kerry’s interview, the State Department issued a statement saying there was no definite timetable to end the targeted killing program in Pakistan, and a department spokeswoman, Marie Harf, said, “In no way would we ever deprive ourselves of a tool to fight a threat if it arises.”¶ Micah Zenko, a fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, who closely follows American drone operations, said Mr. Kerry seemed to have been out of sync with the rest of the Obama administration in talking about the drone program. “There’s nothing that indicates this administration is going to unilaterally end drone strikes in Pakistan,” Mr. Zenko said, “or Yemen for that matter.”¶ The mixed messages of the past week reveal a deep-seated ambivalence inside the administration about just how much light ought to shine on America’s shadow wars. Even though Mr. Obama pledged a greater transparency and public accountability for drone operations, he and other officials still refuse to discuss specific strikes in public, relying instead on vague statements about “ongoing counterterrorism operations.”¶ Some of those operations originate from a C.I.A. drone base in the southern desert of Saudi Arabia — the continued existence of which encapsulates the hurdles to changing how the United States carries out targeted-killing operations.¶ The Saudi government allowed the C.I.A. to build the base on the condition that the Obama administration not acknowledge that it was in Saudi Arabia. The base was completed in 2011, and it was first used for the operation that killed Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical preacher based in Yemen who was an American citizen.¶ Given longstanding sensitivities about American troops operating from Saudi Arabia, American and Middle Eastern officials say that the Saudi government is unlikely to allow the Pentagon to take over operations at the base — or for the United States to speak openly about the base.¶ Spokesmen for the White House and the C.I.A. declined to comment.¶ Similarly, military and intelligence officials in Pakistan initially consented to American drone strikes on the condition that Washington not discuss them publicly — a bargain that became ever harder to honor when the United States significantly expanded American drone operations in the country.¶ There were three drone strikes in Pakistan last month, the most since January, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, which monitors such strikes. At the same time, the number of strikes has declined in each of the last four years, so in that sense Mr. Kerry’s broader characterization of the program was accurate.¶ But because the drone program remains classified, administration officials are loath to discuss it in any detail, even when it is at the center of policy discussions, as it was during Mr. Obama’s meeting in the Oval Office on Thursday with President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi of Yemen.

## Solvency

#### Obama will circumvent Congress and the courts

**Kumar 3-19**-13 [Anita, White House correspondent for McClatchy Newspapers, former writer for The Washington Post, covering Virginia politics and government, and spent a decade at the St. Petersburg Times, writing about local, state and federal government both in Florida and Washington, “Obama turning to executive power to get what he wants,” <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/03/19/186309/obama-turning-to-executive-power.html#.Ue18CdK1FSE>]

“The expectation is that they all do this,” said Ken Mayer, a political science professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison who wrote “With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power.” “That is the typical way of doing things.”¶ But, experts say, Obama’s actions are more noticeable because as a candidate he was critical of Bush’s use of power. In particular, he singled out his predecessor’s use of signing statements, documents issued when a president signs a bill that clarifies his understanding of the law.¶ “These last few years we’ve seen an unacceptable abuse of power at home,” Obama said in an October 2007 speech.. “We’ve paid a heavy price for having a president whose priority is expanding his own power.”¶ Yet Obama’s use of power echoes that of his predecessors. For example, he signed 145 executive orders in his first term, putting him on track to issue as many as the 291 that Bush did in two terms.¶ John Yoo, who wrote the legal opinions that supported an expansion of presidential power after the 2001 terrorist attacks, including harsh interrogation methods that some called torture, said he thought that executive orders were sometimes appropriate – when conducting internal management and implementing power given to the president by Congress or the Constitution – but he thinks that Obama has gone too far.¶ “I think President Obama has been as equally aggressive as President Bush, and in fact he has sometimes used the very same language to suggest that he would not obey congressional laws that intrude on his commander-in-chief power,” said Yoo, who’s now a law professor at the University of California at Berkeley. “This is utterly hypocritical, both when compared to his campaign stances and the position of his supporters in Congress, who have suddenly discovered the virtues of silence.”¶ Most of Obama’s actions are written statements aimed at federal agencies that are published everywhere from the White House website to the Federal Register. Some are classified and hidden from public view.¶ “It seems to be more calculated to prod Congress,” said Phillip J. Cooper, the author of “By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action.” “I can’t remember a president being that consistent, direct and public.”¶ Bush was criticized for many of his actions on surveillance and interrogation techniques, but attention has focused on Obama’s use of actions mostly about domestic issues.¶ In his first two years in the White House, when fellow Democrats controlled Capitol Hill, Obama largely worked through the regular legislative process to try to achieve his domestic agenda. His biggest achievements – including a federal health care overhaul and a stimulus package designed to boost the economy –came about with little or no Republican support.¶ But Republicans took control of the House of Representatives in 2010, making the task of passing legislation all the more difficult for a man with a detached personality who doesn’t relish schmoozing with lawmakers. By the next year, Obama wasn’t shy about his reasons for flexing his presidential power.¶ In fall 2011, he launched the “We Can’t Wait” campaign, unveiling dozens of policies through executive orders – creating jobs for veterans, adopting fuel efficiency standards and stopping drug shortages – that came straight from his jobs bills that faltered in Congress.¶ “We’re not waiting for Congress,” Obama said in Denver that year when he announced a plan to reduce college costs. “I intend to do everything in my power right now to act on behalf of the American people, with or without Congress. We can’t wait for Congress to do its job. So where they won’t act, I will.”¶ When Congress killed legislation aimed at curbing the emissions that cause global warming, Obama directed the Environmental Protection Agency to write regulations on its own incorporating some parts of the bill.¶ When Congress defeated pro-union legislation, he had the National Labor Relations Board and the Labor Department issue rules incorporating some parts of the bill.¶ “The president looks more and more like a king that the Constitution was designed to replace,” Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa, said on the Senate floor last year.¶ While Republicans complain that Obama’s actions cross a line, experts say some of them are less aggressive than they appear.¶ After the mass shooting in Newtown, Conn., in December, the White House boasted of implementing 23 executive actions to curb gun control. In reality, Obama issued a trio of modest directives that instructed federal agencies to trace guns and send information for background checks to a database.¶ In his State of the Union address last month, Obama instructed businesses to improve the security of computers to help prevent hacking. But he doesn’t have the legal authority to force private companies to act.¶ “The executive order can be a useful tool but there are only certain things he can do,” said Melanie Teplinsky, an American University law professor who’s spoken extensively on cyber-law.¶ Executive actions often are fleeting. They generally don’t settle a political debate, and the next president, Congress or a court may overturn them.¶ Consider the so-called Mexico City policy. With it, Reagan banned federal money from going to international family-planning groups that provide abortions. Clinton rescinded the policy. George W. Bush reinstated it, and Obama reversed course again.¶ But congressional and legal action are rare. In 1952, the Supreme Court threw out Harry Truman’s order authorizing the seizure of steel mills during a series of strikes. In 1996, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals dismissed an order by Clinton that banned the government from contracting with companies that hire workers despite an ongoing strike.¶ Obama has seen some pushback.¶ Congress prohibited him from spending money to move inmates from the Guantanamo Bay U.S. naval base in Cuba after he signed an order that said it would close. A Chinese company sued Obama for killing its wind farm projects by executive order after he said they were too close to a military training site. A federal appeals court recently ruled that he’d exceeded his constitutional powers when he named several people to the National Labor Relations Board while the Senate was in recess.¶ But Obama appears to be undaunted.¶ “If Congress won’t act soon to protect future generations,” he told Congress last month, “I will.”

#### AUMF is irrelevant- other authority exists

**Lohmann 1-28**-13 [Julia, director of the Harvard Law National Security Research Committee, BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, “Legality of U.S. Government’s Targeted Killing Program under Domestic Law,” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/legality-of-targeted-killing-program-under-u-s-domestic-law/>]

Nevertheless, Bradley and Goldsmith explain, even if Congress did not authorize the U.S. government’s targeted killing program with the AUMF, the President could in theory act against terrorists presenting an imminent threat under the Covert Action Statute (CAS), 50 U.S.C. §413b. The CAS is potentially an important authorizing authority, as its scope extends beyond that of the AUMF, namely in that it is not limited to those terrorist groups linked to the September 11, 2001 attacks. In other ways, though, the CAS may be narrower than the AUMF. For instance, Robert Chesney sets forth the argument that the CAS merely authorizes that which is otherwise lawful under Article II, and thus does not expand the scope of the President’s authority. Consequently, the CAS, like the AUMF, may be insufficient to support the entire breadth of the U.S. government’s targeted killing policy.

#### Drones can continue outside the AUMF-

**Pearlstein 4-11**-13 [Deborah, served in the White House from 1993-1995 as a Senior Editor and Speechwriter for President Clinton. A magna cum laude graduate of Harvard Law School, Pearlstein clerked for Judge Michael Boudin of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, then for Justice John Paul Stevens of the U.S. Supreme Court, assistant professor of law at Cardozo School of Law for Yeshiva University, “Keeping up with the Drones’,” <http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/11/keeping-up-with-the-drones/>]

The McClatchy piece contends that such statistics are necessarily at odds with Administration statements that its targeting operations were limited to senior leaders of Al Qaeda and allied groups. This seems wrong; I haven’t understood the Administration’s position to be that it would only target senior leadership. Indeed, that was part of the problem with the White Paper. It argued that targeting senior leaders was within the President’s authority, but it didn’t foreclose the possibility that others could also be targeted. The Paper spent a great deal of time gesturing at, if not quite committing to, legal theories that would support much broader targeting authority. In this respect, the leaked news, if accurate, confirms what should by now be the unsurprising conclusion that the White Paper did not describe the full scope of asserted U.S. targeting authority.¶ That said, the official details here are new and therefore important to untangle. We might fairly assume some of these strikes are the deeply problematic signature strikes we’ve known about – against ‘militants’ who may or may not pose a threat to the United States. But what about the named groups? Does the United States have the authority to target the groups it targeted in the Pakistan/Afghan border region – including the Haqqanis, the Pakistani Taliban, and Lashkar i Jhangvi? Start with domestic law. The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), giving the President the power to use force against those groups responsible for the attacks of 9/11, is an authorization for the use of military force. It’s not clear the AUMF empowers the CIA to do anything. In any case, as the article points out, there’s no suggestion that the groups named above were in fact responsible for the attacks of 9/11. So odds are slim that the AUMF is the relevant source of domestic authority. That leaves CIA’s authority under Title 50 of the U.S. Code to conduct covert operations, operations for which a presidential finding is required and which the U.S. wishes to be able publicly to deny. So perhaps there is a presidential finding (of course classified) that authorizes the use of force against a far broader range of groups than is covered by the AUMF. That would be news. One may well not think this a good idea (itself worth several separate posts), but provided the Administration is complying with the modest requirements of covert action (the finding, congressional notification, etc.), it would address the problem of domestic law.

#### Article II authority means Obama can strike outside the AUMF

**Chesney ’12** [Bobby Chesney is the Charles I. Francis Professor in Law at the University of Texas School of Law, as well as a non-resident Senior Fellow of the Brookings Institution, “AQAP Is Not Beyond the AUMF: A Response to Ackerman,” April 24, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/04/aqap-is-not-beyond-the-aumf-a-response-to-ackerman/>]

In any event, what is so bad about invoking Article II’s national self-defense theory as to a group that has repeatedly attempted to kill Americans? Let’s assume that Ackerman is correct and that the AUMF does not apply to AQAP. That would not automatically make the use of force against it problematic from a separation of powers perspective, for such uses of force might be justified under Article II. Ackerman takes the contrary view, writing that the president should have “to return to Congress, and the American people, for another round of express support for military campaigns against other terrorist threats.” This is too broad. In circumstances where the “terrorist threat” in question is an organization that has already attempted to kill Americans on multiple occasions and is plainly intent on doing so again when the opportunity presents itself, the president just as plainly has both the authority and the obligation under Article II to act to defend the country, with or without an explicit legislative authorization to do so. To give the most obvious example, President Clinton did not wait for an AUMF authorizing him to use force against al Qaeda in 1998 after the East African embassy bombings—and rightly so.

#### Libya and the WPR prove circumvention

**Druck ‘12** [Judah A. Druck, law associate at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Cornell Law School graduate, magna cum laude graduate from Brandeis University, “Droning On: The War Powers Resolution and the Numbing Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare,” <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Druck-final.pdf>]

On March 19, 2011, American forces began attacking various¶ targets controlled by Muammar el-Qaddafi as part of NATO’s support¶ for the Libyan antigovernment resistance.1¶ Promising that no ground troops would be used during these operations,2¶ President Barack¶ Obama ordered strikes on Qaddafi forces using Tomahawk missiles¶ and bombings from warplanes.3¶ This order would later include the¶ use of unmanned Predator drones, signaling a shift toward a supporting role for NATO.4¶ Fighting lasted for months, ultimately culminating in the ousting of Qaddafi by rebel forces.5¶ Despite the limited nature of the U.S. intervention, questions¶ concerning the legality of the President’s actions quickly arose.6¶ Under the 1973 War Powers Resolution (WPR),7¶ which was enacted in¶ the wake of protests during the Vietnam War, the President is required to cease any use of military forces in “hostilities” within sixty¶ days of the conflict’s beginning unless he receives congressional authorization to the contrary.8¶ Having acted without any support from¶ Congress in the first sixty days, the President had seemingly presented¶ a clear example of a WPR violation. Yet President Obama and State¶ Department legal adviser Harold Koh rejected this view by arguing¶ that the use of force in Libya had not involved the type of “hostilities”¶ covered by the WPR.9¶ Emphasizing the absence of U.S. casualties and¶ lack of exposure to “exchanges of fire with hostile forces,” the President stood firmly behind his decision to intervene in Libya without¶ consulting Congress.10 Legislators, pundits, and academics alike broadly criticized this¶ legal analysis.11 Yet aside from these particularized complaints, the¶ President ultimately faced no discernible repercussions (judicial, legislative, or social challenges) for his actions.12 From a historical perspective, the absence of substantial backlash is unsurprising: since its¶ inception, the WPR has generally failed to prevent presidents from¶ using military action in an arguably illegal manner.13 In those situations, courts,14 legislators,15 and social movements16 have failed to¶ challenge this sort of presidential action, setting the stage for President Obama’s similar neglect of the WPR.

# 1NR

## Debt ceiling

### uniqueness

#### -- Obama is pushing

Feldmann 9/18/13 (Linda, Christian Science Monitor, "Government shutdown coming? Boehner raises stakes on defunding Obamacare")

As for Obama, even before Boehner’s capitulation to the tea party wing of his caucus, efforts to woo the Republicans into a budget deal have born no fruit, and so he has opted for verbal slaps. On Monday, the president took to a [White House](http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/The%2BWhite%2BHouse) stage to mark the five-year anniversary of the 2008 financial crisis, and he spewed vitriol at his most ardent opponents – even though a mass shooting had just taken place a few miles from the White House.¶ "I cannot remember a time when one faction of one party promises economic chaos if it doesn't get 100 percent of what it wants," Obama said.¶ At Wednesday’s briefing, White House press secretary [Jay Carney](http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Jay%2BCarney) suggested that the president’s past charm offensive with Republicans – including taking some out to dinner at an expensive restaurant (on his dime) – hadn’t completely failed.¶ “What we discovered is that there is a sincere desire by Republican lawmakers, some of them, anyway ... to make budget policy that ... reduces the deficit responsibly, but invests responsibly as well,” Mr. Carney said.¶ And, he said, the president will still try “all manner of ways to get to yes with Republican leaders.”

#### - Obama has the momentum

Easley 9/18/13 (Jason, "Obama's Genius Labeling of GOP Demands Extortion Has Already Won the Debt Ceiling Fight")

President Obama effectively ended any Republican hopes of getting a political victory on the debt ceiling when he called their demands extortion. Nobody likes being extorted. The American people don’t like feeling like they are being shaken down. The White House knows this, which is why they are using such strong language to criticize the Republicans. Obama is doing the same thing to House Republicans that he has been doing to the entire party for the last few years. The president is defining them before they can define themselves.¶ Obama is taking the same tactics that he used to define Mitt Romney in the summer of 2012 and applying them to John Boehner and his House Republicans. While Republicans are fighting among themselves and gearing up for another pointless run at defunding Obamacare, the president is already winning the political battle over the debt ceiling. His comments today were a masterstroke of strategy that will pay political dividends now and in the future. If the president is successful anytime a Republican talks about defunding Obamacare, the American people will think extortion. Republicans keep insisting on unconstitutional plots to kill Obamacare, and the [president is calling them out on it.](http://www.politicususa.com/2013/09/15/obama-turns-tables-tells-republicans-debt-ceiling-demands-unconstitutional.html) Republicans haven’t realized it yet, but while they are chasing the fool’s gold of defunding Obamacare they have already lost on the debt ceiling. By caving to the lunatic fringe in his party, John Boehner may have [handed control of the House of Representatives back to Democrats on a silver platter.](http://www.politicususa.com/2013/09/17/wall-street-journal-warns-gop-government-shutdown-give-democrats-house.html) While Republicans posture on Obamacare, Obama is routing them on the debt ceiling.

#### -- Democrats are confident that the House will raise the debt ceiling now – high level statements prove

Bolton 9/14/13 (Alexander, Writer for the Hill, "Confident Democrats Want Separate Showdowns on Shutdown and Debt Limit")

¶ Senate Democrats want to have separate fights with the House GOP over a potential government shutdown and raising the nation’s debt limit, confident they will win showdowns on both issues. [[WATCH VIDEO](http://thehill.com/video/senate/322259-house-gop-prepares-for-last-fight-against-obamacare)]  Some House Republicans want to bundle the question of setting federal funding levels and raising the debt limit into one vote but a senior Senate Democrat has rejected that possibility. ¶ Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) said repeatedly raising the debt limit in small increments wreaks havoc on government operations.¶ “The longer you extend the debt limit, the more thoughtless it is,” he said.¶ Durbin predicted Congress would tackle the debt limit question in mid October instead of pushing the debate until shortly before Christmas.¶ “October 15, mark your calendar,” he said. “I’m told that come October 15 we better start getting serious about it.”¶ Durbin said he wants extend the nation’s borrowing limit for as long as possible in one increment. He cited a year as a reasonable extension.¶ “We’re not going to be in the situation where you’re lurching from crisis to crisis and putting the full faith and credit [of the government] at the hands of a Republican caucus that can’t get it’s act together,” said a senior Senate Democratic aide. “Doing a longer term clean debt-limit extension will prevent that from happening.” Some House Republicans want to maximize their leverage by bundling the debt limit and stopgap measure funding government. They could accomplish this by extending government funding until mid-December and bumping up the debt limit just enough to delay a medium-term solution until year’s end.¶ Democrats, however, want to force the GOP to debate these issues successively.¶ “We’re not negotiating on the debt ceiling. We think we have the high ground in both of those fights,” said a senior Senate Democratic aide.¶ The Senate Democratic strategy over the next several weeks will be to stand pat and refuse to make any significant concessions in exchange for funding the government or raising the debt ceiling.  “If push comes to shove on debt ceiling, I’m virtually certain they’ll blink,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (N.Y.), the third-ranking member of the Senate Democratic leadership. “They know they shouldn’t be playing havoc with the markets.”¶

#### -- Republicans will cave now

The Economist 9/21/13 (Print Edition of the Economist, "Once More to the Brink")

Strangely, the improving economics of the debt have done little for the rotten politics. Both the president and Republican leaders in Congress are anxious to avoid a repeat of their standoff in August 2011, when they brought America close to an unnecessary and catastrophic default by refusing to agree on the terms under which the debt ceiling should be raised.¶ In this section¶ [Style and substance](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586553-it-may-not-look-it-barack-obamas-presidency-tied-syria-style-and-substance)¶ Once more to the brink¶ [Tokers’ delight](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586584-sensible-drug-policy-decision-federal-government-once-tokers-delight)¶ [Mass shootings are up; gun murders down](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586585-mass-shootings-are-up-gun-murders-down)¶ [Of trolls and mistrials](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586543-idiotic-comments-derail-big-civil-rights-case-trolls-and-mistrials)¶ [The risk of rabid raccoons](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586542-using-marshmallow-treats-fight-deadly-disease-risk-rabid-raccoons)¶ [The American Dream, RIP?](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586581-economist-asks-provocative-questions-about-future-social-mobility-american)¶ [Reprints](http://www.economist.com/rights)¶ The “debt ceiling” is the legal limit to federal borrowing. Since the Treasury borrows 19 cents of every dollar it spends, Congress has to keep raising the debt ceiling or Uncle Sam will not be able to pay his bills. When Republicans and Democrats played chicken with the full faith and credit of the United States, it undermined confidence in the economy and dented the squabbling lawmakers’ approval ratings. Yet they seem poised to do it all again.¶ On October 1st much of the federal government will shut down unless Congress votes to fund the roughly 35% of the budget that requires annual authorisation. Then, around mid-October, the Treasury will hit the debt ceiling. Unless Congress votes to raise it, Treasury will have to stop paying bills such as salaries, pensions, and in the extreme, interest on the national debt, which would trigger a cataclysmic default.¶ In theory, a deal should be within grasp. Mr Obama would like to replace the so-called “sequester”—across-the-board spending cuts that resulted from that last showdown, in 2011—with more targeted spending cuts and higher taxes. But with no leverage to force the Republicans to agree, he would almost certainly sign a budget that kept funding at the sequester’s levels. He also wants the debt ceiling raised with no strings attached. Since Republicans did that last January, they should be prepared to do so again.¶ But several dozen conservative Republican congressmen are blocking the way. They want to use the budget and the debt ceiling to gut Mr Obama’s healthcare plan, the main provisions of which are scheduled to take effect by January. So far, 74 of the 233 House Republicans have sponsored a bill that would wipe out any funds for implementing Obamacare next year, while funding the rest of the government.¶ Mr Obama, however, has vowed not to delay Obamacare or negotiate over the debt ceiling. This has saddled Republican leaders with a dilemma: how to satisfy their members’ Quixotic longing to kill Obamacare without committing political suicide by shutting down the government or causing a default. Last week John Boehner, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Eric Cantor, the Majority Leader, proposed passing two bills, one that defunded Obamacare, and another that funded the government. The Senate could reject the first and pass the second.

### at: raise inev

#### The debt ceiling will be raised now – but a strong Obama is critical to dismiss GOP riders

Taylor 9/18/13 (Andrew, Associated Press Staff Writer, "House GOP Plans To Link Debt Limit Increase To Its Own Wish List")

House GOP leaders Wednesday announced that they will move quickly to raise the government's borrowing cap by attaching a wish list of GOP priorities like blocking "Obamacare," forcing construction of the Keystone XL pipeline and setting the stage for reforming the loophole-cluttered tax code.¶ They also, as expected, promised tea party lawmakers a chance to first use a routine temporary government funding bill to try to muscle the Democratic-controlled Senate into derailing President Barack Obama's health care law.¶ "That fight will continue as we negotiate the debt limit with the president and the Senate," said House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, R-Va.¶ Obama said again that he won't knuckle under to the GOP's demands¶ The GOP strategy appears to assume that the Senate will strip out the "defund 'Obamacare'" provision and send it back. The House would then face a choice: pass the measure without the health care provision or continue the battle and risk a partial government shutdown when the new budget year begins Oct. 1.¶ Speaking to CEOs of the Business Roundtable Wednesday, Obama called on the corporate leaders to use their influence to avoid a potentially damaging showdown over the debt ceiling. He reiterated his promise to not negotiate over the need to raise the nation's borrowing limit, which the government is expected to hit as early as next month.¶ He blamed "a faction" of the Republican Party for budget brinkmanship designed to undo his three-year-old health care law.¶ "You have never seen in the history of the United States the debt ceiling or the threat of not raising the debt ceiling being used to extort a president or a governing party and trying to force issues that have nothing to do with the budget and have nothing to do with the debt," Obama said.¶ "So I'm happy to negotiate with them around the budget, just as I've done in the past," he added. "What I will not do is to create a habit, a pattern, whereby the full faith and credit of the United States ends up being a bargaining chip to set policy. It's irresponsible. The last time we did this, in 2011, we had negative growth at a time when the recovery was just trying to take off."¶ GOP leaders telegraphed that they would likely concede to the Senate's demand for a stopgap spending bill shorn of the Obamacare provision -- but that they would carry on with the fight on legislation to increase the government's borrowing cap.

#### A lift is not inevitable – recent meetings prove that there are credible threats in the Republican party

Shiner 9/18/13 (Meredith, Roll Call, "Democratic Senators Say They're More Worried Than Ever About a Default")

Democratic senators said they left a Wednesday meeting with Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew more concerned about the likelihood of government default as a result of Congress failing to lift the debt ceiling than they were even during the brutal fight on the issue back in 2011.¶ Members of the Senate Finance Committee huddled with Lew to discuss the imminent deadline to extend the government’s borrowing capacity. Treasury has projected that the U.S. will hit the debt limit by mid-October.¶ “I’m more worried about default than I’ve ever been,” Sen. Charles E. Schumer, D-N.Y., told reporters at a news conference to discuss the economic costs of brinksmanship on the debt limit.¶ “I came out of that meeting, as Chuck just said, a lot more concerned about the debt limit than I was going into that meeting. I wish I could have been encouraged coming out of that, but I was discouraged coming about of that,” Sen. Bob Casey, D-Pa., said. “You have people in the Republican Party in both Houses who — very rational conservatives — [are] talking about this in ways that I’ve never heard before. And if all you care about, you’re a Republican official and all you care about is fiscal responsibility, making the right choices from a fiscal point of view … this is among the most fiscally reckless and dangerous things you can do. But it seems even on something as fundamental as paying our debts and not going into default … [the GOP] cannot take on the extremes [of their party].”

#### Both parties are more likely to resort to brinkmanship

CNN Money 9/12/13 (Jeanne Sahadi, "Pessimism Deepends Over Budget Standoff"

Funding the government and raising the country's legal borrowing limit, of course, are among the legislature's most basic functions.¶ And yet, in recent years, both efforts have been stymied by political demands and brinksmanship.¶ "It's extraordinary how dysfunctional our system has become and how casually we accept it," said Rudolph Penner, a former director of the Congressional Budget Office speaking at the same National Journal event.¶ West and others who joined Greenstein, Hoagland and Penner think a short-term funding bill is likely to get through. But beyond that is anyone's guess.¶ Republican Sen. Orrin Hatch, a keynote speaker at the event, was asked whether he thought there was a chance for a Christmastime crisis. "It's very possible," he said.  UQ – AT: Inevitable

### at: syria

#### It won’t derail debt ceiling

Drum 9/17, Kevin, writer for mother jones, “Syria Is a Very Minor Blip in the Course of US Foreign Policy,” 9/17, <http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/09/syria-minor-blip-obama-foreign-policy>

I don't think anyone is really much interested in yet another tedious thumbsucker about What Syria Means, but the tone of the commentary over the past few days has simply gotten insane. I know I'll get laughed at for writing a typical Kevin Drum post that tells everyone to calm down a bit, but for God's sake. Can we all calm down a bit? Some quick bullet points: Yes, Obama's handling of Syria was initially pretty fubared. He didn't understand how much support he could count on for air strikes; he was taken by surprise over the intensity of the opposition; and he ended up hurting his own cause with some pretty silly statements. At the same time, can we talk? The question of whether to bomb Syria for a few days is pretty trivial as these things go. This is no Iraq and it's no Vietnam. Hell, it's not even a Suez crisis. American credibility has barely been scratched. Our foreign policy is intact; the rest of the world is pretty clear on what it is; and our reluctance to engage in military action one time out of dozens of opportunities simply doesn't change anyone's view of American power. If a congressional repudiation of a president happened over and over, that would change some views. But once? Please. Obama's leadership chops have likewise barely been scratched. They were pretty low to begin with, and Syria hasn't changed that much. And while we're talking about that: being willing to change course isn't a sign of vacillation or weakness. It's simply nuts to think this. The Russian proposal for UN inspections represented a pretty good opportunity to salvage a decent outcome from the congressional mutiny; it was a chance to nudge Vladimir Putin in a constructive direction; and it doesn't preclude future military action in any way. Only someone with near-clinical insecurity issues would reject this opportunity simply because it represented a change of course. Nor is the latest round of diplomacy a triumph for Putin or Bashar al-Assad or Iran. Russia continues to be yoked to a crumbling pariah regime; Syria actually is a crumbling pariah regime; and Iran has gotten nothing out of this. See Dan Drezner for more straight talk on this score. Syria will have precisely zero effect on domestic fights over the budget and the debt ceiling. The whole idea is preposterous, and I think everyone knows it. The Republican gridlock freight train has been on track for months and it hasn't budged an inch since spring. Syria hasn't had the slightest impact on this. As Anthony Weiner would say, chillax, people. This whole affair is a pretty minor foreign policy barnacle, and its long-term effect on both American power and Obama's ability to get things done is tiny. How about if we all tone down the apocalyptic language?

### at: democrat infighting

#### Dems are unified now -

Allen 9/19/13 (Jonathan, POLITICO, "GOP Battles Boost President Obama")

They risk getting caught up in a blame game if there’s a shutdown and they vote against a GOP-written bill that would extend government funding while blocking Obamacare funds. Even without the Obamacare provision — which could, conceivably, be stripped out by the Senate — many of them don’t want to lock in current spending levels because they say the sequestration deal struck at the end of a similar showdown in August 2011 has robbed their communities of needed funding. That makes it hard to swallow a so-called clean extension of government funding for a few months.¶ Democratic Rep. Gerry Connolly, who represents thousands of government workers and contractors in northern Virginia, is against both a shutdown and the maintenance of current spending levels. He would vote for a clean CR to keep the government funded rather than letting it shut down but would prefer to see the president strike a deal that increases funding for some priorities. In any event, he said, he won’t vote for legislation that defunds Obamacare — like the version of the CR that the House is set to vote on Friday.¶ But Connolly and other Democrats seem willing to follow Obama, who is vowing not to cut Obamacare or negotiate over whether to raise the debt limit next month, all without getting into the details of a possible deal. At least for now.¶ “He has not really given much away,” Connolly said. “I think his Sphinx-like position with respect to the Republicans makes it harder for them to exact unacceptable concessions, and therefore it’s probably a wise posture at this time.”

### link debate

#### The GOP Will spin the plan as soft on terror – that’ll cause congressional backlash

Voorhees 5/23/13 (Josh, Editor of Slatest Magazine, Former Greenwire and Politico Reporter, "Slatest PM: GOP Senator Says Obama's Speech Will "Be Viewed by the Terrorists As a Victory")

No Love From the Right: [Washington Post](http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-outlines-new-rules-for-drones/2013/05/23/1b5918e6-c3cb-11e2-914f-a7aba60512a7_story.html?hpid=z1): "Obama’s speech drew a quick response from Republicans, who have accused the president of downplaying the threat of terrorism. 'The president’s speech today will be viewed by terrorists as a victory,' said Sen. Saxby Chambliss (Ga.), the ranking Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee. 'Rather than continuing successful counterterrorism activities, we are changing course with no clear operational benefit.' Chambliss was also critical of Obama’s plans to try to close Guantanamo, signaling the obstacles that the president will face in Congress."

#### Republicans hate the plan – they’ll spin it as soft on terror

Banerjee 5/26/13 (Neela, LA Times DC Energy and Environment Correspondent, McClatchy Newspapers, The State Newspaper, "Republicans Criticize Obama's shift on Drone Use")

WASHINGTON, DC — Republicans criticized President Barack Obama on Sunday for what they described as a retreat in the war against terrorism when they said the world’s crises demand a more aggressive, vigilant United States.¶ In a speech Thursday at the National Defense University in Washington, Obama said he would narrow the use of drone attacks against suspected terrorists and seek to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.¶ Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-SC, who serves on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said on “Fox News Sunday” that he had “never been more worried about national security” and called the president “tone deaf” on the issue.¶ “I see a big difference between the president saying the war’s at an end and whether or not you’ve won the war,” said Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla. “We have still tremendous threats out there, that are building – not declining, building – and to not recognize that, I think, is dangerous in the long run and dangerous for the world.”¶ Democrats such as Sen. Charles Schumer of New York defended the President’s anti-terrorism policy, contending that the revised approach would address concerns about the lack of transparency in the deployment of drones without sacrificing security.

#### Debates about drones cost capital – they cause massive fracturing in the GOP

Rothman 3/7/13 (Noah, Editor at Mediaite, "Lindsey Graham Slams Rand Paul, GOP'ers Cheering Him: Paul's Position On Drones Not a 'Republican View')

Joining Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) objection to Sen. Rand Paul’s (R-KY) filibuster of President Barack Obama’s nominee to become the next CIA director, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) slammed Paul and the members of his party who cheered his filibuster. Graham said that Paul’s position on drones is not a “Republican view,” and he is “disappointed” in his fellow Republicans for supporting Paul’s opposition towards Obama administration’s drone policy. ¶ “To my Republican colleagues, I don’t remember any of you coming down here suggesting that President [George W.] Bush was going to kill anybody with a drone,” Graham said. He added that even Democrats never accused Bush of wanting to assassinate Americans with a drone.¶ “What is it, all of the sudden, that this drone program has gotten every Republican all spun up?” Graham asked. He said that many are “astonished” that Obama has continued President Bush’s war on terror. “I’m not astonished, I congratulate him for having the good judgment to understand we’re at war,” Graham added.¶ “To my party, I’m a bit disappointed that you no longer apparently think we’re at war,” he observed. “Not Senator Paul, he’s a man to himself. He has a view that I don’t think is a Republican view – I think it’s a legitimately held libertarian view.”¶

### at: compart

#### GOP disunity now makes obama’s agenda fine

Allen 9/19/13 (Jonathan, POLITICO, "GOP Battles Boost President Obama")

There’s a simple reason President Barack Obama is using his bully pulpit to focus the nation’s attention on the battle over the budget: In this fight, he’s watching Republicans take swings at each other.¶ And that GOP fight is a lifeline for an administration that had been scrambling to gain control its message after battling congressional Democrats on the potential use of military force in Syria and the possible nomination of Larry Summers to run the Federal Reserve.¶ If House Republicans and Obama can’t cut even a short-term deal for a continuing resolution, the government’s authority to spend money will run out on Oct. 1. Within weeks, the nation will default on its debt if an agreement isn’t reached to raise the federal debt limit.¶ ([PHOTOS: 25 unforgettable Obamacare quotes](http://href.li/?http://www.politico.com/gallery/2013/07/25-unforgettable-obamacare-quotes/001172-016561.html))¶ For some Republicans, those deadlines represent a leverage point that can be used to force Obama to slash his health care law. For others, they’re a zero hour at which the party will implode if it doesn’t cut a deal.¶ Meanwhile, “on the looming fiscal issues, Democrats — both liberal and conservative, executive and congressional — are virtually 100 percent united,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.).¶ Just a few days ago, all that Obama and his aides could talk about were Syria and Summers. Now, they’re bringing their party together and shining a white hot light on Republican disunity over whether to shut down the government and plunge the nation into default in a vain effort to stop Obamacare from going into effect.

#### Political capital is key to get a compromise on the debt ceiling

Capehart 9/16/13 (Jonathan, Post Partisan, The Washington Post, "Obamacare, The Debt Ceiling and GOP Instanity")

Now, here’s the scary part. The venerable Bipartisan Policy Center estimates that the Treasury will run out of that $50 billion sometime between Oct. 18 and Nov. 5. That’s the [“X date.”](http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/staff-paper/debt-limit) If we reach that point, all hell will break loose. The president would be in the [politically perilous position](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2013/09/10/on-the-road-to-default/) of choosing who gets paid on time and who doesn’t.¶ “It’s time for the president’s party to show the courage to work with us to solve this problem,” Boehner told reporters on Thursday. It is long past time for the speaker to show the courage to stand up to the [crazy](http://maddowblog.msnbc.com/_news/2013/09/13/20477384-congress-on-crazy-pills) wing of his own party. Destroying the full faith and credit of the United States while on a fool’s errand to defund Obamacare, the president’s signature legislative achievement, which was upheld by the Supreme Court, is not leadership. It’s surrender.

#### It’s empirical – Obama’s use of the bully pulpit flipped the 2011 debt debates

Sargent 9/13/13 (Greg, The Washington Post, "The Morning Plu: Delusions and Lies About Obamacare Come Back to Haunt GOP Leaders")

Of course, public opinion always tilts against the debt limit — that didn’t stop Republicans from caving on it earlier this year — and as the [NBC write-up](http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/09/13/.UjL___5RkKc.twitter) notes, Obama has the bully-pulpit, which ultimately flipped opinion on it last time. But for conservatives looking for ways to rally the shock troops for the coming confrontation, this poll could boost their case that the GOP must hold firm in its demand to block or delay Obamacare, probably in the debt ceiling fight, where GOP leaders say they will make their stand against the law. Some are already [pointing to it](https://twitter.com/conncarroll/status/378490225816649729) as proof of leverage.

### at: econ d

#### Economic decline causes protectionism and war – their defense doesn’t assume accompanying shifts in global power

Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of extern conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crisis could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of **miscalculation** (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavious of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations, However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. **Crisis could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations** either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflict self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. P. 89) Economic decline has been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increase incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states

, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlated economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crisis and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.